O objetivo do trabalho será avaliar se os efeitos da crise financeira de 2008 relativizaram as características da autonomia dos bancos centrais, que são conceitualmente vinculadas à manutenção da estabilidade de preços como objetivo singular da política monetária. Devido a seu perfil institucional e seu contexto de atuação, as decisões do Banco de México (Banxico) servirão como estudo de caso. A análise busca demonstrar que, diante da severidade dos efeitos da crise, o Banxico optou por aplicar uma política monetária eclética no período, já que abandonou ocasionalmente seu mandato constitucional orientado para a estabilidade de preços, mesmo que sem prejuízos ao cumprimento das metas de inflação. Por um lado, o banco seguiu conservador na utilização da taxa de juros como principal instrumento monetário, sem recorrer à compra direta de ativos e outros mecanismos não convencionais aplicados nos países industrializados. Por outro, demonstrou sensibilidade à degradação do cenário internacional e à atividade doméstica, tanto ao manter os juros inalterados durante um longo período, como ao reduzi-los sucessivamente diante do desempenho fraco da produção entre 2013 e 2014. Assim, ao menos durante a crise, o comportamento do Banxico se afastou das definições convencionais sobre a autonomia do banco central, o que reforçou a natureza política da organização. / This article aims to evaluate if the effects of the 2008 financial crisis relativized the main characteristics of the central bank\'s autonomy, that are conceptually related to the maintenance of price stability as a single objective of the monetary policy. Due to its institutional profile and its operational context, the decisions of the Banco de Mexico (Banxico) will serve as a case study. The analysis seek to demonstrate that, despite the severity of the crisis, Banxico has chosen to apply na eclectic monetary policy in the period, as it occasionally abandoned its constitutional mandate oriented towards price stability, even without harm to the achievement of its inflation targets. On the one hand, the bank remained conservative in the use of the interest rate as the main monetary instrument, without resorting to the direct asset purchase or other non-conventional mechanisms applied by industrialized countries. On the other, the bank demonstrated sensitivity to the degradation of the international markets and domestic activity, both by keeping the interest rate at the same level for a longer period as by reducing it succesively before the poor output performance between 2013 and 2014. Thus, at least during the crisis, Banxico\'s behavior departed from the conventional definitions of the autonomy of central banks, which reinforced the political nature of the organization.

O objetivo central desta tese é desenvolver a análise de três bancos centrais e seu desenho institucional para o exercício do poder monetário. O estudo visa a analisar mecanismos de hard law (estabelecido por tratados, constituições ou leis) destinados à accountability política e social de três bancos centrais: Banco Central do Brasil (Bacen), Banco Central Europeu (BCE) e Federal Reserve dos Estados Unidos (Fed). Este trabalho também pretende explorar mecanismos de soft law criados por iniciativa de bancos centrais, os quais desempenham papel importante para a sua legitimidade e para sua accountability. Este estudo adota uma abordagem jurídica específica: o direito e a análise jurídica como mecanismos de imaginação institucional em uma democracia política. O direito é concebido como instrumento para a estruturação da accountability política e social da gestão monetária por bancos centrais. Esta tese sustenta que os mecanismos de prestação de contas e responsabilização de autoridades monetárias podem sustentar a legitimidade de suas ações no tempo. As principais hipóteses deste estudo são: (i) os mecanismos de hard law parecem não revelar todos os instrumentos de accountability para os bancos centrais estudados; (ii) apesar de esses mecanismos representarem importante componente de sua moldura jurídica, destinada a assegurar sua prestação de contas e sua responsabilização política e social, instrumentos de soft law têm provocado mudanças institucionais significativas (e de forma mais rápida) na legitimidade e na accountability desses bancos centrais; (iii) o contexto institucional nos quais bancos centrais operam é variável relevante para se pensar sobre o desenho de mecanismos jurídicos de accountability; e (iv) com base nas hipóteses (i) a (iii), este estudo entende que a concepção e o papel do direito nesse domínio precisariam ser repensados e reconstruídos e esta tese apresenta algumas propostas nesse intuito. / The central goal of this dissertation is to develop an analysis of three central banks and their institutional design for the exercise of monetary power. The study aims at analyzing hard law mechanisms (established by treaties, constitutions or statutes) for the political and social accountability of three central banks: Brazilian Central Bank (Bacen), European Central Bank (ECB) and Federal Reserve (Fed). The dissertation also intends to explore the soft law mechanisms created by the central banks themselves, which in some institutions play an important role for their legitimacy and accountability. This study provides a specific legal approach: law as an instrument of institutional design in a political democracy. It conceives law as an instrument for the construction of the monetary policys political and social accountability. This dissertation claims that the mechanisms of accountability can sustain the legitimacy of central banks actions. The hypotheses of this study are: (i) the current hard law framework does not reveal all the mechanisms for political and social accountability for the central banks under study; (ii) while hard law mechanisms still represent an important component of the framework designed to build and ensure political and social accountability, soft law mechanisms are causing more and faster institutional changes in central banks accountability and legitimacy; (iii) the institutional context in which central banks operate is a relevant variable in order to conceive the design of accountability mechanisms; and (iv) building on the findings of (i), (ii) and (iii), the conception and the role of law in this domain have to be rethought and rebuilt and the dissertation presents some proposals in that purpose.

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.    Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.    Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.    Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability    Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.    Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.    Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.    Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability    Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

O objetivo central desta tese é desenvolver a análise de três bancos centrais e seu desenho institucional para o exercício do poder monetário. O estudo visa a analisar mecanismos de hard law (estabelecido por tratados, constituições ou leis) destinados à accountability política e social de três bancos centrais: Banco Central do Brasil (Bacen), Banco Central Europeu (BCE) e Federal Reserve dos Estados Unidos (Fed). Este trabalho também pretende explorar mecanismos de soft law criados por iniciativa de bancos centrais, os quais desempenham papel importante para a sua legitimidade e para sua accountability. Este estudo adota uma abordagem jurídica específica: o direito e a análise jurídica como mecanismos de imaginação institucional em uma democracia política. O direito é concebido como instrumento para a estruturação da accountability política e social da gestão monetária por bancos centrais. Esta tese sustenta que os mecanismos de prestação de contas e responsabilização de autoridades monetárias podem sustentar a legitimidade de suas ações no tempo. As principais hipóteses deste estudo são: (i) os mecanismos de hard law parecem não revelar todos os instrumentos de accountability para os bancos centrais estudados; (ii) apesar de esses mecanismos representarem importante componente de sua moldura jurídica, destinada a assegurar sua prestação de contas e sua responsabilização política e social, instrumentos de soft law têm provocado mudanças institucionais significativas (e de forma mais rápida) na legitimidade e na accountability desses bancos centrais; (iii) o contexto institucional nos quais bancos centrais operam é variável relevante para se pensar sobre o desenho de mecanismos jurídicos de accountability; e (iv) com base nas hipóteses (i) a (iii), este estudo entende que a concepção e o papel do direito nesse domínio precisariam ser repensados e reconstruídos e esta tese apresenta algumas propostas nesse intuito. / The central goal of this dissertation is to develop an analysis of three central banks and their institutional design for the exercise of monetary power. The study aims at analyzing hard law mechanisms (established by treaties, constitutions or statutes) for the political and social accountability of three central banks: Brazilian Central Bank (Bacen), European Central Bank (ECB) and Federal Reserve (Fed). The dissertation also intends to explore the soft law mechanisms created by the central banks themselves, which in some institutions play an important role for their legitimacy and accountability. This study provides a specific legal approach: law as an instrument of institutional design in a political democracy. It conceives law as an instrument for the construction of the monetary policys political and social accountability. This dissertation claims that the mechanisms of accountability can sustain the legitimacy of central banks actions. The hypotheses of this study are: (i) the current hard law framework does not reveal all the mechanisms for political and social accountability for the central banks under study; (ii) while hard law mechanisms still represent an important component of the framework designed to build and ensure political and social accountability, soft law mechanisms are causing more and faster institutional changes in central banks accountability and legitimacy; (iii) the institutional context in which central banks operate is a relevant variable in order to conceive the design of accountability mechanisms; and (iv) building on the findings of (i), (ii) and (iii), the conception and the role of law in this domain have to be rethought and rebuilt and the dissertation presents some proposals in that purpose.

O objetivo do trabalho será avaliar se os efeitos da crise financeira de 2008 relativizaram as características da autonomia dos bancos centrais, que são conceitualmente vinculadas à manutenção da estabilidade de preços como objetivo singular da política monetária. Devido a seu perfil institucional e seu contexto de atuação, as decisões do Banco de México (Banxico) servirão como estudo de caso. A análise busca demonstrar que, diante da severidade dos efeitos da crise, o Banxico optou por aplicar uma política monetária eclética no período, já que abandonou ocasionalmente seu mandato constitucional orientado para a estabilidade de preços, mesmo que sem prejuízos ao cumprimento das metas de inflação. Por um lado, o banco seguiu conservador na utilização da taxa de juros como principal instrumento monetário, sem recorrer à compra direta de ativos e outros mecanismos não convencionais aplicados nos países industrializados. Por outro, demonstrou sensibilidade à degradação do cenário internacional e à atividade doméstica, tanto ao manter os juros inalterados durante um longo período, como ao reduzi-los sucessivamente diante do desempenho fraco da produção entre 2013 e 2014. Assim, ao menos durante a crise, o comportamento do Banxico se afastou das definições convencionais sobre a autonomia do banco central, o que reforçou a natureza política da organização. / This article aims to evaluate if the effects of the 2008 financial crisis relativized the main characteristics of the central bank\'s autonomy, that are conceptually related to the maintenance of price stability as a single objective of the monetary policy. Due to its institutional profile and its operational context, the decisions of the Banco de Mexico (Banxico) will serve as a case study. The analysis seek to demonstrate that, despite the severity of the crisis, Banxico has chosen to apply na eclectic monetary policy in the period, as it occasionally abandoned its constitutional mandate oriented towards price stability, even without harm to the achievement of its inflation targets. On the one hand, the bank remained conservative in the use of the interest rate as the main monetary instrument, without resorting to the direct asset purchase or other non-conventional mechanisms applied by industrialized countries. On the other, the bank demonstrated sensitivity to the degradation of the international markets and domestic activity, both by keeping the interest rate at the same level for a longer period as by reducing it succesively before the poor output performance between 2013 and 2014. Thus, at least during the crisis, Banxico\'s behavior departed from the conventional definitions of the autonomy of central banks, which reinforced the political nature of the organization.

Thesis is dealing with the development of the central banking on the basis of experience from the last decade. Hypothesis is the statement, whether the central banks of the developed economies are increasingly less capable of the effective reactions on the accelerating development of the global economy and their position in the money emission and regulation of the banking sector is and will be more and more weakened by the alternative banking and monetary systems. This hypothesis is successfully disproved because of the behavior of the four chosen central banks which are CNB, FED, ECB and BoJ. The main reason was an increase in their activities and interventions causing among others multiplication of their balance sheets. On the other hand the alternative in the free banking is further from the reality than before. Virtual currencies also did not show threatening growth of the national currencies substitution in the reference period. Thesis also provides insight into new and potentially new instruments of the central banks.

The issue of competences of central bank in monetary or foreign exchange policy, the optimal adjustment of regulation and supervision of financial market and also the necessary independence of this institution is subjected to intensive discussion at the present time economic policy. In the theoretical part I will define basic concepts and definitions relating to this issue. From a theoretical point of view I will describe the concept and function of central banking, the independence of central bank, its types and optimal settings. I will also characterize the regulation and supervision of financial markets with regard to the definitions, models, systems, objectives and instruments of this issue. I will define the basic theoretical aspects of monetary and foreign exchange policy. In the analytical part I will process an analysis of selected indicators of activities and powers of the central bank in our country since 1989, mainly from the independence of the central bank, setting of monetary policy, financial market supervision and foreign exchange policy. I will make a comparison of changes in the development and activities of central banks in these areas with regard to trends in the legislation and their powers. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the development of selected indicators of activity of the central bank in our country with a focus on the transformation of the Czech economy with a summary of significant changes.

The Czech National Bank, its legal status and scope of activities Abstract The theme of this thesis is the Czech National Bank, its legal status and scope of activities. The aim of the thesis is to describe and analyse the development of central banking and to evaluate current legal status of the Czech National Bank. Due to the volume of the Czech National Bank's activities, the work is focused only on the supervisory activities of the Czech National Bank and on the examination of the functioning of the unified supervision system. The thesis is divided into five parts. The first part deals with theoretical issues of the emergence of central banking and with the functions of central banks. The following part deals with the development of central banking in the Czech lands from the time of the Austrian Empire until the establishment of the independent Czech Republic. The third part of the thesis describes legal status of the Czech National Bank, its establishment in the Constitution of the Czech Republic, its tasks, objectives and its independence. Furthermore, the thesis describes bank's relationship with other constitutional institutions, its organizational structure, management and regulatory activities. The fourth part of the thesis deals with the supervisory activities of the Czech National Bank. At the...

Diese Arbeit umfasst drei Kapitel, die die Debatte über Zentralbankpolitik, insbesondere im Hinblick auf transnationale Dimensionen, bereichern. Dabei zielt das Projekt darauf ab, die bestehende Literatur zu ergänzen, indem es ein besseres Verständnis der internationalen Geldpolitik unter Einsatz mikroökonomischer Daten fördert. Das erste Kapitel untersucht, wie sich die Geldpolitik der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) auf den Lohnquote auf Unternehmensebene auswirkt, und legt nahe, dass die Wirksamkeit der Geldpolitik von der Arbeitsintensität der Produktion abhängt. Die Ergebnisse fließen in die politische Debatte über Transmission und Umverteilungseffekte der Geldpolitik ein. Das zweite Kapitel liefert empirische Belege dafür, dass die Geldpolitik im gesamten Euro-Gebiet den industriellen Wettbewerb auf den lokalen Märkten beeinflusst. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass eine Verschärfung des geldpolitischen Kurses mit einem Rückgang des Wettbewerbs verbunden ist (und umgekehrt), und dass dieser Effekt beträchtlich und signifikant ist. Dieses Kapitel unterstreicht, dass niedrige Zinssätze den Marktwettbewerb und antimonopolistische Tendenzen in einem Umfeld der bankbasierten Kreditvergabe unterstützen können. Das dritte Kapitel beleuchtet Kooperation unter Zentralbanken in Form von Swap-Linien, die zwischen den sechs wohl wichtigsten Zentralbanken (Anm.: der US-Notenbank, EZB, Bank of England, Schweizerische Nationalbank, Bank of Canada und der Bank of Japan.) eröffnet wurden: während der globalen Finanzkrise 2007/08. Diese Fazilität entwickelte sich schließlich zu einer ständigen internationalen Fazilität als Kreditgeber letzter Instanz, und fungiert als öffentliche Liquiditätssicherung für Eurodollarmärkte. Auf der Grundlage eines Interpretationsrahmens der politökonomischen Analyse stellen wir rationalistische Ansätze in Frage, indem wir zeigen, dass Zentralbanker:innen ihre Krisenerfindungen schließlich institutionalisieren. Wir beantworten die Frage, wie der öffentliche Backstop für den größten Finanzmarkt - den Eurodollarmarkt - im Jahr 2013 entstanden ist. Insgesamt unterstreichen die Ergebnisse meiner Dissertation die wichtige Rolle der Geldpolitik im Hinblick auf politisch relevante und umstrittene Dimensionen. Insbesondere analysiere ich die Ursachen und Folgen des internationalen Zentralbankwesens und trage zur öffentlichen Debatte um Zentralbanken bei. Meine Untersuchung zeigt, dass Geldpolitik reale Auswirkungen haben kann, und legt nahe, dass eine tiefere Integration des Euroraums und der internationalen Geldmärkte ratsam erscheint. / This thesis includes three chapters that inform the debate about central bank policies, especially with respect to trans-national dimensions. Thereby, the project aims at complementing the existing literature by fostering a better understanding of international monetary policy under the use of micro-economic data. The first chapter investigates how monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) affects the labor share at the firm-level, and suggests that the effectiveness of monetary policy may depend on the labor intensity of production. The results inform the policy debate on transmission and redistribution effects of monetary policy. The second chapter provides empirical evidence that euro-area wide monetary policy affects industrial competition in local markets. The findings suggest that tightening the policy stance is associated with a decline in competition (and vice versa), and this effect is sizeable and significant. This chapter highlights that low interest rates may support market competition and anti-monopolistic tendencies in an environment of bank-based lending. The third chapter sheds light on central bank cooperation in the shape of swap lines opened between the six major centrals banks (These are: The US Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England, Swiss National Bank, Bank of Canada, and the Bank of Japan.) during the Global Financial Crisis 2007/08. This facility ultimately developed into a permanent international lender of last resort facility, and acts a public liquidity backstop to Eurodollar markets. Building an interpretative framework of political economic analysis, we contrast rationalist approaches by showing that central bankers eventually institutionalize their crisis inventions. We answer the question of how the public backstop for the largest financial market - the eurodollar market - emerged in 2013. Taken together, the findings in my dissertation highlight the important role of monetary policy with respect to politically relevant and contested dimensions. In particular, I analyse the causes and consequences of international central banking and contribute to the public debate about central bank skepticism. My research shows that monetary policy can have real effects, and suggests that a deeper integration of the euro area and international money markets seem advisable.