This thesis asks why the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) continues to exist and remain relevant in the defence of North America following the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. This thesis argues that NORAD’s binational nature is key to understanding the command’s continued role in continental defence. By employing the international relation theories of functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism as a lens of analysis to understand binational defence cooperation, NORAD’s origins as a binational defence command tasked with the air defence of North America, and its acquisition of its responsibilities for drug interdiction, the continental interior, and for maritime warning are analyzed. NORAD’s longevity and continued relevance can be attributed to the command’s binational nature, which has allowed the command to focus on and institutionalize specific functional-technical solutions to select issues of mutual concern in continental defence and security for Canada and the U.S. / May 2016

Canada consistently balances competing inclinations for proximity and distance with the United States. Yet the extant literature on Canadian foreign policy has rarely focused on this particular behaviour trait or readily accepted that such an ambiguous stance is actually underpinned by a strategic logic, let alone the crux of a purported grand strategy. And the few that that are open to the notion of a Canadian grand strategy often overlook the domestic decision-making determinants of behaviour, are largely empirical-descriptive in content, or are chronologically limited to either the early Cold War or a few key foreign policy episodes. This dissertation rectifies these shortcomings by providing a theoretical-explanatory and empirically-informed account of Canada’s post-war grand strategy, in which its domestic origins, strategic policies, and cultural predispositions are all carefully explored. It does so by applying the cultural-cybernetic model of behaviour, which combines strategic cultural factors that guide policy-makers on security matters with cybernetic policy processes, through which beliefs, inclinations, and policy choices are standardized and regularized as distinct doctrines across a range of foreign, defence, and security policies. It tests this model on two key cases of Canadian grand strategy in the post-war period: (1) Canada’s policy responses to American preferences on strategic (air and missile) defence over some six decades, and (2) its policy responses to US – and to a lesser extent British – strategic preferences on NATO defence strategy during the Cold War. The findings reveal that Canada’s strategic policies fluctuated between the two Standing Operational Doctrines in its policy repertoire: continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism. These two doctrines span the range of feasible policy options – the “goldilocks zone” – required to ensure that any trade-offs between security and sovereignty, as the central values being pursued in the cybernetic process, are minimized. It is for this reason that Canada’s strategic behaviour has a high degree of policy continuity, patterned consistency, and is best described as the goldilocks grand strategy.