Wong Chi Leung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-99). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- The Model --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1. --- Environment --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2. --- Autarkic equilibrium --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3. --- Equilibrium with unfettered international capital mobility --- p.14 / Figures of Chapter 2 --- p.20 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Regarding Asymmetric Information Problem as a Subsidy --- p.23 / Chapter 3.1. --- Equilibrium without differential degree in asymmetric information --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2. --- Simulating asymmetric information by a subsidy --- p.26 / Figures of Chapter 3 --- p.29 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Barrier as a Policy Instrument --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1. --- Introduction to barrier policy --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2. --- Fixing southern investment target --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3. --- Possibility of the stabilization policy to improve both countries' steady states --- p.36 / Chapter 4.4. --- Time-invarying barrier for attaining long-run target --- p.44 / Chapter 4.5. --- Inducing worldwide optimal path --- p.50 / Chapter 4.6. --- Precluding poverty trap --- p.56 / Figures of Chapter 4 --- p.59 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- Welfare --- p.66 / Chapter 5.1. --- Welfare effects at the agent level --- p.66 / Chapter 5.2. --- Welfare effects at the country level: introduction --- p.68 / Chapter 5.3. --- Next-period welfare effects at the country level: the South erects the policy --- p.70 / Chapter 5.4. --- Steady-state welfare effects at the country level: the South erects the policy --- p.73 / Chapter 5.5. --- Next-period welfare effects at the country level: the North erects the policy --- p.75 / Chapter 5.6. --- Steady-state welfare effects at the country level: the North erects the policy --- p.78 / Figures of Chapter 5 --- p.83 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Epilogue --- p.84 / "Table of results: a comparison with Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000)" --- p.87 / Appendix --- p.90 / Appendix A --- p.90 / Appendix B --- p.90 / Appendix C --- p.91 / Appendix D --- p.95 / References --- p.98

Firms can use financial derivatives to hedge risks and thereby decrease the probability of bankruptcy and increase total expected tax shields. Firms also can adjust their operational policies in response to fluctuations in prices, a strategy that is often referred to as "operational hedging". In this paper, I investigate the relationship between the optimal financial and operational hedging strategies for a firm, which are endogenously determined together with its capital structure. This allows me to examine how operational hedging affects debt capacity and total expected tax shields and to make quantitative predictions about the relationship between debt issues and hedging policies. I also model the effects of asymmetric information about firms' investment opportunities on their financing and hedging decisions. First, I examine the case in which both debt and hedging contracts are observable. Then, I study the case in which firms' hedging activities are not completely transparent. The models are tested using a data set compiled from the annual reports of North American gold mining companies. Supporting evidence is found for the key predictions of the model under asymmetric information.

Firms can use financial derivatives to hedge risks and thereby decrease the probability of bankruptcy and increase total expected tax shields. Firms also can adjust their operational policies in response to fluctuations in prices, a strategy that is often referred to as "operational hedging". In this paper, I investigate the relationship between the optimal financial and operational hedging strategies for a firm, which are endogenously determined together with its capital structure. This allows me to examine how operational hedging affects debt capacity and total expected tax shields and to make quantitative predictions about the relationship between debt issues and hedging policies. I also model the effects of asymmetric information about firms' investment opportunities on their financing and hedging decisions. First, I examine the case in which both debt and hedging contracts are observable. Then, I study the case in which firms' hedging activities are not completely transparent. The models are tested using a data set compiled from the annual reports of North American gold mining companies. Supporting evidence is found for the key predictions of the model under asymmetric information. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate