This study examines the foreign policy views of the Canadian thinker, George Grant. It focuses on the years between Mackenzie King’s re-election in 1935 and the Liberal party’s return to power under Lester Pearson in 1963. During this period, Grant argued, Canada was transformed from a British dependent to a satellite of the United States, a process that he believed had been accelerated by the continentalist economic and security policies of successive Liberal governments. As a young man during World War II, Grant admired the United States of F. D. Roosevelt. But as he began to contemplate the threat that a postwar Pax Americana posed to the societies of the Old World, and, ultimately, to Canada, his misgivings grew. His attempts to understand the emerging order led him to a critical study of modern liberalism, which he believed provided the chief philosophical justification for America’s expansion. Unlike Marxists who saw liberalism as simply an ideology of individual greed, Grant claimed that it succeeded largely by appealing to our hopes for social progress. These hopes found their loftiest expression in the belief that liberalism’s internationalization would produce the conditions for the overcoming of war within and between nations. Grant feared that this ideal could only be achieved through the annihilation of all real cultural diversity—the realization of what he called the universal and homogeneous state. One of his unique claims was that the Liberal policy of rapprochement with the United States after 1935 signaled the growing dominance of this ideal within Canada. This dominance was fed during the Cold War by “realists” like Pearson who decried the utopianism of communism, while failing to reckon with the utopian aspirations of his own society. Fearful of Marxist one-worldism, Pearson committed himself to a single-minded defence of a liberal order that tended to produce even greater homogeneity around the world. Grant’s own practical aim in writing about foreign policy, I argue, was neither to defend liberalism against its “utopian” critics, nor to reject it for an alternative like Marxism, but to highlight the utopian aspirations of liberal society, and thereby subject it to the moderating influence of doubt.

This study examines the foreign policy views of the Canadian thinker, George Grant. It focuses on the years between Mackenzie King’s re-election in 1935 and the Liberal party’s return to power under Lester Pearson in 1963. During this period, Grant argued, Canada was transformed from a British dependent to a satellite of the United States, a process that he believed had been accelerated by the continentalist economic and security policies of successive Liberal governments. As a young man during World War II, Grant admired the United States of F. D. Roosevelt. But as he began to contemplate the threat that a postwar Pax Americana posed to the societies of the Old World, and, ultimately, to Canada, his misgivings grew. His attempts to understand the emerging order led him to a critical study of modern liberalism, which he believed provided the chief philosophical justification for America’s expansion. Unlike Marxists who saw liberalism as simply an ideology of individual greed, Grant claimed that it succeeded largely by appealing to our hopes for social progress. These hopes found their loftiest expression in the belief that liberalism’s internationalization would produce the conditions for the overcoming of war within and between nations. Grant feared that this ideal could only be achieved through the annihilation of all real cultural diversity—the realization of what he called the universal and homogeneous state. One of his unique claims was that the Liberal policy of rapprochement with the United States after 1935 signaled the growing dominance of this ideal within Canada. This dominance was fed during the Cold War by “realists” like Pearson who decried the utopianism of communism, while failing to reckon with the utopian aspirations of his own society. Fearful of Marxist one-worldism, Pearson committed himself to a single-minded defence of a liberal order that tended to produce even greater homogeneity around the world. Grant’s own practical aim in writing about foreign policy, I argue, was neither to defend liberalism against its “utopian” critics, nor to reject it for an alternative like Marxism, but to highlight the utopian aspirations of liberal society, and thereby subject it to the moderating influence of doubt.

This thesis asks a simple question: what is the state of Canada’s sanctions practice since 1990? In a post-Cold War environment, sanctions have become one of the most commonly applied tools of statecraft. Sanctions are commonly applied to address all manner of crises be they interstate aggression, intrastate humanitarian crises, civil wars, illegal seizures of power, arms proliferation, and international terrorism. There has been no sustained analysis of Canada’s use of sanctions since Kim Richard Nossal’s book Rain Dancing, which only investigated Canada’s application of sanctions in comparison to Australia’s until 1990. Therefore, there is a significant gap in the general sanctions literature and, more worrisome, Canada’s foreign policy literature. This thesis conducts an investigation into Canada’s use of sanctions since 1990 to establish when, why and with whom Canada has applied economic sanctions. / October 2015

Since the end of World War II, through the mandates of Prime Ministers Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper, the Canadian government has found itself in conflict with the US Administration over the question of Arctic sovereignty. This situation is particularly difficult because of the power imbalance between the two countries. Thus, how Canada deals with the US is critical.<p> John Kirton identifies five ways in which Canada manages its differences with the US on foreign policy issues. The first is the process of ad hoc adjustment and problem-solving on individual issues. A second way is by pursuing solutions that achieve integration and cooperation. The third strategy consists of building defences and taking initiatives to reduce Canadas vulnerability to the US. The fourth strategy involves the deliberate influencing of the US domestic policy process in order to create policy that is more advantageous to Canadians.<p> In the fifth strategy, Canada aligns itself with others in the international community, building coalitions that can match the power and strength of the US; but more importantly, it establishes a place for Canada to lead the discussion and pursue its own interests. John Holmes believed that Canadian foreign policy was best served by multilateralism, as Canada often found it difficult to further its own interests within a bilateral framework. Kirton takes Holmes argument one step further by observing that by playing a leadership role in the multilateral arena on specific issues, Canada can help find global solutions that advance Canadian interests.<p> This thesis uses Kirtons analytical framework to examine the strategies that Canada has employed in dealing with conflicts with the US over the Arctic. It examines the Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin and Harper governments and finds a common thread in their approaches. While showing that each one adopted a number of the strategies identified by Kirton, the thesis draws particular attention to their common utilization of the fifth strategy of working with others to reshape the international or global communitys perspective on Arctic issues in the pursuit of Canadian interests.

Since the end of World War II, through the mandates of Prime Ministers Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper, the Canadian government has found itself in conflict with the US Administration over the question of Arctic sovereignty. This situation is particularly difficult because of the power imbalance between the two countries. Thus, how Canada deals with the US is critical.<p> John Kirton identifies five ways in which Canada manages its differences with the US on foreign policy issues. The first is the process of ad hoc adjustment and problem-solving on individual issues. A second way is by pursuing solutions that achieve integration and cooperation. The third strategy consists of building defences and taking initiatives to reduce Canadas vulnerability to the US. The fourth strategy involves the deliberate influencing of the US domestic policy process in order to create policy that is more advantageous to Canadians.<p> In the fifth strategy, Canada aligns itself with others in the international community, building coalitions that can match the power and strength of the US; but more importantly, it establishes a place for Canada to lead the discussion and pursue its own interests. John Holmes believed that Canadian foreign policy was best served by multilateralism, as Canada often found it difficult to further its own interests within a bilateral framework. Kirton takes Holmes argument one step further by observing that by playing a leadership role in the multilateral arena on specific issues, Canada can help find global solutions that advance Canadian interests.<p> This thesis uses Kirtons analytical framework to examine the strategies that Canada has employed in dealing with conflicts with the US over the Arctic. It examines the Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin and Harper governments and finds a common thread in their approaches. While showing that each one adopted a number of the strategies identified by Kirton, the thesis draws particular attention to their common utilization of the fifth strategy of working with others to reshape the international or global communitys perspective on Arctic issues in the pursuit of Canadian interests.

This thesis continues the discussion of the role of interests and values as determinants of Canadian foreign policy by examining closely their treatment in the Martin governments 2005 foreign policy statement, <i>A Role of Pride and Influence in the World</i> (RPIW). The purpose of the thesis is to capture the expression and interplay of interests and values within RPIW vis-à-vis past foreign policy expressions. It begins by presenting a literature review of selected works by Denis Stairs, Jennifer Welsh, Kim Richard Nossal and Cranford Pratt, which will reveal the state of the discourse on the role of interests and values in Canadian foreign policy. It proceeds with a textual analysis of RPIW: Overview, comparing its structure and content to those which appear in <i>Canada in the World</i> (1995), <i>Competitiveness and Security</i> (1985) and <i>Foreign Policy for Canadians</i> (1970).<p> This textual analysis ends with the conclusion that RPIW not only incorporates past criticisms by Denis Stairs and Kim Richard Nossal, but also seems to embrace the interests-driven, values-based orientation put forward by Jennifer Welsh in <i>At Home in the World</i>. However, as the thesis moves on to a comparison of RPIW: Overview and RPIW: Development, the thesis exposes the fact that in RPIW: Development, the interests-based, values-driven approach seems to have been abandoned in favour of policies, such as the section titled Good Governance, that use values as policy drivers in and of themselves. The thesis concludes that development, despite the Martin governments deliberate efforts in RPIW, appears to be a consistently altruistic, values-driven exercise. If aid effectiveness has any hope of being strengthened, it must be done under both an acknowledgement of the altruistic character of the development enterprise, as well as careful thought as to what the desired outcome of Canadian development policy ought to be.

The inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy is typically rationalized as corresponding to the fundamental Canadian value of respect for human rights; however, Canada’s limited appeals to human rights, couched in the rhetoric of values, altruism, and morality, have not produced a substantive policy that adequately considers or sufficiently protects human rights. Although human rights are generally considered subordinate to security, economic, and other national interests, this thesis will argue that these are mutually inclusive concepts that serve to support each other. By examining Canadian engagement in Afghanistan through the theoretical perspective of the English School solidarists, this thesis contends that Canada national interest can be realized through a commitment to a human rights foreign policy, thereby providing concrete justification for the inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. The objective of such an approach is to improve Canada’s ability to protect and promote international human rights, leaving little doubt in the minds of Canadian foreign policy-makers that there is undeniable value in a human rights foreign policy and that such a policy will produce national interest ends.

The inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy is typically rationalized as corresponding to the fundamental Canadian value of respect for human rights; however, Canada’s limited appeals to human rights, couched in the rhetoric of values, altruism, and morality, have not produced a substantive policy that adequately considers or sufficiently protects human rights. Although human rights are generally considered subordinate to security, economic, and other national interests, this thesis will argue that these are mutually inclusive concepts that serve to support each other. By examining Canadian engagement in Afghanistan through the theoretical perspective of the English School solidarists, this thesis contends that Canada national interest can be realized through a commitment to a human rights foreign policy, thereby providing concrete justification for the inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. The objective of such an approach is to improve Canada’s ability to protect and promote international human rights, leaving little doubt in the minds of Canadian foreign policy-makers that there is undeniable value in a human rights foreign policy and that such a policy will produce national interest ends.

This thesis continues the discussion of the role of interests and values as determinants of Canadian foreign policy by examining closely their treatment in the Martin governments 2005 foreign policy statement, <i>A Role of Pride and Influence in the World</i> (RPIW). The purpose of the thesis is to capture the expression and interplay of interests and values within RPIW vis-à-vis past foreign policy expressions. It begins by presenting a literature review of selected works by Denis Stairs, Jennifer Welsh, Kim Richard Nossal and Cranford Pratt, which will reveal the state of the discourse on the role of interests and values in Canadian foreign policy. It proceeds with a textual analysis of RPIW: Overview, comparing its structure and content to those which appear in <i>Canada in the World</i> (1995), <i>Competitiveness and Security</i> (1985) and <i>Foreign Policy for Canadians</i> (1970).<p> This textual analysis ends with the conclusion that RPIW not only incorporates past criticisms by Denis Stairs and Kim Richard Nossal, but also seems to embrace the interests-driven, values-based orientation put forward by Jennifer Welsh in <i>At Home in the World</i>. However, as the thesis moves on to a comparison of RPIW: Overview and RPIW: Development, the thesis exposes the fact that in RPIW: Development, the interests-based, values-driven approach seems to have been abandoned in favour of policies, such as the section titled Good Governance, that use values as policy drivers in and of themselves. The thesis concludes that development, despite the Martin governments deliberate efforts in RPIW, appears to be a consistently altruistic, values-driven exercise. If aid effectiveness has any hope of being strengthened, it must be done under both an acknowledgement of the altruistic character of the development enterprise, as well as careful thought as to what the desired outcome of Canadian development policy ought to be.

The end of the Cold War marks the beginning of the policy shift from strategic stability (the policy that guided U.S. and Soviet nuclear doctrine and acquisition strategies throughout the Cold War) to a new strategy privileging ballistic missile defence (BMD). Prior to this shift BMD programs were considered by both sides to be financially untenable, technologically unreliable, and dangerously destabilising and potentially catastrophic, primarily because they risked undermining the stability of a second strike capability and other stabilizing features of mutually assured destruction (MAD). I argue that this new environment is making missile defence a viable alternative to massive nuclear arsenals. In this new security environment Canada remains an anomaly. Canadian officials support NATO BMD programs but reject any bilateral and/or bi-national negotiations with Washington on continental BMD for North America. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that Canada, through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) agreement on early warning radars, is in fact part of missile defence.