To follow the trend of internationalization and to meet the enforcement of New Basel Capital Accord (which call BASEL II), our government is aggressively promoting financial reform. The major objectives of twice financial reform are to promote the merger of financial institutions and to attract overseas investment. Furthermore, It make financial institutions being more international competitiveness. However, since its had been performed, it occurred many abuses, including a series of running on banks, illegal acquisition and merger and misappropriation of funds, etc. It shows up the incomplete supervision and poor performance of Taiwan's financial supervisory system again. Therefore, the proper financial supervisory system must be developed to stabilize Taiwan's finance and make people be competitive in the globe. The thesis focuses on the impact of twice financial reform and refers to financial reform and relative financial supervisory systems of various countries (such as EU, USA, Japan, and Korea, etc.)which link with us. To explore the issues of Taiwan's financial supervisory system generated from new banking environment, and to provide suggestion of future financial supervisory system, then more sound financial supervisory system can be developed and the twice financial reform can be guided to its right way. It is true that only the proper and sound financial supervisory system can really accomplish financial reform.

The New Basel Capital Accord implementation, is similar to announced the bank management manages approaching of the new century. The money market globalization tendency, the bank surface risk management focal point changed the globalization risk management, covers the different physiographic region and the different product category, the risk management just like becomes the core ability and the strategy superiority is at. Modern finance risk management, some several tendencies: 1.The financial risk management by board of directors direct supervising and managing, and formulates a set of risk management strategy by it. 2.The risk management overhead construction and the organization, have highly the independence, does not subordinate any administrative department, but is directly operates by the board of directors. 3.The present risk management of, performs the different department the conformity, by quota processing, needs massive technology of aspect the and so on uses measurement, statistics. 4.When in 2006 The New Basel Capital Accord execution, the financial overseeing unit proposed the risk management overseeing mechanism, and request financial organ itself also must have overhead construction of the overseeing. 5.Weeding through the old to bring forth the new of the growing commodity, the risk controls the tube to be allowed to borrow by the growing commodity design or the reform, is dispersible the risk. 6.The risk management and the IT technology unify, also for inevitable trend.

In recent years, the government gradually opens the new bank establishment, causes the financial organ to enter another competition the time. However because the petroleum crisis causes the inflation, the original material rise, the interest rate undulation to be frequent, the industrial field and the finance service sector's control relaxes or relieves the limiting condition, causes many investments services multiplex, the negotiable securities, the liberalization and the internationalization. Furthermore, because under the financial service multiplication transformation, its service area separates day by day fuzzily, the financial organ should truly understand the bank storm danger spot, establishes the good risk management system, conforms to principle of the organization safe steady transport business. The new Basel capital accord reached an agreement already is regarded as one of international finance overseeing standards; In its agreement regarding the credit risk credit appraisal, the final goal is expected the silver behavior establishment innate internal credit comments and so on the system (IRB) reflects bank itself the management essence. The computation credit risk standard method and the interior comment and so on the law may say is the important angle in new Basel capital accord , the interior to comment and so on the law is according to 1988 the old version reached an agreement made the revision. This research also aims at in the new old version and new edition the credit risk in the risk weights, carries out the standard, various countries' implementation present situation, and makes the share questionnaire survey to understand our country finance industry and the enterprise regarding the new edition procedure, do again with Europe and America alternately compares. The expectation penetrates these comparative analyses, can discover difference and the improvement revises the place, provides our country financial organ and the proper authorities, faces up to the risk management transport business of regarding the organization importance, truly achieved so-called and international connects rails the goal.

The New Capital Accord (henceforth, Basel II), is expected to impose dramatic changes on banks and other providers of corporate financing, as well as companies. Literature indicates that small and medium sized enterprises (henceforth SMEs), in general, and in particular German SMEs seem to be affected: Germany has the highest SME density with SMEs comprising 99.6% of all corporations (IMF, 2008), these SMEs are highly dependent on banks for financing (see Jacobson et al, 2006). However, there is huge controversy in the literature concerning how these changes will look, right before Basel II came into effect in the years 2007 / 2008 in the European Union. In order to explore this effect from a Post-Basel II perspective, the objective of this research project is to establish what effect Basel II will have on corporate financing of SMEs in Germany. The high impact on SMEs (in Germany), combined with controversial evidence from extant Pre-Basel II research, indicates a high relevance to academics and practitioners for this thesis. This thesis is probably the first from a Post-Basel II perspective which covers both the SMEs' as well as the financiers' perspective. Based on a structured literature review using the comparative method (Peters, 1998) 'Most Different Systems' evidence is provided that there is no consistent picture regarding the effect of Basel II. Therefore, further research is needed to determine whether the effect in Germany is consistent, from a Post-Basel II perspective, with regards to the conditions which trigger certain mechanisms, from a 'scientific realism' (Smith, 1998) perspective, because the literature indicates that 'positivist generalising' has limited validity. Building on Creswell (2003), an 'exploratory sequential' design was created to test three initial hypotheses (as confirmation or refutation of a theory, see Gujarati, 2003:8): a multi-method design is best suited to the author's philosophical stance of 'scientific realism' by means of triangulation (Robson, 2002:174). The result of the initial quantitative phase is based on the analysis of questionnaire data from 125 SMEs and financiers (banks, private equity companies, family offices, providers of alternative means of financing) derived from a probabilistic sample frame in the fourth quarter of 2008. Mathematical models for SMEs and financiers regarding the three initial hypotheses were set-up and tested using the appropriate statistical tests. In order to limit bias by means of a spill-over effect from the financial crises, control questions were used. The subsequent qualitative phase by means of semistructured elite interviews (Saunders et al, 2007:312) between March and May 2009 enabled a valid triangulation and provided in-depth insights into how SMEs can cope best with Basel II. The purposive sample, of 17 'important cases', included company owners and top-level financier executives. In a conclusive quantitative and qualitative synopsis, the three initial hypotheses were acknowledged. However, the qualitative in-depth analysis by means of 'causal networks' (Miles and Huberman, 1994) led to an amendment of the hypotheses as follows: 1. Corporate finance has become different for SMEs because the 'house bank principle' has changed to a 'core bank principle' due to Basel II. Shopping around regarding credits will be more difficult which makes financing more difficult. This could be overcompensated by major SMEs, by using non-credit corporate financing which leads to a reduction of the 'house bank' principle. 2. SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters, or b) they adjust their strategy as stated in hypothesis 3. 3. Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME corporate finance when they have a sound financial basis / management and when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth with the aim of niche market leadership and when they open up for exit strategies.

Since reformed of banking structure in China, banks have been gradually developed their operation system. Moreover, the restructure in commercial bank after joined WTO had established China¡¦s banks performance and international reputation. Since 2007, many large commercial banks have strength its risk management based on the commitments made by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to follow the New Basel Capital Accord. When the global banking industry is devastated by global financial crisis (GFC) during 2008, China¡¦s banks are less affected by GFC. In addition, the capital scale and revenues performance were thrived during GFC. Therefore, it shows that banks in China had improved the resilience ability during financial crisis. However, being originated in China¡¦s loose monetary policy and economic stimulus package after GFC, investors worried that domestic banks might bear high risks. Notably, the risk is specific risk from each bank instead of system risk. This study employs Markov regime-switching model to examine 14 China banks¡¦ stock prices. The empirical evidence supports our hypothesis that behavior of China banks¡¦ stock prices has confronted structural change after GFC. Furthermore, this research presents that unsystematic risks from each bank were significantly decreased after GFC. It indicates that investors are too pessimistic on the banks in China might suffer high risk after government interventions.

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A topical issue in financial economics is the development of appropriate stochastic dynamic models for banking items and behavior. The issue here is to fulfil the need to generalize the more traditional discrete-time models of banking activity to a Levy process setting. In this thesis, under the assumption that the loan market is imperfectly competitive, we investigate the evolution of banking items such as bank assets (cash, bonds, shares, Treasuries, reserves, loans and intangible assets), liabilities (demand deposits) and bank capital (bank equity, subordinate debt and loan loss reserves). Here we consider the influence of macroeconomic factors and profitability as well as its indicators return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). As far as bank assets are concerned, we note that loan pricing models usually reflect the financial funding cost, risk premium to compensate for the risk of default by the borrower, a premium reflecting market power exercised by the bank and the sensitivity of the cost of capital raised to changes in loans extended. On the other hand, loan losses can be associated with an offsetting expense called the loan loss provision (LLP), which is charged against Nett profit. This offset will reduce reported income but has no impact on taxes, although when the assets are finally written off, a tax-deductible expense is created. An important factor influencing loan loss provisioning is regulation and supervision. Measures of capital adequacy are generally calculated using the book values of assets and equity. The provisioning of loans and their associated write-offs will cause a decline in these capital adequacy measures, and may precipitate increased regulation by bank authorities. Greater level of regulation generally entail additional costs for the bank. Currently, this regulation mainly takes the form of the Basel II Capital Accord that has been implemented on the worldwide basis since 2008. It is clear that bank profitability is a major indicator of financial crises for households, companies and financial institutions. An example of this from the 2007-2008 subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) is the U.S. bank, Wachovia Corp., who reported a big loss as from the first quarter of 2007 and eventually was bought by the world's largest bank, Citigroup, on 29 September 2008. A further example from the SMC is that both the failure of the Lehman Brothers investment bank and the acquisition in September 2008 of Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns by Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, respectively, were preceded by a decrease in profitability and an increase in the price of loans and loan losses. The subprime mortgage crisis is characterized by contracted liquidity in the global credit markets and banking system. The level of liquidity in the banking sector affects the ability of banks to meet commitments as they become due without incurring substantial losses from liquidating less liquid assets. Liquidity, therefore, provides the defensive cash or near-cash resources to cover banks' liability. An undervaluation of real risk in the subprime market is cascading, rippling and ultimately severely adversely affecting the world economy. The downturn in the U.S. housing market, risky lending and borrowing practices, and excessive individual and corporate debt levels have caused multiple adverse effects tumbled as the US housing market slumped. Banks worldwide are hoarding cash and showing a growing reluctance to lend, driving rates that institutions charge to each other on loans to record highs. Also, global money markets are inoperative, forcing increased injections of cash from central banks. The crisis has passed through various stages, exposing pervasive weaknesses in the global financial system and regulatory framework. The stochastic dynamics of the aforementioned banking items assist in formulating a maximization problem that involves endogenous variables such as profit consumption, the value of the bank's investment in loans and provisions for loan losses as control variants. In particular, we demonstrate that the bank is able to maximize its expected utility of discounted profit consumption over a random time interval, [t,r], and terminal profit at time r. Here the term profit consumption refers to the consumption of the bank's profits by dividend payments on equity and interest and principal payments on subordinate debt. The associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation has a smooth solution when the optimal controls are computed by means of power, logarithmic and exponential utility functions. This enables us to make a direct comparison between the economic properties of the solutions for different choices of the utility function. In keeping with the main theme of this thesis, we simulate the financial indices ROE and ROA that are two measures of bank profitability. We further discuss optimization with power utility where we show the convergence of the Markov Chain Approximation Method (MCAM) and the impact of varying the model parameters in the form of loan loss severity, P, and loan loss frequency, <f>. We investigate the connections between the banking models and Basel II capital accord as well as the current subprime mortgage crises. As a way of conclusion, we provide remarks about the main issues discussed in the thesis and speculate about future research directions. The contents of this thesis is based on 3 peer-reviewed journal articles (see [105], [106] and [107]) and 1 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [104]). In addition, the paper [108] is currently being prepared for submission to an accredited journal. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

A topical issue in financial economics is the development of appropriate stochastic dynamic models for banking items and behavior. The issue here is to fulfil the need to generalize the more traditional discrete-time models of banking activity to a Levy process setting. In this thesis, under the assumption that the loan market is imperfectly competitive, we investigate the evolution of banking items such as bank assets (cash, bonds, shares, Treasuries, reserves, loans and intangible assets), liabilities (demand deposits) and bank capital (bank equity, subordinate debt and loan loss reserves). Here we consider the influence of macroeconomic factors and profitability as well as its indicators return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). As far as bank assets are concerned, we note that loan pricing models usually reflect the financial funding cost, risk premium to compensate for the risk of default by the borrower, a premium reflecting market power exercised by the bank and the sensitivity of the cost of capital raised to changes in loans extended. On the other hand, loan losses can be associated with an offsetting expense called the loan loss provision (LLP), which is charged against Nett profit. This offset will reduce reported income but has no impact on taxes, although when the assets are finally written off, a tax-deductible expense is created. An important factor influencing loan loss provisioning is regulation and supervision. Measures of capital adequacy are generally calculated using the book values of assets and equity. The provisioning of loans and their associated write-offs will cause a decline in these capital adequacy measures, and may precipitate increased regulation by bank authorities. Greater level of regulation generally entail additional costs for the bank. Currently, this regulation mainly takes the form of the Basel II Capital Accord that has been implemented on the worldwide basis since 2008. It is clear that bank profitability is a major indicator of financial crises for households, companies and financial institutions. An example of this from the 2007-2008 subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) is the U.S. bank, Wachovia Corp., who reported a big loss as from the first quarter of 2007 and eventually was bought by the world's largest bank, Citigroup, on 29 September 2008. A further example from the SMC is that both the failure of the Lehman Brothers investment bank and the acquisition in September 2008 of Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns by Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, respectively, were preceded by a decrease in profitability and an increase in the price of loans and loan losses. The subprime mortgage crisis is characterized by contracted liquidity in the global credit markets and banking system. The level of liquidity in the banking sector affects the ability of banks to meet commitments as they become due without incurring substantial losses from liquidating less liquid assets. Liquidity, therefore, provides the defensive cash or near-cash resources to cover banks' liability. An undervaluation of real risk in the subprime market is cascading, rippling and ultimately severely adversely affecting the world economy. The downturn in the U.S. housing market, risky lending and borrowing practices, and excessive individual and corporate debt levels have caused multiple adverse effects tumbled as the US housing market slumped. Banks worldwide are hoarding cash and showing a growing reluctance to lend, driving rates that institutions charge to each other on loans to record highs. Also, global money markets are inoperative, forcing increased injections of cash from central banks. The crisis has passed through various stages, exposing pervasive weaknesses in the global financial system and regulatory framework. The stochastic dynamics of the aforementioned banking items assist in formulating a maximization problem that involves endogenous variables such as profit consumption, the value of the bank's investment in loans and provisions for loan losses as control variants. In particular, we demonstrate that the bank is able to maximize its expected utility of discounted profit consumption over a random time interval, [t,r], and terminal profit at time r. Here the term profit consumption refers to the consumption of the bank's profits by dividend payments on equity and interest and principal payments on subordinate debt. The associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation has a smooth solution when the optimal controls are computed by means of power, logarithmic and exponential utility functions. This enables us to make a direct comparison between the economic properties of the solutions for different choices of the utility function. In keeping with the main theme of this thesis, we simulate the financial indices ROE and ROA that are two measures of bank profitability. We further discuss optimization with power utility where we show the convergence of the Markov Chain Approximation Method (MCAM) and the impact of varying the model parameters in the form of loan loss severity, P, and loan loss frequency, <f>. We investigate the connections between the banking models and Basel II capital accord as well as the current subprime mortgage crises. As a way of conclusion, we provide remarks about the main issues discussed in the thesis and speculate about future research directions. The contents of this thesis is based on 3 peer-reviewed journal articles (see [105], [106] and [107]) and 1 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [104]). In addition, the paper [108] is currently being prepared for submission to an accredited journal. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

The aim of my thesis is to evaluate the risk management system of Czech banks according to the Basel II rules. In my thesis I also deal with the ability of the Czech banking system to accept new Basel III rules. The first part of my thesis focuses on definition of risks and methods of risk management according to Basel rules. They discuss diferent risks that they fall within activity to the rules on the capital adequacy of the bank. The second part of thesis focuses on characteristics of Basel II and III and how the rules are implemented to the law of the EU and then to the law of Czech Republic. Part of the second part is also shortages of Basel II. On this shortage, Basel Committee on banking supervision responded to introduce new accord Basel III. In the final part, both of part is connected on the samples of three banks. After analysis, the thesis rates readiness Czech banks on the new capital accord and new risk management. The thesis summarizes readiness of the Czech banking system on the Basel III rules.

The New Capital Accord (henceforth, Basel II), is expected to impose dramatic changes on banks and other providers of corporate financing, as well as companies. Literature indicates that small and medium sized enterprises (henceforth SMEs), in general, and in particular German SMEs seem to be affected: Germany has the highest SME density with SMEs comprising 99.6% of all corporations (IMF, 2008), these SMEs are highly dependent on banks for financing (see Jacobson et al, 2006). However, there is huge controversy in the literature concerning how these changes will look, right before Basel II came into effect in the years 2007 / 2008 in the European Union. In order to explore this effect from a Post-Basel II perspective, the objective of this research project is to establish what effect Basel II will have on corporate financing of SMEs in Germany. The high impact on SMEs (in Germany), combined with controversial evidence from extant Pre-Basel II research, indicates a high relevance to academics and practitioners for this thesis. This thesis is probably the first from a Post-Basel II perspective which covers both the SMEs' as well as the financiers' perspective. Based on a structured literature review using the comparative method (Peters, 1998) 'Most Different Systems' evidence is provided that there is no consistent picture regarding the effect of Basel II. Therefore, further research is needed to determine whether the effect in Germany is consistent, from a Post-Basel II perspective, with regards to the conditions which trigger certain mechanisms, from a 'scientific realism' (Smith, 1998) perspective, because the literature indicates that 'positivist generalising' has limited validity. Building on Creswell (2003), an 'exploratory sequential' design was created to test three initial hypotheses (as confirmation or refutation of a theory, see Gujarati, 2003:8): a multi-method design is best suited to the author's philosophical stance of 'scientific realism' by means of triangulation (Robson, 2002:174). The result of the initial quantitative phase is based on the analysis of questionnaire data from 125 SMEs and financiers (banks, private equity companies, family offices, providers of alternative means of financing) derived from a probabilistic sample frame in the fourth quarter of 2008. Mathematical models for SMEs and financiers regarding the three initial hypotheses were set-up and tested using the appropriate statistical tests. In order to limit bias by means of a spill-over effect from the financial crises, control questions were used. The subsequent qualitative phase by means of semistructured elite interviews (Saunders et al, 2007:312) between March and May 2009 enabled a valid triangulation and provided in-depth insights into how SMEs can cope best with Basel II. The purposive sample, of 17 'important cases', included company owners and top-level financier executives. In a conclusive quantitative and qualitative synopsis, the three initial hypotheses were acknowledged. However, the qualitative in-depth analysis by means of 'causal networks' (Miles and Huberman, 1994) led to an amendment of the hypotheses as follows: 1. Corporate finance has become different for SMEs because the 'house bank principle' has changed to a 'core bank principle' due to Basel II. Shopping around regarding credits will be more difficult which makes financing more difficult. This could be overcompensated by major SMEs, by using non-credit corporate financing which leads to a reduction of the 'house bank' principle. 2. SMEs can cope best with the effect when they: a) proactively engage in rating and improve the parameters, or b) they adjust their strategy as stated in hypothesis 3. 3. Financiers (especially non-bank financiers) will engage in SME corporate finance when they have a sound financial basis / management and when they adjust their strategy in terms of growth with the aim of niche market leadership and when they open up for exit strategies.