This thesis has two main purposes. The first is to trace those particular facets of the development of Canada from the British colony of 1867 to the modern nation-state of 1939 that have to do with the gradual growth of Canadian control over external affairs. The second is to bring together as much as possible of the vast body of writing that has appeared over the years on this part of Canadian development. All aspects of the growth of control over external affairs have been treated many times, often far more thoroughly than has been possible within the bounds of this study, but no one, within the knowledge of the writer, has attempted to make a single study of this vital portion of Canadian history. An extensive bibliography is included. The section entitled "General Works" is not intended to be anything more than a useful list of background reading. In the sections entitled "Primary Sources" and "Secondary—Specific" as far as possible everything available in the Library of the University of British Columbia with direct bearing on the problem is listed, with comments where it has seemed these would be helpful. Throughout the thesis it has been taken as fundamental that this development has been the result of the free urge to growth inherent in a vital democratic society. The point of view has been taken that once Canada was conceded responsible government, the development of full Canadian control over all matters, both internal and external, was bound to follow, and that no schemes, such as Imperial Federation, for keeping Canada permanently in a position subordinate to Great Britain could have succeeded. Throughout, those attitudes, not only in Canada and Britain, but also in the rest of the world, that have encouraged or discouraged this development, have been discussed. This is done in particular detail in the first chapter, which describes the extent of Canadian control over external affairs at Confederation, and the attitudes towards the future of the new Dominion then prevalent in Britain and Canada. The first area in which Canada achieved full control over her external relationships was in commercial matters. The second chapter covers this, from the first inclusion of a Canadian to assist a British plenipotentiary to the final achievement of the Halibut Treaty, signed by the Canadian negotiator alone. To control her external relations, it was necessary for Canada to control her own defence. This is covered in chapter three. In chapter four are discussed the developments of status and the first real international recognition of that status achieved during World War I and at the Peace Conferences. Through the part she played in the League, Canada gained further international recognition of her new status, as described in chapter five. Chapters six and seven cover the development of machinery adequate for growing Canadian control over external affairs, both at Ottawa, in the Department of External Affairs, and in representation abroad, culminating in the right of legation. The final two chapters trace the changing position of Canada in the Empire-Commonwealth. During the period to 1922, the tendency towards centralization of foreign policy appeared dominant, but always it was faced with the growing strength of Canadian nationalism. In the period 1922-1939, full control over external affairs was achieved and it was recognized that Canada was bound by no international obligations that she had not assumed by her own act. Even the final control over war and peace was achieved. Finally, a brief attempt is made to evaluate this development in the light of the attitudes that produced it and of the place of Canada in the modern world. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

In 1919 Canada became a member of the League of Nations. In so doing she accepted the obligation to support the maintenance of peace by the collective measures defined in the League Covenant. This included the preservation of the territorial integrity and political independence of every League member against external aggression by the application of financial, economic and, if necessary, military measures. These sanctions were outlined in Article 10 and Article 16 of the Covenant. Canada accepted these obligations with mixed feelings. Some elements in the Dominion opposed from the beginning the assumption of any external obligations. Others considered the enhancement of the nation's international status as outweighing the burden of sanctions. Very few were of the opinion that it was to Canada's advantage to play an active role in the League and do all in her power to preserve peace by joining in collective measures against an aggressor. As time passed both government policy and public opinion became more hostile towards Canadian commitments to the League. From the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to the Fourth Assembly in 1922 Conservatives and Liberals alike attempted to remove or dilute the irksome obligations. Canada initiated an attack on Article 10 and supported the movement for the weakening of Article 16. The effect on Canada of the abstention of the United States was immediate and profound. The period between the wars was marked by an ever increasing intimacy in the relations between the two states. Every Canadian government closely watched the prevailing attitude in the United States and supported any action by the League which might facilitate the entry of the United States. In addition, Canada's position on the continent of North America was used as an excuse for a negative role in the League. The government of Canada refused to accept the draft treaties or the Geneva Protocol for it was believed that these schemes increased the obligation to participate in collective measures. The Pact of Paris, on the other hand, was accepted with some enthusiasm. It contained no specific obligations and was endorsed by the United States. The economic depression, the failure of collective security and the breakdown of the League of Nations, and the rise of armed dictatorships increased the isolationist sentiment in Canada. By the end of 1935 the great majority of Canadians were inclined to favor a North American policy of aloofness towards Europe and the League. Their natural sympathies lay with the isolationism of the United States. Throughout the period from 1919 to 1926, from the birth to the death of the League of Nations, Canada's policy towards League sanctions was one of negation. This policy was subscribed to by every Canadian government and was supported by the Canadian people. This paper surveys the more prominent features and outstanding incidents of Canadian policy and opinion with regard to League sanctions. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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The subject of this dissertation is the impact of Canada's position within the international capitalist system on foreign policy as manifested towards Korea from 1947 to 1955. Canada is characterized as an "advanced dependent-developed" country, exhibiting both "dependent" and "independent" directions in its economic development. The dissertation argues that a similar combination could be distinguished in foreign policy. A scale is elaborated identifying four hypothetical categorizations of policy: Independent; Limited-Independent; Active-Dependent; and, Dependent; and the scale is applied to critical points in Canada-Korea relations. The dissertation concludes that "Active-Dependence" is the most consistent conceptualization of Canadian policy and that the movement in this direction involved the gradual erosion of Canadian independence. This is directly related to the development of "continental economic integration" and Canadian "advanced dependent-developed" status.

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This thesis applies the 'government from the centre' thesis, as put forth by Donald Savoie in his book Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics, to the creation of foreign policy during the Chretien government. Savoie argues that the centre of Canadian government, meaning the Prime Minister and his advisors, dominated government policy and have forced other bodies, formerly involved in policy creation, into an advisory role. The thesis starts with an examination of the central theory as well as the views of its opponents; followed by a brief history of the department and its relation to the centre of government over the years. This is followed in chapters two and three by a study of Chretien himself as well as an examination of other actors in the foreign policy process. By determining the roles of each individual, and how much power each carried to formulate and initiate policy, the 'government from the centre' model is tested. Finally, the international landmine ban created during the late 1990's is used as a case study to show exactly how the centre dominated foreign policy creation when Chretien was Prime Minister. This case initially suggests that the Foreign Affairs Minister is the dominant player in foreign policy creation. Upon further study however, it is determined that the centre controlled the process. 'Governing from the centre' is alive and well in Canadian politics, and is the rule rather than the exception in foreign policy.

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Although Great Powers are often thought to be the most influential actors in terms of international arms control efforts, during the 1990s Canada showed itself capable of successfully leading several arms control initiatives. This research sets out to (a) explain why Canada has been able to enjoy these successes while other recent Canadian arms control leadership efforts have failed, and (b) further the abstract thinking around Canadian foreign policy. This is done by introducing the Identity Management model of arms control to explain the process by which Canadian arms control processes succeed or fail, and testing it against four post-Cold War Canadian-led initiatives: the Open Skies initiative, the landmines initiative, the MOX fuel initiative, and the small arms initiative. / Within the Identity Management model, Canada is classified as an Activist State, a categorisation that rejects and improves upon the popular, yet heavily flawed, Middle Power concept. Blending together critical insights from realism and constructivism, the Identity Management model focuses on the foreign policy preferences of states, distinguishing between the preferences of Great Powers, such as the United States, and the preferences of Activist States. The foreign policy preferences of Activist States are designed and promoted by important elite domestic actors, and expressed as the country's chosen identity on a given arms control issue. The Identity Management model thus postulates that while states such as Canada can express independent policy initiatives, these identities are offered up into the international system, the character of which is defined by the foreign policy preferences of Great Powers. Overall, the Identity Management model establishes that Canadian arms control initiatives are successful only when Canada's chosen identity accurately reflects the constantly changing character of the international system.