This thesis seeks to determine the nature and character of Canada's foreign policy towards Vietnam. / Dependent upon Southeast Asian stability for strategic resources, a merchandise surplus and the expansion of the American economy, Canada also benefitted directly through increased exports of staple goods, automotive parts and war material. / Ottawa's record on the International Control Commissions was characterized by partisan voting, complicity in the violation of the Geneva and Paris Agreements and the rationalization of Washington's strategy. / Canadian aid, dispensed only to Saigon, was a co-ordinated part of American pacification programs. / The purpose of Ottawa's policy was to ensure the permanent division of Vietnam while the ultimate intention and consequence was to legitimate the U.S. intervention. Underlying Ottawa's decision-making was Canada's integration into the world market system and the unequal, albeit voluntary, alliance between the economic elites of Canada and the United States.

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This paper will rather seek to uncover and emphasize Cold War imperatives that served as significant guiding factors in shaping the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis. The success of Canadian diplomacy in the 1956 Suez Crisis was in the ability of Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and his Canadian colleagues to protect Western interests in the context of the Cold War. Suez threatened Anglo-American unity, and the future of the North Atlantic alliance. It also presented the Soviets an opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force ensured that Britain and France had a means to extricate themselves from the Crisis. Canada wished to further protect Western credibility in the eyes of the non-white Commonwealth and Afro-Asian bloc. It was, therefore, important to focus international attention on Soviet aggression in Hungary, and not Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

My dissertation focuses on the rise and spread of Aboriginal mobilization in Canada between 1951 and 2000. Using social movement and social-political theories, it questions the relationship between contentious actions and formal organizational growth comparing among social movement and political sociological perspectives. In most accounts, contentious action is assumed to be influenced by organization, political opportunity and identity. Few scholars, however, have examined the reverse relationships, namely the effect of contentious action on each of these. Drawing upon time-series data and qualitative interviews with Aboriginal leaders and representatives of organizations, I found that critical events surrounding moments of federal state building prompted contentious action, which then sparked mobilization among Aboriginal communities. I argue that three events: the 1969 White paper, the 1982 patriation of the Constitution, and the 1990 'Indian Summer' led to mass mobilization and the semblance of an emerging PanAboriginal identity. This finding returns to older collective behaviour perspectives, which note that organizations, opportunities, and identities are driven by triggering actions and shared experiences that produce emerging norms. Nevertheless, in the case of Canadian Aboriginal mobilization, unlike that of Indigenous movements in other countries, building a movement on triggering actions led to mass mobilization but was not sustainable because of a saturation of efficacy. As a result, Aboriginal mobilization in Canada has been characterized by divergent interests and unsustained contention.

This thesis is part of a more extended study of the life of John Neilson which I hope to complete later for the degree of Ph.D. It is restricted to the period 1818-182 8 and deals with Neilson1s activities in the Assembly of Lower Canada and his representations in England in 1822, on the matter of the Union Bill, and in 1828 before the Canada Committee. Its scope has been further limited to those issues arising out of the constitution, organization and functioning of the government. This involves the question of administration and the struggle between Assembly and Executive for its control, as well as relations with the mother country and with Upper Canada. The closely related fields of law, land settlement and education have not been included. The object has been to bring out Neilson1s views on these questions in the belief that they contribute to an understanding of the period. / fr

For much of the last twenty years, political leaders and academics have assumed that the survival of Canada depends on constitutional reform, and never more so than in the wake of the 1995 Quebec referendum. This thesis updates the literature by explaining the remarkable story of the last several years: the achievement of a national unity peace in the absence of constitutional reform. The explanation centres on the post-referendum shift in federal strategy from constitutional reform to Plan B, a strategy based on the rules of secession that has its origins, it is argued, in the Reform Party's response to Mulroneyera constitutional reform. The thesis concludes that Plan B was a successful national unity strategy because it made secession seem risky and undesirable, but also because the strategy - unlike constitutional reform - was based on widespread national support and on the viability of the constitutional status quo.

During the twentieth century, as Canadian voters began to associate the brand of their major political parties with the characteristics of their leaders, the Liberal Party of Canada’s leadership races evolved into events of national importance. This study examines this transformation through the 1948, 1958 and 1968 leadership conventions. It incorporates perspectives from inside the Liberal Party as well as the Canadian media’s portrayals of the conventions. This thesis explores the alternating pattern of anglophone and francophone Party leaders, the complications associated with the predictability of the outcome, the evolution of convention tactics to recruit delegate support, Party (dis)unity throughout the contests, and the political science theories that deconstruct the conventions and predict outcomes. It also details how, over time, the political ambitions of senior-ranking members trumped the interests the Liberal Party.

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