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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
41

L'évolution historique de la politique monétaire chinoise / The historical evolution of china’s monetary policy

Han, Junyu 22 June 2017 (has links)
Au cours des six dernières décennies, la Chine a connu un passage d’une économie planifiée à une économie de marché. Durant la même période, un changement profond a eu lieu dans les instruments et la mise en œuvre de la politique monétaire. Cependant, jusqu’à présent, la politique monétaire chinoise se distingue considérablement de celui des économies de marché développées. Durant la période de l’économie planifiée, la Chine a adopté le système de la banque unique et le système de gestion des crédits hautement centralisée. Ces systèmes permettait à la Banque populaire de Chine (la BPC) de contrôler directement le volume d’émission de liquidités et les transferts bancaires par le plan de liquidités et le plan de crédit afin d’ajuster les agrégats monétaires. Durant la période de la transition économique, la Chine a progressivement abandonné son système de la banque unique. Néanmoins, la BPC n’était pas encore une banque centrale véritablement indépendante, parce qu’elle conservait une partie de ses opérations de financement direct à l’appui du développement des agents non-financiers. Même si la BPC a commencé à employer les leviers indirects pour ajuster la dynamique monétaire, elle a continué à mettre en œuvre les instruments d’ajustement direct. En 1994, année où la Chine a entamé des réformes économiques plus importantes, a été établi un système de la banque centrale véritablement indépendant, qui a ensuite été amélioré en 1998. La BPC a exercé, de façon exclusive, les fonctions d’une banque centrale et a mis en œuvre sa politique monétaire principalement à travers des instruments d’ajustement indirect. Cependant, la BPC n’a pas totalement abandonné l’usage du contrôle administratif direct sur les agrégats de crédits. L’autorité monétaire chinoise renforce progressivement le contrôle des activités du système bancaire parallèle, la centralisation de la politique monétaire et son efficacité depuis 2014, par peur de la hausse du levier financier et de l’endettement élevé. / Over the past six decades, China has experienced an institutional change from a planned to a market economy. During the same period, an in-depth change in the instruments and implementation of China’s monetary policy has occurred. However, until now, China’s monetary policy retains considerable differences compared with that of developed market economies. During the planned economy period, China adopted a mono-banking system and a highly centralized credit management system. Under a mono-banking system, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) could directly control the issuance volumes of cash and bank transfers by means of the cash plan and the credit plan to adjust monetary aggregates. During the economic transition period, China gradually abandoned the mono-banking system. However, the PBC still did not become a truly independent central bank because it retained part of its direct financing operations in support of non-financial agents’ development. Although the PBC began to employ indirect levers to adjust monetary dynamics, it continued to implement the monetary policy principally by means of direct adjustment instruments. Since China’s accession into wider economic reforms in 1994, a truly independent central banking system was established and eventually improved in 1998. The PBC has exclusively exercised the functions of a central bank and implemented its monetary policy principally by means of indirect adjustment instruments; however, it did not fully abandon the use of direct administrative controls over credit aggregates. Out of fear for rising financial leverage and high indebtedness (in particular of non-financial corporations), since 2014 China’s monetary authority gradually enhanced the monitoring of shadow banking activities, and thereby the centralization and effectiveness of monetary policy.
42

Česká národní banka, právní postavení a náplň činnosti / Czech national bank, legal status and content of activity

Semecký, Petr January 2011 (has links)
disertační práce Petr Semecký Česká národní banka, právní postavení a náplň činnosti 5 Abstract A. Objectives The main goal of the dissertation "The Czech National Bank, legal status and content of activity" is to quantify, qualify and draw as exact as possible conclusions about some aspects of the development, status and activities of the Czech National Bank in the future. To solve this task, the author has used in the introduction of this work three following key questions: 1. What are the implications for the Czech National Bank of the new bodies supervising the financial markets at european level? 2. What are the benefits and negatives of adopting the euro for the Czech Republic and should the Czech Republic actually join the European Monetary Union? 3. What impact will have the amendment of the Capital Adequacy Directive (the "Basel II") on the activities of the Czech National Bank? B. Methods By creating this work was used a wide range of research methods to ensure that there will be drawn conclusions with the best possible informative value. It is possible to mention particularly the method of recherche, abstraction, comparison and synthesis. C. Sources As the most important sources used by creating the work can be mentioned ecpecially, scientific publications, monographs, articles published...
43

Parliamentary control of public money

Bateman, William January 2018 (has links)
This dissertation analyses the idea that parliament controls public money in parliamentary constitutional systems of government. That analysis proceeds through an historical and contemporary examination of the way legal practices distribute authority over public money between different institutions of government. The legislative and judicial practices concerning taxation, public expenditure, sovereign borrowing, and the government financing activities of central banks are selected for close attention. The contemporary analysis focuses on the design and operation of those legal practices in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Australia, in the context of the boom-bust-recovery economic conditions experienced between 2005 and 2016. The dissertation's ultimate claims are explanatory: that "parliamentary control" is a poor explanation of the distribution of financial authority in parliamentary systems of government and should be jettisoned in favour of an idea of "parliamentary ratification". An empirically engaged methodology is adopted throughout the dissertation and (historical and contemporary) public sector financial data enrich the legal analysis. The dissertation acknowledges the impact of, but remains agnostic between, different economic and political perspectives on fiscal discipline and public financial administration. The dissertation makes a number of original contributions. It provides a detailed examination of the historical development, legal operation and constitutional significance of annual appropriation legislation, and the legal regimes governing sovereign borrowing and monetary finance. It also analyses the way that law interacts with government behaviour in situations of economic emergencies (focusing on the Bank of England's public financing activities since 2008), and the institutional and doctrinal obstacles facing judicial involvement in disputes concerning public finance (focusing on the Australian judiciary's recent engagements with public expenditure legislation).

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