Wong Chi Leung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-99). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- The Model --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1. --- Environment --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2. --- Autarkic equilibrium --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3. --- Equilibrium with unfettered international capital mobility --- p.14 / Figures of Chapter 2 --- p.20 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Regarding Asymmetric Information Problem as a Subsidy --- p.23 / Chapter 3.1. --- Equilibrium without differential degree in asymmetric information --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2. --- Simulating asymmetric information by a subsidy --- p.26 / Figures of Chapter 3 --- p.29 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Barrier as a Policy Instrument --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1. --- Introduction to barrier policy --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2. --- Fixing southern investment target --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3. --- Possibility of the stabilization policy to improve both countries' steady states --- p.36 / Chapter 4.4. --- Time-invarying barrier for attaining long-run target --- p.44 / Chapter 4.5. --- Inducing worldwide optimal path --- p.50 / Chapter 4.6. --- Precluding poverty trap --- p.56 / Figures of Chapter 4 --- p.59 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- Welfare --- p.66 / Chapter 5.1. --- Welfare effects at the agent level --- p.66 / Chapter 5.2. --- Welfare effects at the country level: introduction --- p.68 / Chapter 5.3. --- Next-period welfare effects at the country level: the South erects the policy --- p.70 / Chapter 5.4. --- Steady-state welfare effects at the country level: the South erects the policy --- p.73 / Chapter 5.5. --- Next-period welfare effects at the country level: the North erects the policy --- p.75 / Chapter 5.6. --- Steady-state welfare effects at the country level: the North erects the policy --- p.78 / Figures of Chapter 5 --- p.83 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Epilogue --- p.84 / "Table of results: a comparison with Espinosa-Vega, Smith and Yip (2000)" --- p.87 / Appendix --- p.90 / Appendix A --- p.90 / Appendix B --- p.90 / Appendix C --- p.91 / Appendix D --- p.95 / References --- p.98

Part I comprises three chapters (2-4) that analyse the optimal combination of a universal benefit (B≥0) and categorical benefit (C≥0) for an economy where individuals differ in both their ability to work and, if able to work, their productivity. C is ex-ante conditioned on applicants being unable to work, and ex-post conditioned on recipients not working. In Chapter 2 the benefit budget is fixed but the test awarding C makes Type I and Type II errors. Type I errors guarantee B > 0 at the optimum to ensure all unable individuals have positive consumption. The analysis with Type II errors depends on the enforcement of the ex-post condition. Under No Enforcement C > 0 at the optimum conditional on the awards test having some discriminatory power; whilst maximum welfare falls with both error propensities. Under Full Enforcement C > 0 at the optimum always; and whilst maximum welfare falls with the Type I error propensity it may increase with the Type II error propensity. Chapters 3 and 4 generalise the analysis to a linear-income tax framework. In Chapter 3 categorical status is perfectly observable. Optimal linear and piecewise-linear tax expressions are written more generally to capture cases where it is suboptimal to finance categorical transfers to eliminate inequality in the average social marginal value of income. Chapter 4 then derives the optimal linear income tax for the case with classification errors and Full Enforcement. Both equity and efficiency considerations capture the incentives an increase in the tax rate generates for able individuals to apply for C. Part II (Chapter 5) focuses on the decisions of individuals to work when receiving C, given a risk of being detected and fined proportional to C. Under CARA preferences the risk premium associated with the variance in benefit income is convex-increasing in C, thus giving C a role in enforcement.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / A sizeable body of research has attempted to examine the interaction between government spending and private giving known as the crowd-out effect. Most researchers reported that increases of government spending cause decreases of philanthropic giving to different types of nonprofits. However, few studies have attempted to indicate the interaction between government welfare expenditures and private giving to human service organizations even though human service organizations are the most sensitive to the changes of government spending. Additionally, the estimated crowd-out effects with a simple crowd-out model have been criticized for potential endogeneity bias. This paper investigates the total effect of federal government welfare spending on state government expenditures and philanthropic giving to human service organizations (known as joint crowd-out). I used the 2005 wave of the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) to estimate the effect of federal human service grants on state government spending on, and donations to human services. From these reduced-form estimates I infer the levels of simple and joint crowd-out. I found that indicate federal spending on public welfare crowds out private giving to human service organizations while holding control variables constant in the donations equation. However, federal government spending on public welfare crowds in state government spending on public welfare.