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Delusions are symptomatic of a number of psychiatric disorders; however, nonpsychiatric adults have also been shown to vary on a propensity toward delusional thought, or "delusion-proneness." The current study examined whether there is a relationship between an individual's degree of delusion proneness (on a continuum) and performance on the Stroop task, a cognitive task thought to measure conflict response monitoring. It was theorized that reduced conflict response monitoring ability may relate to (and perhaps cause) increased delusional propensity. A total of 35 nonpsychiatric college students completed a measure of delusion-proneness (Peter's et al. Delusion Inventory-21 item version; PDI-21), and a computerized version of the Stroop task with three conditions- congruent, incongruent, and neutral. It was hypothesized that PDI-21 scores would be positively correlated to Stroop interference contrast scores. Results revealed that delusion-proneness showed a statistically significant positive correlation with the Stroop reaction time contrast score, but not the accuracy constrast score, in the incongruent/congruent contrasts. Our pattern of results suggests that efficiency (i.e. reaction time) of Stroop performance is more sensitive to delusion-proneness, compared to the more gross measure of accuracy. This study appears to be the first to report this relationship across a continuum of delusion-proneness in a nonpsychiatric sample, and overall, the findings suggest that delusion-proneness is related to performance on a behavioral measure of conflict response monitoring and inhibitory control. This research may have implications on treatment interventions used with patients presenting with clinical delusions.

At its core, Capgras syndrome is the delusional belief that someone close to you has been replaced by an identical imposter. Capgras has historically been explained with Freudian psychodynamic theories concerning latent hostility and a sense of personal or professional inadequacy. There is now widespread consensus in the scientific community that Capgras syndrome can arise from brain lesions. Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain its mechanism. The mirror-image-of-prosopagnosia hypothesis posits a disruption of the dorsal visual pathway. Another hypothesis emphasizes the role of a single lesion affecting the functional connectivity of the retrosplenial cortex. Our analysis of 10 case studies reveals inconsistencies with these hypotheses, particularly in accounting for the diverse lesion locations observed in Capgras patients. Our findings suggest that Capgras syndrome likely stems from a multifactorial aetiology involving neurological and neuropsychiatric factors. Lesions may impact multiple areas associated with facial processing and belief evaluation, challenging the notion of a single lesion explanation.

En nous étayant des théories issues de l’épistémologie psychanalytique, nous concevons la schizophrénie comme résultant d’une expérience traumatique primaire n’ayant pu être intégrée au sein de la subjectivité. Ce traumatisme, nous le rattachons moins à un évènement en tant que tel qu’à la position impensable qu’il désigne pour le sujet. Ainsi, en nous inspirant de la pensée de P. Aulagnier et de R. Roussillon, nous suggérons que le noyau traumatique conditionnant le développement d’une problématique schizophrénique se rapporte à la position d’objet pulsionnel, ou de non-désir, à laquelle se trouve identifié le sujet au sein des premiers échanges avec son environnement. Face à l’impensable de cette position identificatoire, le sujet se voit contraint de s’extraire de la scène relationnelle avec ses objets primaires, se clivant par la même opération du capital représentatif qui lui est associé. Dans ces conditions, nous pensons que le délire, moins d’apparaître comme une production pathologique dépourvue de sens, correspond à un mode de réponse face au retour hallucinatoire de l’impensé traumatique. Aussi, à partir d’une méthodologie qualitative basée sur l’analyse d’une douzaine de cas cliniques, nous mettons en évidence trois principales fonctions du délire dans la schizophrénie. La première, conceptualisée sous le terme de « fonction contenante », procède à la mise en forme et à la transformation signifiante de ce qui ne put être symbolisé de l’expérience traumatique. La seconde, nommée « fonction localisante », tente de situer en dehors du sujet le débordement pulsionnel inhérent au traumatisme primaire. La troisième, appelée « fonction identifiante », permet à la personne délirante de s’attribuer un énoncé identificatoire qui, de manière auto-créée, supplée à l’énigme de son histoire insensée.Enfin, l’analyse de nos données cliniques souligne que ces trois fonctions de l’activité délirante ne se réalisent pas de façon aléatoire mais qu’elles s’articulent selon une logique particulière. Ainsi, nous suggérons qu’à partir de sa triple opération le délire schizophrénique tend à se déployer en un « processus délirant », par lequel le sujet peut rendre pensable et supportable la position traumatique à laquelle il a été identifié au cours de son histoire. / By following theories from the psychoanalytical epistemology, we consider schizophrenia as the result of a primary trauma that has not been assimilated within the subjectivity. We connect less this traumatism with an event than with the unthinkable position the subject is identified to. Therefore, being inspired by the thought of P. Aulagnier and R. Roussillon, we suggest that the traumatic nucleus which conditions the development of schizophrenia is related to the position of instinctual object, or of non-desire, to which the subject is identified within the first exchanges with his environment. In view of this unthinkable position, the subject is forced to remove himself from the relationship with his primary objects, splitting off from the representative capital that is associated with it. In these conditions, we think that the delusion appears less as a meaningless pathological production than as a way of answering to the hallucinatory return of the traumatic unthought. From a qualitative methodology based on the analysis of a dozen clinical cases, we highlight three main functions of the delusion in schizophrenia. The first, conceptualized under the term «containing function», carries out the shaping and the significant transformation of what could have not been symbolized of the traumatic experience. The second, called «localizing function», tries to locate outside of the subject the instinctual overflow inherent to the primary trauma. The third, named «identifying function», enables the delusional person to assume an identificatory principle which, in a self-created way, compensates for the enigma of his senseless history.Finally, the analysis of our clinical data underlines that these three functions of the delusional activity are not randomly accomplished but are organized according to a particular logic. Thus from its triple operation, we suggest that the schizophrenic delusion tends to develop into a «delusional process», by which the subject can make thinkable and bearable the traumatic position to which he was identified during his history.

La question de l'essence de la sexualité féminine est l'une de celles qui firent d'emblée le plus débat au sein de la communauté psychanalytique, allant parfois jusqu'à être escamotée (le "continent noir" de Sigmund Freud). Toutefois, on sait que Freud a laissé échapper des bribes d'une théorisation alternative: on y rencontre une femme dotée d'un orifice vaginal, et dont le but sexuel passif est d'être pénétrée. D'où provient cette appétence à accueillir passivement l'autre en soi ? La pénétration génitale dans sa valence passive constitue le but pulsionnel ultime du développement psychosexuel féminin, celui qui permet la reproduction. Toutefois, il semble probable qu'une représentation psychique de celle-ci n'est pas le produit d'une génération spontanée à la puberté (comme l'a parfois suggéré Freud), mais qu'elle plonge ses racines dans les temps prégénitaux: elle ne peut manquer de s'appuyer sur la réalité du corps de la fille comme du garçon, porteur d'une dimension contenante-excitable. C'est pourquoi il nous semble possible d'isoler une composante pulsionnelle spécifique, qui vise le but passif d'être pénétré: une composante pulsionnelle vaginale. Les phénomènes d'influence apparaissent paradigmatiques de la figuration psychique de la pénétration. Nous avons choisi d'en considérer deux modalités: le délire d'influence constitue une résolution, dans le champ psychotique, de l'ambivalence à l'égard du désir vaginal; sous hypnose, la modification de l'état de conscience favorise l 'appétence à s'abandonner aux suggestions de 1'hypnotiseur, en neutralisant, par divers procédés, les résistances du sujet qui relèvent d'un refus du vaginal. / Female sexuality is one of the issues which made at once most debate within psychoanalytical community (the "Black continent", Sigmund Freud said). However, we know that Freud, in some texts, let out fragments of an alternative theory: it offers a woman endowed with a vaginal aperture, and whose passive sexual aim is to be penetrated. Where does this desire to receive passively the other into oneself come from? Genital penetration in its passive form is the ultimate instinctual aim of female psycho-sexual development, the one who enables reproduction. However, it seems likely that a psychic representation of it is not the product of a spontaneous generation during the puberty (as Freud sometimes suggested), but that roots in pre-genital period: it relies without fail on the reality of girl or boy's body, which carries a containing-excitable feature. Accordingly, it seems possible to isolate a specific instinctual component, which aims at the passive purpose to be penetrated: a vaginal instinctual component. Influence's phenomena seem paradigmatic of a psychic figuration of penetration. We chose to consider two modalities of it: delusion of control is a resolution, in the psychotic experience area, of the ambivalence towards vaginal desire; under hypnosis, modified state of consciousness favors surrendering to hypnotist's suggestions, in so far as it neutralizes, by diverse processes, subject's resistances, which recover from a refusal of the vaginal.

Debates de psiquiatria contemporânea apontam que tanto a definição de delírio como a de crítica levantam dificuldades terminológicas que levam a imprecisões clínicas. Uma destas situações diz respeito principalmente à progressão do delírio em direção a uma recusa do tratamento, o que tem sido descrito pela literatura psiquiátrica de maneira genérica como ausência de insight, ausência de consciência da doença mental, ausência de crítica e até como simples não adesão ao tratamento. Com intuito de contribuir para essa dissensão a partir da psicanálise sugerimos que, assim como outros fenômenos ligados ao inconsciente, o delírio pode ser redefinido a partir da capacidade do sujeito em criticá-lo, o que depende da reordenação perceptiva (insight) de aspectos do próprio delírio. Como a terminologia da crítica está presente na filosofia e história da psicopatologia, discutimos modificações no delírio que vão de Kant a Pinel, de Freud à tese de doutoramento de Lacan. A crítica é uma atividade do juízo que pode estar ligada à interpretação e à reordenação perceptiva (insight), mas pode ser também fruto da atividade das instâncias críticas do sujeito. A fim diferenciar esses dois tipos de crítica que encontramos, crítica do delírio e no delírio, sugerimos considerá-la como uma modalidade de implicação subjetiva, ligada a síntese das representações, intencionalidade do juízo e responsabilidade da conduta / Debates of contemporary psychiatry point that problems on definition has led to clinical inaccuracies. One of the main situations described in the literature concerns to the expansion of delusion toward a refusal of treatment. Such situations are denominated from a wide semantic spectrum that ranges from the lack of insight, lack of awareness of mental illness, lack of critique and even simple non-adherence to treatment. To contribute to this disagreement as from the psychoanalysis we suggest that, like other unconscious phenomena linked, the delusion can be reset from the subject\'s ability to criticize it, which depends on reorganization of perceptual aspects (insight) of the delusion itself. Because critical terminology is present in the philosophy and history of psychopathology, we discuss changes in delusion ranging from Kant to Pinel, from Freud to Lacan\'s doctoral thesis. Critique is an activity of judgment that can be linked to perceptual interpretation and reordering (insight), but can also be the result of the activity of critical instances of the subject. In order to differentiate these two types of criticism that we find, critique of delusion and critique in delusion, we suggest considering it as a form of subjective implication, linked to synthesis of representations, intentionality of judgment and responsibility of conduct

This autoethnography uses narrative inquiry within an anticolonial theoretical framework. As a White Italian male settler living on Turtle Island, I bring survivor experience to psychiatric definitions of “psychosis,” or what I call psychosic narrative, and to broader literatures for the purpose of decolonizing “mental” relations. Using reflexive critiques, including feminist antiracism, I question my own privileges as I consider the possibilities of Mad culture to disturb authorizations of practices like forced electroshock and drugging. Using journals, salient themes of experience are identified, including “delusion,” “psychosis,” “madness,” and “illness,” especially as they appear in texts about politics, culture, and theory. A temporally rigorous narrative approach to my readings allows for a self-reflexive writing on such themes in relation with antiracist anticolonial resistance. Thus a White psychiatric survivor resistance to psychiatry and its social (local) history is related to the problematic of global Western neoliberal heteropatriarchy in psychological institutional texts. Survivor testimonies bring critical madness and disability theories as they pertain to racialization and constructions of sex/uality and gender. Rather than present a comprehensive analysis, this narrative inquiry is generated from the process of research as it was experienced in order to represent and question its epistemological grounds.

The left hemisphere interpreter refers to a function in the left hemisphere of the brain that search for and produce causal explanations for events, behaviours and feelings, even though no such apparent pattern exists between them. Confabulation is said to occur when a person presents or acts on obviously false information, despite being aware that they are false. People who confabulate also tend to defend their confabulations even when they are presented with counterevidence. Research related to these two areas seems to deal with the same phenomenon, namely the human tendency to infer explanations for events, even if the explanations have no actual bearing in reality. Despite this, research on the left hemisphere interpreter has progressed relatively independently from research related to the concept of confabulation. This thesis has therefore aimed at reviewing each area and comparing them in a search for common relations. What has been found as a common theme is the emphasis they both place on the potentially underlying function of the interpreter and confabulation. Many researchers across the two fields stress the adaptive and vital function of keeping the brain free from both contradiction and unpredictability, and propose that this function is served by confabulations and the left hemisphere interpreter. This finding may provide a possible opening for collaboration across the fields, and for the continued understanding of these exciting and perplexing phenomena.

This autoethnography uses narrative inquiry within an anticolonial theoretical framework. As a White Italian male settler living on Turtle Island, I bring survivor experience to psychiatric definitions of “psychosis,” or what I call psychosic narrative, and to broader literatures for the purpose of decolonizing “mental” relations. Using reflexive critiques, including feminist antiracism, I question my own privileges as I consider the possibilities of Mad culture to disturb authorizations of practices like forced electroshock and drugging. Using journals, salient themes of experience are identified, including “delusion,” “psychosis,” “madness,” and “illness,” especially as they appear in texts about politics, culture, and theory. A temporally rigorous narrative approach to my readings allows for a self-reflexive writing on such themes in relation with antiracist anticolonial resistance. Thus a White psychiatric survivor resistance to psychiatry and its social (local) history is related to the problematic of global Western neoliberal heteropatriarchy in psychological institutional texts. Survivor testimonies bring critical madness and disability theories as they pertain to racialization and constructions of sex/uality and gender. Rather than present a comprehensive analysis, this narrative inquiry is generated from the process of research as it was experienced in order to represent and question its epistemological grounds.

A presente dissertação aborda o tema da constituição da noção de espaço na psicanálise tomando como central um caso clínico de uma paciente atendida em um ambulatório de saúde mental na rede pública do município de Porto Alegre. Tendo em vista que tempo/espaço são categorias indissociáveis no campo das ciências humanas, a pesquisa aborda os momentos da constituição do sujeito em que a organização e estruturação dessas variáveis estão em causa. Privilegiando o conceito de espaço como efeito da posição do sujeito na linguagem, o texto desenvolve as relações entre percepção e representação presentes nas formações delirantes. A partir da experiência clínica, pretende discutir algumas importantes formulações teóricas no campo da psicanálise ao mesmo tempo em que compõe uma escrita de caso. Utiliza como elemento privilegiado nesse diálogo o livro de literatura “Noite do Oráculo”, do escritor americano Paul Auster, em função da estrutura presente na narrativa. As relações que o escritor estabelece entre leitor/escritor/personagem compõe um universo narrativo semelhante ao da transferência clínica na psicose. A partir desses elementos aborda o tema das diferenças entre ficção e delírio no que diz respeito às diferenças nas formações narrativas. / This dissertation addresses the issue of development of the concept of space in psychoanalysis taking as central the clinical case of a patient treated at a public mental health clinic in the city of Porto Alegre. Given that time/space are inseparable categories in the field of human sciences, the research addresses the moments of the development of the subject in which the organization and structuring of these variables are concerned. Emphasizing the concept of space as an effect of the position of the subject in language, the text develops the relationship between perception and representation present in delusional formations. From clinical experience, it intends to discuss some important theoretical formulations in the field of psychoanalysis while composing a case study. It uses the literary work of the American writer Paul Auster "Oracle Night" as a privileged element in this dialogue as a representation of the structure present in the narrative. The relationships established between reader/writer /character composes a narrative universe similar to the transfer in clinical psychosis. From these elements it addresses the issue of the differences between fiction and delusion with regard to the narrative configuration.