Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 210-230). Also available in print.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 210-230). Also available online.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2009. / Open access. Includes bibliographical references (p. 208-221). Print copy also available.

With the implementation of the pilot Emission Trading Schemes (ETSs) in China since 2013, there emerges a new opportunity for investing in Chinese green technology (greentech) projects. Apart from trading the international CERs (Certified Emissions Reductions), investors nowadays can also trade the CCERs (Chinese Certified Emissions Reductions) in the domestic carbon market. However, the pricing of CCERs is different from that of CERs due to the distinct climate policies in China, thus making the investment decisions in Chinese greentech projects a complicated problem. This study is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to evaluate greentech projects under uncertain climate policies in developing countries like China. To identify the investment environment of Chinese greentech projects, a qualitative research on the development of climate policies and greentech market is first conducted. Based on the study of international climate polices and carbon markets, the pricing mechanisms of carbon assets (carbon allowances and carbon offsets) are investigated. Furthermore, China’s climate polices, including the energy policies and emission reduction policies, are analysed in detail. In addition, both the administrative and economic instruments used in China’s climate policies are investigated. Then, business opportunities and challenges in greentech market are investigated. It is shown that there is substantial demand for greentech projects, and the uncertainties embedded a Chinese greentech project in power sector mainly come from the CCER price and electricity price. To integrate the different stochastic price processes, a real-options-based greentech investment (ROGI) model is developed to derive the investment options value and the optimal investment timing. Considering the possible interventions of the government, the CCER price is modelled as mean-reverting process with jump and cap-floor. In addition, an equivalent electricity price is developed and also described by a mean-reverting process. To solve the ROGI model with various uncertainties involved, a least-square Monte Carlo (LSM) approach is developed. The proposed LSM algorithm is built within the dynamic programming framework. It is shown that the optimal investment strategy can be characterized by a continuation region. The proposed ROGI model is verified by a real case of wind power project investment in China. Sensitive analysis is conducted to examine the effects of the model parameters on the investment decisions. Different climate policy scenarios are then tested, including carbon price jump, carbon price cap and floor, and carbon tax. Several interesting findings are concluded from the results analysis in this study. First, it is found that investors are relatively insensitive to the jump in the CCER price, the volatility of the CCER price, or the mean-reverting speed. Second, the CCER price floor set by the government can effectively encourage greentech investments while the price cap is not a major concern of investors. Finally, the long-term growth rate of the CCER price as well as the carbon tax rate can also plays a significant role in investment decisions. / published_or_final_version / Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis consists of two essays on the impacts product market competition has on the real investment efficiency of firms. While the first essay looks at this question through the corporate governance angle and finds product market competition complements institutional investors in disciplining firms, the latter one studies the impacts from an information production point of view and concludes competition reduces the incentive of firms to acquire information thereby reduces investment efficiency. Using product market competition as a proxy for external corporate governance, the first essay documents a sizeable difference between the governance impact of institutional investors on firms with strong and weak external corporate governance. Higher institutional ownership is associated with real efficiency of firms, but only when external corporate governance is strong. The real efficiency is reflected in higher investment sensitivity to investment opportunities and higher firm value. Utilizing the passing of business combination laws as a negative shock to external corporate governance, the essay identifies that firms with higher institutional ownership suffer a larger decrease in real efficiency, suggesting external corporate governance such as product market competition is critical for institutional investors in disciplining firms. The second essay attempts to figure out the impact of product market competition from an ex ante point of view. Specifically, how does product market competition change the incentive of firms to acquire information about investment opportunities ex ante? The essay provides both a model and a series of extensive empirical tests. The model features a two-stage Bayesian game in differentiated products market competition. This essay finds that competition causes firms to acquire less information and that investment becomes more inefficient in competitive industries. Empirically investment efficiency is measured by a latent variable technique and related to competition using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index as well as more exogenous measure such as trade costs. The panel regression analysis provides strong support for the theory and shows that investment is more efficient in concentrated industries. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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