This thesis applies the 'government from the centre' thesis, as put forth by Donald Savoie in his book Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics, to the creation of foreign policy during the Chretien government. Savoie argues that the centre of Canadian government, meaning the Prime Minister and his advisors, dominated government policy and have forced other bodies, formerly involved in policy creation, into an advisory role. The thesis starts with an examination of the central theory as well as the views of its opponents; followed by a brief history of the department and its relation to the centre of government over the years. This is followed in chapters two and three by a study of Chretien himself as well as an examination of other actors in the foreign policy process. By determining the roles of each individual, and how much power each carried to formulate and initiate policy, the 'government from the centre' model is tested. Finally, the international landmine ban created during the late 1990's is used as a case study to show exactly how the centre dominated foreign policy creation when Chretien was Prime Minister. This case initially suggests that the Foreign Affairs Minister is the dominant player in foreign policy creation. Upon further study however, it is determined that the centre controlled the process. 'Governing from the centre' is alive and well in Canadian politics, and is the rule rather than the exception in foreign policy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

On July 21, 1954, Canada was asked to assume, with Poland and India, the supervision of the Cease Fire Agreements (CFA) in what had been French Indochina. The CFA marked the end of French rule in Indochina, a rule that had never been unquestioned, and that, since December of 1946, had involved France in a bitter and costly war. At the end of 1953 a series of events led to a decision to seek a negotiated peace in Indochina. After eight years of fighting that had drained away manpower and resources, France had lost control of large areas of Vietnam. The death of Stalin in Russia brought new leaders to power who were anxious to secure a lessening of international tensions so that they could turn their attention to improving the lot of the average Russian. The Chinese were about to embark on their first Five Year Plan, and wished to be free of the heavy burden that supplying the Vietminh war machine entailed. The Vietminh and the Americans, on the other hand, seem to have come to the conference table only on the insistence of their allies. The Vietminh considered that final victory was within their grasp and did not wish to stop short of their objective - control over the whole of Vietnam. The new Republican administration in the U.S. was committed to "rolling back" Communism, and foresaw another victory for Communism in the proposed peace conference. Proceedings at the Geneva Conference soon showed the diversity and conflict of aims among the participants. The U.S. soon retired for all practical purposes from active participation, and for quite long periods there was not even an official head of the U.S. Delegation present in Geneva. The Laniel Government fell in France during the negotiations, and Laniel was replaced by Mendès France, largely on the strength of his promise to conclude a peace within thirty days. Britain and the USSR acted as co-chairmen of the Conference and were active in moving their allies closer together; they share the responsibility for the eventual successful outcome of the Conference. Of the differences that developed between the two sides at Geneva, the most significant was the difference of opinion over the composition of an International Control Commission (ICC) to supervise the Cease Fire. A compromise was finally reached on India, Poland and Canada. During the first two years of the Commission's existence it supervised the withdrawal and regroupment of forces provided for in the Geneva Agreement. Particularly in the evacuation of Haiphong and Hanoi the ICC was able to render valuable service. By the end of this two year period, however, the French Union Forces (FUF) had left Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese to continue to enforce the Cease Fire Agreement, and the RVN had of course refused to consider itself bound by the Agreements. The Diem Government refused to contemplate the holding of elections that would have re-unified the country and brought to an end the ICC's task in Vietnam. Of all the members of the ICC, it was India's foreign policy that most affected the decisions and the work of the Commission. Indian policy was non-aligned, and must even more importantly be clearly seen to be non-aligned. At the same time India had an almost instinctive dislike of Communism, a dislike that appeared in India's lukewarm support for anti-colonial struggles in Asia that were dominated by Communists. Although the Indian Delegation sided with the Poles more often than with the Canadians during the life of the Commission, on important decisions that affected the South's ability to maintain its security, India sided with the Canadians. After 1956, the Commission became increasingly ineffective. Its freedom to investigate was eroded, financial support was lacking, and eventually the increasing tempo of the war in Vietnam swept the ICC aside as largely irrelevant. The ICC is only one of many peacekeeping operations in which Canada has been involved. UN missions have tended to be popular within Canada, while service on the ICC has not been generally approved. In fact Canada has not been as neutral or as partisan as public opinion has assumed. Certain conditions tend to ineffectiveness in peacekeeping missions, and these conditions have been present in other missions as well as in the ICC. In recent years, Canada has been increasingly reluctant to take on peacekeeping duties where it is judged the chance for effective action has not been great. But Canada has not been involved in peacekeeping simply because it has suited her to be involved. In future dangerous and difficult situations the pressures on us to participate might well be too strong to resist. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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Canada has actively incorporated human security into its foreign policy framework ever since the first articulation of human security in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Annual Report. The Canadian Government has been at the forefront of promoting the concept internationally, thereby identifying Canada as one of the leading 'humanist-activist' states. This thesis, however, takes a more skeptical approach towards the emancipatory claims of Canada's human security discourse. It argues that, despite its overarching humanistic tone, the question of who is secured through the language and operationalization of human security remains problematic. In examining Canada's human security discourse in reference to this central question, this thesis analyses the promotion and operationalization of human security within Canada and abroad. The central argument of this thesis is that with its overwhelmingly statist and liberal language, Canada's interpretation of human security is far from being a challenge to the traditional ontological claims of security as being the provider of political order. The Canadian human security agenda is driven by a traditional fear of national insecurity. It aims to secure national unity and identity in Canada, and its national and economic security abroad, by promoting the ideals of liberal democratic peace. Drawing upon the insights of critical security studies and post-structuralist approaches to international relations, this thesis reveals several meaning-producing effects of Canada's human security discourse. First, domestically, it perpetuates the truth claims of the discourse of Canadian identity by naturalizing the idea of Canadian goodness. Canada's human security discourse enhances the social control of the population by masking 'human insecurities' within Canada. Second, by framing 'failed' and 'fragile' states as a threat to Canadian security and liberal international order, the Canadian Government perpetuates the constant struggle between the zones of peace and the zones of chaos, and overcodes human security with simultaneously a statist and universalist language that aims to control as well as emancipate the 'borderlands' Third, while Canadian discourse on human security claims to encourage a bottom-up approach to security, it works ironically as an elitist policy which endorses an ideal form of governance in Canada and abroad.