At its core, Capgras syndrome is the delusional belief that someone close to you has been replaced by an identical imposter. Capgras has historically been explained with Freudian psychodynamic theories concerning latent hostility and a sense of personal or professional inadequacy. There is now widespread consensus in the scientific community that Capgras syndrome can arise from brain lesions. Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain its mechanism. The mirror-image-of-prosopagnosia hypothesis posits a disruption of the dorsal visual pathway. Another hypothesis emphasizes the role of a single lesion affecting the functional connectivity of the retrosplenial cortex. Our analysis of 10 case studies reveals inconsistencies with these hypotheses, particularly in accounting for the diverse lesion locations observed in Capgras patients. Our findings suggest that Capgras syndrome likely stems from a multifactorial aetiology involving neurological and neuropsychiatric factors. Lesions may impact multiple areas associated with facial processing and belief evaluation, challenging the notion of a single lesion explanation.

Recientemente, algunos críticos del enfoque davidsoniano de la atribución intencional han señalado que el mismo no puede ser aplicado para el caso de los delirios psiquiátricos, dado que las creencias delirantes no satisfacen los requisitos de racionalidad que este impone. En este trabajo: i) reconstruyo, a partir del análisis del caso del delirio de Capgras, la crítica a la idea de que solo podemos interpretar a un agente con creencias irracionales si mantiene aún un trasfondo de racionalidad; ii) objeto la misma y argumento que este delirio no representa un verdadero contraejemplo ya que un examen adecuado del mismo muestra que los sujetos con delirio de Capgras conservan un trasfondo de racionalidad. Señalaré así, que las condiciones mínimas para que la atribución de estados intencionales tenga lugar se encuentran garantizadas.