Policy-minded legislatures have a number of tools to implement policy at their disposal. On the one hand, they can write specific legislation and ensure that their policy wishes are accurately carried out. On the other hand, legislatures can delegate this authority to administrative agencies, and, with broad authority, allow them to formulate policy in a manner consistent with the preferences of the agency. This "delegation game" has received significant scholarly attention, and scholars have noted that the political context within which legislatures make this decision affects whether or not delegation will occur. Scholars have also examined the role that interest groups play in this game, yet studies at the interest group level are few in number. Interest groups are strategic actors that formulate strategies of lobbying in a manner that maximizes their potential influence per their resources. As such, interest groups should formulate lobbying strategies that take into consideration the delegation game that legislatures play when formulating policy. In this paper, I develop a game-theoretic model of legislative delegation and examine interest group lobbying strategies within that context. The equilibria from the game that I present: (1) Confirm previous studies of legislative delegation that argue legislatures delegate in a strategic manner given differing political conditions and (2) Suggests that indeed interest groups are strategic actors who develop lobbying strategies based on the expected actions of the legislature.

A presente dissertação possui por objeto discutir o controle judicial da atividade normativa das agências reguladoras no direito brasileiro. O trabalho é dividido em três partes. Na primeira, é analisa a evolução do princípio da separação de poderes ao longo dos séculos XIX e XX, bem como a receptividade dele no início do século XXI, notadamente em virtude do processo de retirada do Estado da intervenção direta na economia, como prestador de serviços aos cidadãos, e sua recolocação como regulador das atividades econômicas. Também é analisada na primeira parte como tais mudanças econômicas e sociais implicaram em uma alteração do papel do Poder Judiciário que, inicialmente criado como o menos ativo dos poderes, tornou-se órgão central para a efetivação dos direitos da democracia contemporânea. Na segunda parte, é analisada a atividade normativa das agências reguladoras, com a defesa da tese da delegação legislativa, bem como com a verificação dos requisitos procedimentais e materiais que devem ser observados pelas agências reguladoras na expedição dos atos normativos e de como tais requisitos acabam por limitar a discricionariedade dos entes reguladores. Na terceira parte, é feita a verificação do controle judicial da regulação, tendo como premissas a adoção pelo direito brasileiro do sistema da unidade de jurisdição e as diferenças funcionais entre o Judiciário e a Administração no estabelecimento de políticas públicas, com a defesa de que o controle judicial dos atos normativos das agências reguladoras deve se dar de modo negativo, ou seja, sem que o Judiciário possua competência para a estipulação da política regulatória a ser seguida, e de forma responsiva, ou seja, com a análise das consequências do controle judicial sobre o setor regulado, devendo o magistrado analisar não apenas os aspectos de legalidade do normativo questionado, mas também a finalidade do sistema regulado e os impactos que a decisão judicial terá sobre ele. / The object of the current thesis is to discuss the judicial control of the normative activity of the regulatory agencies according to Brazilian law. This paper is divided into three parts. At first, the evolution of the principle of the separation of powers across the Nineteenth and the Twentieth century will be analyzed, as well as the reception of such principle in the early Twenty-one century, especially due to the process of disengagement of the State from the direct intervention in the economy (as a provider of services to the citizens) and its replacement as a regulator of economic activities. Also in the first part, it will be analyzed how such economical and social changes caused a modification of the role of the Judiciary branch which, initially, was created as the less active of the State powers, becoming the central body for the effectiveness of the contemporary democracy rights. The second part analyzes the normative activity of the regulatory agencies, with the defense of the thesis of legislative delegation, as well as with the verification of the procedural and material requirements that must be observed by the regulatory agencies in the issuance of normative rulings and how such requirements end up limiting the discretion of the regulatory bodies. In the third part the verification of the judicial control of such regulation is carried out, having as its premises the adoption, by Brazilian law, of the unity of jurisdiction system and the functional differences between the Judiciary branch and the Public Administration in the establishment of public policies, being defended that the judicial control of the regulatory agencies normative rulings must be made in a negative manner, i.e., without the Judiciary having the competence for the stipulation of the regulatory policy to be followed, as well as in a responsive manner, i.e., with the analysis of the consequences of the judicial control over the regulated sector, being the magistrate responsible for analyzing not only the aspects of legality of the questioned normative rulings, but also the objective of the regulated system and the impacts of the judicial decision on it.

Administrative rules have played a central role in Ethiopian public administration since 1994 when the current constitution was adopted. However, if the formulation and implementation of the rules are not politically controlled, and proper accountability is not applied, these same rules could become threats instead of assurances of the rule of law and order. This case study explored what strategic controls and accountability measures are in place to regulate the rulemaking process. To inform the study, the political control of bureaucracy framework in general and the principal-agency model, in particular, were used. The central research question focused on strategies that ensure the political control and accountability of rulemaking in Ethiopia. Purposive sampling methods were employed, with interviews of five legislators and five appointed officials, as well as supportive legislative documents providing the data. The data were coded and thematically analyzed using a coding framework and a continuous iterative process. The results revealed that in Ethiopia there is a constitutional framework of control and accountability, but there is no political control mechanism in place, and no accountability measures have been taken. The study findings may indicate that there is a need for further studies on administrative and judicial review mechanisms and federated states' control mechanisms to fully understand the situation. The implication for social change includes awareness and attitudinal change of lawmakers and administrative authorities towards the importance of controlling and limiting the power to make rules. Positive social change is nearly impossible where unlimited and uncontrolled power is exercised.

A presente dissertação possui por objeto discutir o controle judicial da atividade normativa das agências reguladoras no direito brasileiro. O trabalho é dividido em três partes. Na primeira, é analisa a evolução do princípio da separação de poderes ao longo dos séculos XIX e XX, bem como a receptividade dele no início do século XXI, notadamente em virtude do processo de retirada do Estado da intervenção direta na economia, como prestador de serviços aos cidadãos, e sua recolocação como regulador das atividades econômicas. Também é analisada na primeira parte como tais mudanças econômicas e sociais implicaram em uma alteração do papel do Poder Judiciário que, inicialmente criado como o menos ativo dos poderes, tornou-se órgão central para a efetivação dos direitos da democracia contemporânea. Na segunda parte, é analisada a atividade normativa das agências reguladoras, com a defesa da tese da delegação legislativa, bem como com a verificação dos requisitos procedimentais e materiais que devem ser observados pelas agências reguladoras na expedição dos atos normativos e de como tais requisitos acabam por limitar a discricionariedade dos entes reguladores. Na terceira parte, é feita a verificação do controle judicial da regulação, tendo como premissas a adoção pelo direito brasileiro do sistema da unidade de jurisdição e as diferenças funcionais entre o Judiciário e a Administração no estabelecimento de políticas públicas, com a defesa de que o controle judicial dos atos normativos das agências reguladoras deve se dar de modo negativo, ou seja, sem que o Judiciário possua competência para a estipulação da política regulatória a ser seguida, e de forma responsiva, ou seja, com a análise das consequências do controle judicial sobre o setor regulado, devendo o magistrado analisar não apenas os aspectos de legalidade do normativo questionado, mas também a finalidade do sistema regulado e os impactos que a decisão judicial terá sobre ele. / The object of the current thesis is to discuss the judicial control of the normative activity of the regulatory agencies according to Brazilian law. This paper is divided into three parts. At first, the evolution of the principle of the separation of powers across the Nineteenth and the Twentieth century will be analyzed, as well as the reception of such principle in the early Twenty-one century, especially due to the process of disengagement of the State from the direct intervention in the economy (as a provider of services to the citizens) and its replacement as a regulator of economic activities. Also in the first part, it will be analyzed how such economical and social changes caused a modification of the role of the Judiciary branch which, initially, was created as the less active of the State powers, becoming the central body for the effectiveness of the contemporary democracy rights. The second part analyzes the normative activity of the regulatory agencies, with the defense of the thesis of legislative delegation, as well as with the verification of the procedural and material requirements that must be observed by the regulatory agencies in the issuance of normative rulings and how such requirements end up limiting the discretion of the regulatory bodies. In the third part the verification of the judicial control of such regulation is carried out, having as its premises the adoption, by Brazilian law, of the unity of jurisdiction system and the functional differences between the Judiciary branch and the Public Administration in the establishment of public policies, being defended that the judicial control of the regulatory agencies normative rulings must be made in a negative manner, i.e., without the Judiciary having the competence for the stipulation of the regulatory policy to be followed, as well as in a responsive manner, i.e., with the analysis of the consequences of the judicial control over the regulated sector, being the magistrate responsible for analyzing not only the aspects of legality of the questioned normative rulings, but also the objective of the regulated system and the impacts of the judicial decision on it.