This work can be roughly divided into two parts. Initially, it may be considered a continuation of the very interesting research on the topic of Lattice-Valued Convergence Spaces given by Jager [2001, 2005]. The alternate axioms presented here seem to lead to theorems having proofs more closely related to standard arguments used in Convergence Space theory when the Lattice is L = f0; 1g:Various Subcategories are investigated. One such subconstruct is shown to be isomorphic to the category of Lattice Valued Fuzzy Convergence Spaces defined and studied by Jager [2001]. Our principal category is shown to be a topological universe and contains a subconstruct isomorphic to the category of probabilistic convergence spaces discussed in Kent and Richardson [1996] when L = [0; 1]: Fundamental work in lattice-valued convergence from the more general perspective of monads can be found in Gahler [1995]. Secondly, diagonal axioms are defned in the category whose objects consist of all the lattice valued convergence spaces. When the latter lattice is linearly ordered, a diagonal condition is given which characterizes those objects in the category that are determined by probabilistic convergence spaces which are topological. Certain background information regarding filters, convergence spaces, and diagonal axioms with its dual are given in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 describes Probabilistic Convergence and associated Diagonal axioms. Chapter 3 defines Jager convergence and proves that Jager's construct is isomorphic to a bireáective subconstruct of SL-CS. Furthermore, connections between the diagonal axioms discussed and those given by Gahler are explored. In Chapter 4, further categorical properties of SL-CS are discussed and in particular, it is shown that SL-CS is topological, cartesian closed, and extensional. Chapter 5 explores connections between diagonal axioms for objects in the sub construct δ(PCS) and SL-CS. Finally, recommendations for further research are provided.

This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as a single system comprised of pure power, and involves the further contention that ‘pure power’ should not be interpreted as ‘purely dispositional’, if dispositionality means potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested power or ability bestowed upon some bearer. The theoretical positions examined include David Armstrong’s Categoricalism, Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties, Brian Ellis’s New Essentialism, Ullin Place’s Conceptualism, Charles Martin’s and John Heil’s Identity Theory of Properties and Rom Harré’s Theory of Causal Powers. The central concern of this Thesis is to examine reasons for holding a pure-power theory, and to defend such a stance. This involves two tasks. The first requires explaining what plays the substance role in a pure-power world. This Thesis argues that fundamental power, although not categorical, can be considered ontologically-robust and thus able to fulfil the substance role. A second task—answering the challenge put forward by Richard Swinburne and thereafter replicated in various neo-Swinburne arguments—concerns how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained starting from a pure-power base. The Light-like Network Account is put forward in an attempt to show how the manifest world can be derived from fundamental pure power.