Existing interest group theory describes legislative decision-making as a communication process whereby interest groups research information on issues, combine this information with constituent opinions, and present the resulting information to legislators. Legislators then use this information in developing legislation. The original source of information used by lobbyists greatly impacts the interest group’s ability to effectively represent its policy objectives in the decision-making process. The purpose of this study was to identify and evaluate sources of information utilized by selected California agricultural interest groups. This study determined common sources used among selected California agricultural interest groups, how and why groups choose their sources, the role of trust in information source selection, and what purposes interest groups have for using the information. Data from this study suggest lobbyists of California agricultural interest groups are primarily researching for lobbying purposes. Lobbyists acknowledged the importance of research in their lobbying work. Specifically, two main themes developed from the interviewees’ responses: 1) lobbyists gather the political and technical information needed to thoroughly understand an issue before lobbying on it, and 2) lobbyists find the appropriate information to support their organization’s policy objectives. The purpose of their research and the type of information needed drive how lobbyists research an issue and what information sources they utilize. Lobbyists rely on their previous experiences to determine which sources will provide them with the necessary information. Data from this study suggest four main factors that impact which information sources lobbyists choose to utilize: 1) what information is needed, 2) who their contacts and personal relationships are with, 3) how much they trust potential sources, and 4) other characteristics of the sources such as accessibility, quality and accuracy, brevity and readability, experience of source, current information, scientifically-based, sincere, and/or a source that provides needed pictures or graphics.

Policy-minded legislatures have a number of tools to implement policy at their disposal. On the one hand, they can write specific legislation and ensure that their policy wishes are accurately carried out. On the other hand, legislatures can delegate this authority to administrative agencies, and, with broad authority, allow them to formulate policy in a manner consistent with the preferences of the agency. This "delegation game" has received significant scholarly attention, and scholars have noted that the political context within which legislatures make this decision affects whether or not delegation will occur. Scholars have also examined the role that interest groups play in this game, yet studies at the interest group level are few in number. Interest groups are strategic actors that formulate strategies of lobbying in a manner that maximizes their potential influence per their resources. As such, interest groups should formulate lobbying strategies that take into consideration the delegation game that legislatures play when formulating policy. In this paper, I develop a game-theoretic model of legislative delegation and examine interest group lobbying strategies within that context. The equilibria from the game that I present: (1) Confirm previous studies of legislative delegation that argue legislatures delegate in a strategic manner given differing political conditions and (2) Suggests that indeed interest groups are strategic actors who develop lobbying strategies based on the expected actions of the legislature.

Existing interest group theory describes legislative decision-making as a communication process whereby interest groups research information on issues, combine this information with constituent opinions, and present the resulting information to legislators. Legislators then use this information in developing legislation. The original source of information used by lobbyists greatly impacts the interest group’s ability to effectively represent its policy objectives in the decision-making process. The purpose of this study was to identify and evaluate sources of information utilized by selected California agricultural interest groups. This study determined common sources used among selected California agricultural interest groups, how and why groups choose their sources, the role of trust in information source selection, and what purposes interest groups have for using the information. Data from this study suggest lobbyists of California agricultural interest groups are primarily researching for lobbying purposes. Lobbyists acknowledged the importance of research in their lobbying work. Specifically, two main themes developed from the interviewees’ responses: 1) lobbyists gather the political and technical information needed to thoroughly understand an issue before lobbying on it, and 2) lobbyists find the appropriate information to support their organization’s policy objectives. The purpose of their research and the type of information needed drive how lobbyists research an issue and what information sources they utilize. Lobbyists rely on their previous experiences to determine which sources will provide them with the necessary information. Data from this study suggest four main factors that impact which information sources lobbyists choose to utilize: 1) what information is needed, 2) who their contacts and personal relationships are with, 3) how much they trust potential sources, and 4) other characteristics of the sources such as accessibility, quality and accuracy, brevity and readability, experience of source, current information, scientifically-based, sincere, and/or a source that provides needed pictures or graphics.

Elections are one way in which interest groups seek to advance their policy goals. Policy studies and election studies have approached this issue differently, leaving unanswered questions about the relationship between interest group policy goals and electoral involvement. This report helps to fill the gaps by applying conventional wisdom to the unstudied question of interest group support for primary challengers. Its findings amend the conventional wisdom in a few key ways. While legislative access does have a negative effect on challenger support, a group-specific measure of access rather than a type-based inference shows the effect to extend beyond groups traditionally thought of as access-seekers. Further, interest in legislative access does not preclude targeted support for challengers by these groups. This suggests that groups may be more sensitive to political circumstances and willing to achieve policy goals through elections than previously thought. / text

Current educational policy theory recognizes two legitimate levels of educational decision-making, provincial ministries/departments of education and local school boards. The purpose of this thesis was to investigate whether a new, third level (i.e., a judicial level) of educational policy-making is evolving in Canada More specifically, the thesis examines the contemporary educational policy-making context in order to ascertain if the nature of educational policy-making structures, changes in the nature and activity of educational interest groups, and changes in the roles and philosophy of the Canadian judiciary may, in conjunction, be creating an unrecognized level of educational policy-making in this country. In addition, the thesis seeks to examine the possible implications of such an addition to the educational policy equation. Conceptually, the thesis is divided into three parts: (a) a review of the literature concerning interest groups, the Canadian courts, and educational policy-making, and the relationships which exist among these phenomena; (b) a questionnaire survey polling the perceptions of knowledgeable professionals concerning these phenomena and their relationships; and, (c) intensive interviews of 24 individuals representing interest groups and decision-making bodies which have been involved in educational policy litigation. Data gathered in the study supported perceptions found in the literature which suggested: (a) that the educational policy process is becoming increasingly centralized and less accessible to input from groups representing special interests; (b) that interest groups are becoming more numerous, more aggressive and more likely to use litigation as a method of influencing educational policy; and, (c) that the courts are adopting a more quasi-legislative role and a more liberal philosophy, primarily, but not exclusively, as a result of the implementation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In conjunction, these factors appear to set the stage for significant judicial decisions which could fundamentally alter traditional conceptions of legitimate, accountable, educational policy-making. Of particular interest is the possible leveling, or nationalizing, effect of judicial decisions in the constitutionally sensitive area of educational policy.

No description available.

We frequently hear that Latinos are the fastest growing minority group in the United States. We also know that like many American immigrant groups, Latinos tend to reside in states where a critical mass of their community already is settled, in this case largely for geo-political reasons (e.g. New Mexico, Arizona, California, Texas, Florida and New York). Why, then, is Latino participation in national politics lower than white, Black, and Asian voters? And who has an interest in doing something about it? This project addresses several interrelated questions concerning the place of Latinos in American politics and the health of democracy in the United States. Political parties are meant to link citizens to the state. However, parties often fear that reaching out to certain groups may alienate the concerns of some core voters, providing a disincentive to political parties to prioritize Latino outreach. Here, I ask, to what degree are local political parties involved in mobilizing Latino voters as compared to other voting groups? Interest groups have much narrower constituencies than political parties by definition, but their purpose may not be exclusively, or even primarily, electoral. So, what role do interest groups and community organizations play in getting Latinos to vote? Perhaps parties and interest groups compliment each other's efforts to mobilize Latinos, so I ask, what relationship do political parties and interest groups develop in the push to mobilize Latino voters? I hypothesize that political parties increase efforts to mobilize Latino communities when these groups of voters are known to be reliable partisan voters and pivotal to winning elections at the local, state, and/or national level. Party organizations are unlikely to target Latino voters when they are few in number and make little difference in an election. Second, interest groups and organizations concerned with Latinos issues are going to be more consistent in mobilizing Latino voters whether or not they constitute a significant segment of the population and are pivotal to winning elections at the local, state, and/or national level. To answer these questions, I use several methods to gather data. Between November of 2008 and February 2009, I conducted a mail survey of 217 county political party chairs concerning Latino mobilization in the 2008 Presidential race. The survey was submitted to the chairs of every county political party in the ten states with the highest percentage of Latino population: Arizona, California, Nevada, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Texas. Responses were then matched to county census and election data in order to understand the relationship between mobilization activity, county demographics, and partisan identity. What best predicts Latino mobilization? Using a multiple regression model, I found that Latino population size threshold and whether a county resides in a presidential swing state most strongly predict Latino mobilization. The greater the size of the Latino community within a county's population, the more likely political parties will seek to reach out to Latino voters. The data suggests that the likelihood that local parties made an attempt to mobilize Latino voters more than doubles when the county's Latino population moves above 25% of the total population. The impact of interest group activity by community organizations also seemed to spur greater party mobilization efforts towards Latinos. Likewise, national political dynamics have a trickle down impact on local Latino communities. County party organizations are more inclined to reach out to Latino voters in states where presidential elections are contested and where Latino votes could have an impact on close elections. Lastly, I conducted a qualitative case study to understand how this mobilization operates in practice. I explored strategies taken by several interest groups and community organization leaders in Nevada during the 2010 midterm elections to detail how those groups attempt to reach and mobilize Latinos, and the possible position political parties may fill in Latino communities where interest groups have become important politically in mobilizing voters, and vice versa. The case study reveals that Latino mobilization by parties and interest groups is part of a larger phenomenon in contemporary American elections in which voters are targeted by a partisan network of political actors that employ political parties, partisan interest groups, party and outside spending organization donors, and partisan volunteers. My work parallels and expands Mildred A. Schwartz's work (1990) on party networks and the complexity of relationships between political parties and interest groups to include how these political actors interact with Latino voters in the United States. / Political Science

Diploma paper "Rentseeking in the Czech legal system" is focused on the analysis of interest groups, their forms, procedures and instruments, which they use for rentseeking activities in the Czech Republic. The first section explains the concept rentseeking, the second part redefines this concept into national environment, the case studies are analyzed in the third part and the fourth is concentrated on specific interest groups in the Czech Republic.

Esta dissertação aborda o tema do futebol, inserido na discussão teórica da ciência política, especialmente a que trata dos grupos de interesse, com destaque para a teoria das coalizões de defesa (Sabatier e Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Especificamente, é estudado o processo de modernização do futebol brasileiro, marcado pela transformação do esporte em uma atividade voltada para a visão do mundo dos negócios, envolvendo quantidades relevantes de dinheiro, ações de marketing, patrocínio de empresas e participação de investidores e empresários no meio futebolístico. Esse processo é abordado em torno de duas questões principais, a saber, a relação de trabalho entre clubes e atletas e a administração dos clubes. Uma torna o futebol uma atividade cada vez mais profissional, enquanto a outra traz a mentalidade empresarial para o esporte. São estudados momentos-chave deste processo, a partir da redemocratização da política brasileira, partindo da Lei Zico, passando pela Lei Pelé, Lei Maguito Vilela, CPIs do Futebol, Estatuto do Desporto, Timemania e Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal do Esporte. Conclui-se que ocorreram mudanças significativas no futebol brasileiro, com o processo de modernização, mas que a atuação dos grupos de interesse foi fundamental para que algumas mudanças não ocorressem, que outras fossem adiadas e também para que algumas fossem efetivadas. / This dissertation deals with the football theme, inserted into the theoretical discussion of interest groups in political science, especially the theory of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Specifically, the process of \"modernization\" of Brazilian football, marked by the transformation of sport in a focused activity for the business world view is studied, involving significant amounts of money, marketing, corporate sponsorship and participation of investors and entrepreneurs among football. This process is covered in around two main issues, namely the working relationship between clubs and athletes and the management of clubs. The first makes football an increasingly professional activity, while the second brings a business mindset for the sport. Key moments of this process are studied, from the democratization of Brazilian politics, starting from the Zico Law, through the Pelé Law, Maguito Vilela Law, Footballs CPIs, Sports Statute, Timemania and Fiscal Responsibility Law of Sports. It was concluded that there were significant changes in Brazilian football, with the modernization process, but that the role of interest groups was essential for some changes did not occur, to others be delayed and also for some to take effect.

Entre os objetivos enunciados no acordo fundacional do Mercosul encontramos a eliminação das tarifas internas entre os países membros (a instituição de uma zona de livre-comércio) e o estabelecimento de uma tarifa externa comum para a relação com os demais países (criação de uma união aduaneira). A permanência de exceções ao livrecomércio entre os membros do bloco e à Tarifa Externa Comum (TEC) reflete um nível de proteção maior do que o que fora acordado inicialmente. A presente dissertação tem como objetivo explicar esse déficit observado entre o acordado no Tratado de Assunção e o efetivamente implementado no Mercosul. A tese defendida ao longo do trabalho diz respeito à influência de grupos de interesse na formulação de políticas. Mais especificamente, argumenta-se que a influência de grupos de interesse foi um fator preponderante nos descumprimentos em relação ao acordado, especialmente no que se refere a questões comerciais. O trabalho, além disso, busca oferecer indícios, através do estudo do caso brasileiro, que ajudem a sustentar essa hipótese de que os grupos de interesse influenciaram a política comercial no Mercosul, fazendo, dessa forma, com que houvesse o déficit entre acordado e realizado. / Among the objectives stated in the foundational treaty of Mercosul we are able to find the elimination of tariffs in the commerce between member-states (the institution of a Free-Trade Area) and the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) for the commercial relations with the rest of the world (creation of a Customs Union). The permanence of exceptions to free trade among the member-states of Mercosul and to the CET reflects a level of protection beyond the level agreed initially in the Tratado de Assunção. The main objective of the present dissertation is to try to explain the deficit observed between the agreed in the Tratado de Assunção and the effectively implemented in reality. The central thesis of this work is that the influence of interest groups was (and still is) a key factor when trying to explain the deficit between agreed and implemented, specially in what refers to the commercial matters. This dissertation, besides, tries to offer some evidence, trough the study of the Brazilian case, in favor of the assertion that interest groups affected (and are still affecting) commercial policy in Mercosul.