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Inflation targeting is a monetary policy regime, characterized by public announcement of official target ranges or quantitative targets for price level increases and by explicit acknowledgement that low inflation is the most crucial long-run objective of the monetary authorities. There are three prerequisites for inflation targeting: 1)central bank independence,2)having a sole target,3)existence of stable and predictable relationship between monetary policy instruments and inflation.In many developing countries, the use of seigniorage revenues as an important source of financing public debts, the lack of commitment to low inflation as a primary goal by monetary authorities, considerable exchange rate flexibility, lack of substantial operational independence of the central bank or of powerful models to make domestic inflation forecasts hinder the satisfaction of these requirements. This study investigates the applicability of inflation targeting to the Turkish economy. Central bank independence in Turkey has been mainly hindered by "fiscal dominance" through monetization of high budget deficits. In addition, although serious steps have been taken recently under a new law to have an independent central bank, such as formal commitment to the achievement of price stability as the primary objective and the prohibition of credit extension to the government, the central bank does not satisfy independence criteria due to the problems associated with the appointment of the government and the share of the Treasury within the bank. Having a sole inflation target was hindered by the existence of fixed exchange rate system throughout the years. However, in February 2001, Turkey switched to a floating exchange rate regime, which is important for a successful inflation-targeting regime. Having a sole target within the system has also been supported by the new central bank law, which gives priority to price stability and supports any other objective as long as it is consistent with price stability. In this thesis, an empirical investigation has been made in order to assess the statistical readiness of Turkey to satisfy the requirements of inflation-targeting by making use of vector autoregressive (VAR) models. The results suggest that inflation is an inertial phenomenon in Turkey and money, interest rates and nominal exchange rates innovations are not economically and statistically important determinants of prices. Most of the variances in prices are explained by prices themselves. According to the VAR evidence, the direct linkages between monetary policy instruments and inflation do not seem to be strong, stable, and predictable. As a result, while the second requirement of the inflation-targeting regime seems to have been satisfied, there are still problems associated with the central bank independence and the existence of stable and predictable relationship between monetary policy instruments and inflation in Turkey. / Master of Arts

This article will verify whether the central banks create political business cycles or not. To refer to the Opportunistic Model operated by Leetouwer and Maier (2002), this research will expand the acquisition time of data till the fourth season of 2008, and added Korea¡BMalaysia and Taiwan into the model. In this article, the independent variables will be the rates announced by central banks of these ten countries. The dependent variables will be the date of president/parliamentary elections and the independence of central bank to verify before the elections whether will the central banks create political business cycles through setting lower rate in monetary policy are pressured by rules or not. The empirical results show that: 1.The assumption of Central banks will use interest rates to create a political business cycle does not hold. This complements with Leetouwer and Maier¡¦s results studied in 2002, the interest rate cannot be used as a tool to create political business cycle. 2. The higher independence of central bank, the interest rate introduced by central bank will be lower, and as well as the inflation rate.

1 Abstract The thesis constructs the indices of independence, transparency and accountability of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) and European Central Bank (ECB). The results for the NBG are compared with the ECB and policy recommendations for the NBG based on ECB practice are suggested. The results of the analyses show that the ECB has achieved almost full independence and transparency in conducting the monetary policy but there are less favorable results in case of accountability. The NBG, even though revealed a gradual increase in its independence, transparency and accountability since 1998, still needs to put more effort into improving its autonomy, communication practices and responsibility.

A substantial amount of prior research has focused on the relation between Central Bank Independence (CBI) and inflation control. However, this research is mainly theoretical or conducted using cross-country statistical regressions and correlations in the developed world. Little attention has been given to understanding this relation in emerging nations or the influence of interest groups on CBI and inflation in a specific context. This thesis addresses both gaps by conducting an in-depth observation and analysis of this relation in a single country (Lebanon) and the influence of the banking sector on both CBI and inflation during a period of high inflation. This empirical evidence in the case of Lebanon shows that Central Bank Independence from the government – even though abundant and complete – was not enough to control inflation. The influence of the banking sector on both CBI and inflation was more important. This work makes a contribution to knowledge through highlighting the importance of national contexts when evaluating the CBI-inflation relation. Furthermore, this research extends our understanding of the literature and its gaps, and presents a new way to conduct in-depth studies in the field. Finally, it provides practical insights that are of importance to central bankers, especially in emerging nations.

Magister Legum - LLM / South Africa

In this thesis, we aim to unveil potential relation between gold in the reserves of central banks and the independence of these institutions. As a reaction to several statements of central bank representatives, we assume that gold might be a determinant of central banks' independence. Following these statements, the key contribution of this thesis was defined: to verify these declarations and the general belief of gold's role within central banks' reserves in the relation to their independence, using empirical data. For that purpose, we examine panel data consisting of information from 145 countries between years 1970 and 2012. As for the control variables, economic variables such as GDP per capita, inflation, exchange rate regime, current account to GDP and broad money and political variables from the range of word governance indicators are employed. The regression results of basic model obtained by fixed effects estimation suggest that, indeed, there might be a significant effect of share of gold on the central bank independence index. However, as the results imply negative relation, we cannot confirm if the effect is real due to endogeneity problem. Moreover, the effect of gold reserves on the central bank independence was not confirmed when employing a different estimation technique -...

A substantial amount of prior research has focused on the relation between Central Bank Independence (CBI) and inflation control. However, this research is mainly theoretical or conducted using cross-country statistical regressions and correlations in the developed world. Little attention has been given to understanding this relation in emerging nations or the influence of interest groups on CBI and inflation in a specific context. This thesis addresses both gaps by conducting an in-depth observation and analysis of this relation in a single country (Lebanon) and the influence of the banking sector on both CBI and inflation during a period of high inflation. This empirical evidence in the case of Lebanon shows that Central Bank Independence from the government – even though abundant and complete – was not enough to control inflation. The influence of the banking sector on both CBI and inflation was more important. This work makes a contribution to knowledge through highlighting the importance of national contexts when evaluating the CBI-inflation relation. Furthermore, this research extends our understanding of the literature and its gaps, and presents a new way to conduct in-depth studies in the field. Finally, it provides practical insights that are of importance to central bankers, especially in emerging nations.

This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact. / This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact.

The objective of the thesis was to study monetary policy frameworks in developing countries. The thesis focused on three aspects of the monetary framework; the degree of central bank independence, the monetary policy strategy and the exchange rate regime. The research applied quantitative empirical analysis and in-depth case studies on Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. The empirical research investigated three areas: 1) the phenomenon of ‘fear of floating’ and the correlation between exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility; 2) the degree of monetary policy independence in developing countries in the context of their increased integration into the global economic system; and 3) the degree of central bank independence and how it impacts both ‘fear of floating’ and monetary policy independence. The case studies allowed for an in-depth understanding of the process of setting monetary policy and the constraints under which it is formulated in developing countries. The results that emerged from the quantitative analysis highlight the impact of central bank independence in influencing the other aspects of the monetary framework, as it can mitigate fear of floating and contribute to increased monetary policy independence of world interest rates in developing countries. The case studies detailed the evolution of monetary frameworks in three countries with varying degrees of central bank independence. The degree of central bank independence increased in Egypt and Jordan as a result of severe currency crises in each country, while Lebanon provides a very different example of a developing country with an independent central bank since its inception. The conclusions that emerged from the cases suggest that central bank independence is critical in achieving exchange rate and price stability; however, developing countries should avoid focusing on exchange rate stability at the expense of other considerations for extended periods of time. In that, the results point to the benefits of proactively and pre-emptively managing the exchange rate regime. The cases also highlight the importance of the coordination between fiscal and monetary policies, as conditions of fiscal profligacy can undermine even the most independent central bank.