This thesis addresses the potential for third parties to apply or make use of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to protect civilians caught in the midst of civil war. A case study is presented of El Salvador, where conflict in the 1970s and 1980s took the lives of an estimated 75,000 people and caused immense human suffering. Of particular interest is how organizations under the aegis of the Salvadoran Catholic Church provided data on human rights violations, gathered with credible precision, to the international community. The Canadian public responded to the situation in El Salvador in a markedly different way than the Canadian government, whose pronouncements were at first ill-informed and uncritically pro-American. The question thus arises: do counter-consensus or public-pressure groups exert any influence over a state’s foreign policy and, if so, does this phenomenon contribute to conflict resolution? While there is disagreement over the actual success that public groups and interested parties have over government decision-making, this thesis demonstrates that, in fact, the counter-consensus in Canada did have a discernable impact on foreign policy during the Salvadoran conflict. These actions have potential contributions to make to conflict resolution and the search for a negotiated end to civil strife, which in the case of El Salvador was generated in the first place not by an alleged international communist conspiracy but by crippling geographies of inequality. / Thesis (Master, Geography) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-26 11:52:47.301

This dissertation examines Canada’s nuclear export and non-proliferation policy. It demonstrates that contrary to the received wisdom on nuclear behaviour, Canada does not think ‘strategically’ in the nuclear field. I argue that while the decision-making of great powers may be straightforward in the nuclear field, non-great powers can afford to be more ambivalent and even less cautious. The focus of the dissertation is on Canada’s nuclear export decisions from the 1950s to the late 1970s. My contention is that middle powers, like Canada, are rarely influenced by military-strategic interests, but that they, nonetheless, act according to their own particular self-interests when determining whether or not to export nuclear materials and technology. In looking at Canada’s nuclear decision-making from its entry into the nuclear age until the late 1970s, the dissertation offers three findings. First, Canada does not make decisions that fit a military-strategic calculus. Second, Canada is often ambivalent in the nuclear field. I argue that Canada can afford to be ambivalent because constraints on its decision-making do not stem primarily from security concerns or existential threats but from beliefs as to what Canada should do and should be in global affairs. Finally, Canada’s nuclear export and non-proliferation policies have been defined primarily by its place – both real and imagined – in the world as a middle power. The argument rests on insights draw from liberal IR theory as well as domestic politics explanations of nuclear behaviour. My contention is that Canada’s decision-making has been influenced by domestically held beliefs and perceptions of its identity – that is, where Canada ranks on the figurative power spectrum and what values it professes in relation to other actors in the international system. My research thus makes a contribution to the literature on nuclear supply and on the broader literature on nuclear behaviour, more generally.

This dissertation assesses the historical engagement of Canadian state and society with the Palestine problem. Canada’s contemporary position on the pro-Israel edge of the spectrum of world politics raises questions about long-term patterns of change and continuity in Canadian politics concerning the Middle East. Liberal patriotic historical narration of Canadian foreign policy conventionally invokes what Lester B. Pearson referred to as ‘the broad and active internationalism’ with which Canadian officials approached the world in the years after World War II. Moderate voices within the contemporary Canadian mainstream typically counterpose this history to a narrow support for Israel that pits Canada against a majority of the world community. This dissertation argues that contemporary political opposition in Canada needs to find other historical precedents to build upon. The established liberal internationalist framing obscures the formative influence upon Canadian foreign policy of a racialized politics of empire. The development of Canadian politics within the framework of the British Empire, and the domestic structures of racial power that formally endured into the twentieth century, need to be taken into account if the historical evolution of Canadian external affairs policy on Palestine – as more generally – is to be understood. Historical and political analysis structured around the assertion of national innocence undercuts the kind of understanding of the past that can inform constructive engagement with the problems of the present. As against the pervasive theme of fair-minded Canadian innocence, this dissertation finds that the implication of both the Canadian government and Canadian civil society in the denial of Palestinian rights has deep historical roots. It is critical to look not only at the scope of internationalist tendencies within Canadian political history, but also at their exclusionist boundaries. In so doing, this study positions Canada within wider Western structures of support for Israel against Palestinian and neighbouring Arab societies.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a place where states can seek international status by campaigning for its ten elected seats. Beginning from this premise, in this dissertation I ask: how do states seek status through their competitions for seats on the UNSC? Drawing on the concerns of IR theorists as well as historians, this is a process-driven question. I am interested in the process of status-seeking, not simply status itself, and I am concerned with the ways that status-seeking has evolved from 1945 to the present in the lifetime of the UN. I understand status as membership in a club embedded in larger hierarchies and examine both the nature of the hierarchies and the responsibilities associated with that membership. Similarly, I take a relational view of status that is predicated on recognition and social closure. While the UN and the UNSC are embodiments of liberal internationalism, they are also embodiments of global and historical imperialism. This imperialism structures the hierarchy under which status-seeking occurs. Status, as membership, comes with shared expectations of behaviour, responsibility, practices, and resources. I argue that status-seeking thus requires relating to these expected behaviours, responsibilities, and practices. Thus, states conduct their campaigns in terms of articulating how they plan to use their status and contribute to the UNSC's (liberal) mandate. By speaking to these liberal responsibilities and the use of status, states are also articulating their relationships to global imperialism at different points in time through the process of status-seeking. In supporting this argument, I examine Canada's nine campaigns to the UNSC in 1946, 1947, 1957, 1966, 1976, 1988, 1998, 2010, and 2020. Using a combination of historical methods (interviews, archival work, policy document analysis), I use a genealogical lens to trace the process of status-seeking in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Ethnic interest organizations have not been considered a salience influence on foreign policy. Traditionally, democratic theory suggests foreign policy should be determined by the will of the general population, rather that the limited and segregated interests of minority groups. Specifically in Canadian foreign policy, ethnic groups have also had limited access to decision-makers because of increased centralization of Canadian foreign policy. In contrast, the literature on Canada-India relations suggests there is an important foreign policy impact by the large, economically progressive Indo-Canadian Diaspora which has actively attempted to improve relations between these states. This dissertation addresses this obvious contrast, showing how the community has overcome the challenges traditionally associated with ethnic groups and foreign policy. Centrally, the research finds that Indo-Canadians have been active and successful foreign policy participants, influencing implementation, perceptions-editing and direct foreign policy between the two countries. This is determined by two characteristics: first, the Harper government’s decision to actively improve economic relations with New Delhi has opened important cess points for the Indo-Canadian community. Give their intimate knowledge of India’s business and economic environment, the Diaspora has been involved in various overseas missions, consultations and networking between the Canadian government and various stakeholders. Second, ethnic group influence is determined by the community’s internal organization, including the composition of their membership, financial resources and political strategies. With these characteristics, the dissertation assesses three interest organizations: the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC), the Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC) and the Canada-India Foundation (CIF). By conducting a within-case analysis, it finds that each organization has a niche role within Canada-India relations – in Diaspora representation (ICCC), business and trade relations (C-IBC) and policy-related advocacy (CIF). Centrally, this dissertation speaks to the evolving relations between the state and society in Canadian foreign policy. It offers a challenge to earlier work in this field, resulting in theoretical, methodological and policy-oriented advancement of a nascent body of literature, suggesting avenues for further investigation.

En 2007, le premier ministre Stephen Harper a annoncé que le renouvellement de l’engagement du Canada dans les Amériques était une priorité internationale pour son gouvernement. Le document qui a formalisé la nouvelle priorité accordée à l’hémisphère occidental stipule que le Canada s’est engagé à faire progresser concurremment la démocratie, l’intégration économique et la sécurité. Cette recherche a pour but de remettre en cause le discours officiel en analysant la politique du Canada à l’égard de la Colombie et du Honduras. L’étude sur le cas colombien porte sur les effets de l’intégration économique sur les droits humains et la sécurité. Elle montre que le texte de l’accord de libre-échange Canada-Colombie et les évaluations d’impact sur les droits humains n’abordent pas convenablement les risques entourant les investissements canadiens et que leurs lacunes diluent l’engagement d’Ottawa envers la protection des droits humains et la résolution du conflit. L’étude sur le cas hondurien porte sur l’impact des déficits démocratiques et de l’insécurité sur l’intégration économique. Elle montre que le virage à droite qui a suivi le coup d’État de 2009 a permis au gouvernement canadien d’entreprendre des négociations de libre-échange bilatérales et de prendre part à la réforme du code minier du Honduras, tandis que les déficits démocratiques et l’insécurité ont empêché la population hondurienne de participer d’une manière significative au processus d’intégration économique. Nous concluons que ces deux cas contredisent le discours officiel dans la mesure où l’objectif de l’intégration économique a été atteint aux dépens des autres objectifs. / In 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that the renewal of Canada’s engagement in the Americas was an international priority for his government. The document that formalized the new emphasis on the western hemisphere stipulates that Canada is committed to advancing democracy, economic integration, and security simultaneously. The purpose of this research is to challenge the official discourse by examining Canada’s policy towards Colombia and Honduras. The Colombia case study focuses on the effects of economic integration on human rights and security. It argues that the text of the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement and the human rights impact assessments do not adequately address the risks posed by Canadian investments and that their shortcomings dilute Ottawa’s commitment to human rights protection and conflict resolution. The Honduras case study is concerned with the impact of democratic deficits and insecurity on economic integration. It shows that the rightward shift that followed the 2009 coup d’État allowed the Canadian government to undertake bilateral free trade negotiations and take part in the reform of the Honduran mining code while democratic deficits and insecurity prevented the meaningful participation of the Honduran people in the economic integration process. I conclude that these two cases contradict the official discourse, as the goal of economic integration has been reached at the expense of the other objectives.

This study is concerned with Canadas policy towards peace, security and development in Africa. It examines Canadas response to these issues in relation to the New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD), the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Security Mechanism. With the intensification of violent conflicts in parts of Africa and their impact on individuals, communities, and socioeconomic development, African leaders transformed the OAU into the AU and established APSA to promote regional and human security in Africa. At the sub-regional level, West African leaders established the ECOWAS Security Mechanism to address the (human) security deficit in the West Africa region. These institutional transformations coincided with the launching of the NEPAD, which became one of the central instruments of engagement between Africa and the international community to address the peace, security and development challenges on the African continent. Canadas response to the NEPAD under the Liberal government of Jean Chrtien came in the form of a $500 million Canada fund for Africa (CFA) that among other things supported the capacity building of APSA and the ECOWAS Security Mechanism. The promotion of human security played a key role in Canadas approach to the AU and ECOWAS peace and security capacity building. I use a non-imperial internationalist approach that draws on the theoretical insights of a constructivist approach to international relations to provide an understanding of the Canadian governments policy. I argue that the Canadian governments policy towards the AU and ECOWAS can be understood in terms of the moral identity that Canada has built or acquired over the years in Africa. While this moral identity provides the means through which Canadian interests are pursued in Africa, it appears that the interest in maintaining this image has overshadowed the need for the Canadian government to craft an overarching policy and put resources behind the rhetoric of promoting peace and security, particularly human security in Africa.

Heather Metcalfe Doctoral Abstract, Ph.D. program, 2009 Department of History, University of Toronto “It’s All About War: Canadian Opinion and the Canadian Approach to International Relations, 1935-1939.” Canadians in the 1930s did not appear eager to focus on foreign affairs. The social and economic difficulties caused by the dislocation of the Great Depression meant that international developments often seemed remote and irrelevant. However, despite this focus on domestic issues, many Canadians were concerned with the trend of international events. As a result, the debate regarding the appropriate Canadian response remained an ongoing, if underlying, factor. In addition, the political issues raised by Canadian foreign policy, particularly through the Canadian involvement in the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations, meant the issue could not simply be ignored. During the later part of the decade, as the possibility of international conflict became ever more likely, increasing numbers of Canadians turned their attention to Canada’s international role. They also turned their attention to what this debate meant in terms of the Canadian sense of identity. These individuals were concerned as well with the response of Canadian public opinion to involvement overseas. This question, of the nature and susceptibility of Canadian public opinion to attempts to direct it, remains an intriguing one. The nature of this response remained open to question, and was the subject of significant debate among Canadian intellectuals, politicians and public figures. In response, a number of individuals and groups, including members of the Canadian press, attempted to influence Canadian public opinion. Many also pressured the Canadian government, led by William Lyon Mackenzie King’s administration, to play a more active role in shaping public opinion. Canadian intellectuals, for instance, influenced by contemporary writings on public opinion, seemed convinced of their natural role as ‘shapers’ of public opinion, particularly in a time of domestic and international crisis. These assumptions, and the ways in which Canadian public opinion both responded to, and rejected these attempts at direction, provide an interesting window into the question of public opinion, particularly in regards to international events. The debate regarding the Canadian response to the crises of the late 1930s can thus aid in gaining a greater appreciation of how public opinion shifts in response to outside challenges and the attempts to influence its course.

Heather Metcalfe Doctoral Abstract, Ph.D. program, 2009 Department of History, University of Toronto “It’s All About War: Canadian Opinion and the Canadian Approach to International Relations, 1935-1939.” Canadians in the 1930s did not appear eager to focus on foreign affairs. The social and economic difficulties caused by the dislocation of the Great Depression meant that international developments often seemed remote and irrelevant. However, despite this focus on domestic issues, many Canadians were concerned with the trend of international events. As a result, the debate regarding the appropriate Canadian response remained an ongoing, if underlying, factor. In addition, the political issues raised by Canadian foreign policy, particularly through the Canadian involvement in the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations, meant the issue could not simply be ignored. During the later part of the decade, as the possibility of international conflict became ever more likely, increasing numbers of Canadians turned their attention to Canada’s international role. They also turned their attention to what this debate meant in terms of the Canadian sense of identity. These individuals were concerned as well with the response of Canadian public opinion to involvement overseas. This question, of the nature and susceptibility of Canadian public opinion to attempts to direct it, remains an intriguing one. The nature of this response remained open to question, and was the subject of significant debate among Canadian intellectuals, politicians and public figures. In response, a number of individuals and groups, including members of the Canadian press, attempted to influence Canadian public opinion. Many also pressured the Canadian government, led by William Lyon Mackenzie King’s administration, to play a more active role in shaping public opinion. Canadian intellectuals, for instance, influenced by contemporary writings on public opinion, seemed convinced of their natural role as ‘shapers’ of public opinion, particularly in a time of domestic and international crisis. These assumptions, and the ways in which Canadian public opinion both responded to, and rejected these attempts at direction, provide an interesting window into the question of public opinion, particularly in regards to international events. The debate regarding the Canadian response to the crises of the late 1930s can thus aid in gaining a greater appreciation of how public opinion shifts in response to outside challenges and the attempts to influence its course.

Canada consistently balances competing inclinations for proximity and distance with the United States. Yet the extant literature on Canadian foreign policy has rarely focused on this particular behaviour trait or readily accepted that such an ambiguous stance is actually underpinned by a strategic logic, let alone the crux of a purported grand strategy. And the few that that are open to the notion of a Canadian grand strategy often overlook the domestic decision-making determinants of behaviour, are largely empirical-descriptive in content, or are chronologically limited to either the early Cold War or a few key foreign policy episodes. This dissertation rectifies these shortcomings by providing a theoretical-explanatory and empirically-informed account of Canada’s post-war grand strategy, in which its domestic origins, strategic policies, and cultural predispositions are all carefully explored. It does so by applying the cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour, which combines strategic cultural factors that guide policy-makers on security matters with cybernetic policy processes, through which beliefs, inclinations, and policy choices are standardized and regularized as distinct doctrines across a range of foreign, defence, and security policies. It tests this model on two key cases of Canadian grand strategy in the post-war period: (1) Canada’s policy responses to American preferences on strategic (air and missile) defence over some six decades, and (2) its policy responses to US – and to a lesser extent British – strategic preferences on NATO defence strategy during the Cold War. The findings reveal that Canada’s strategic policies fluctuated between the two Standing Operational Doctrines in its policy repertoire: continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism. These two doctrines span the range of feasible policy options – the “goldilocks zone” – required to ensure that any trade-offs between security and sovereignty, as the central values being pursued in the cybernetic process, are minimized. It is for this reason that Canada’s strategic behaviour has a high degree of policy continuity, patterned consistency, and is best described as the goldilocks grand strategy.