This work starts from three complementary and interdependent questions: 1) How should we interpret Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategy as presented in On Certainty, and especially the elusive and yet central concept of ‘hinges’? 2) Can Wittgenstein’s strategy, when properly understood and developed, provide a satisfactory response to Cartesian skepticism? 3) Does a Wittgensteinian epistemology license epistemic relativism, and if so to what extent? In Chapter 1, I present Cartesian-style skepticism and its epistemological implications along with the Dretske-Nozick’s ‘relevant alternatives’ theory, based on the rejection of the Closure principle for Knowledge which underlies the skeptical challenge. After a brief discussion of the main concerns raised against this proposal, I argue that this line is untenable and that a successful anti-skeptical proposal has to retain Closure. Having shown the shortcomings of the Dretske-Nozick proposal, I then focus my attention on G. E. Moore’s famous anti-skeptical works, namely “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925, henceforth DCS) and “Proof of an External World”, (1939, henceforth PEW). In these seminal papers, Moore famously argued that it is possible to know several ‘obvious truisms of commonsense’ such as ‘There are external objects’, I have a body’ and so on and that this knowledge can offer a direct response to skeptical worries; the aim of this strategy is then to retain both Closure and our confidence in our everyday knowledge claims. After a detailed presentation of DCS and PEW I will discuss the problems of Moore’s direct response against the skeptic, drawing on the works of distinguished commentators such as Malcolm, Clarke, Stroud and Wright. Roughly, I argue that Moore’s strategy is both unnecessary and unconvincing: unconvincing because Moore’s knowledge-claims cannot refute Cartesian skeptical arguments; unnecessary for they can ‘work’ only within our everyday ‘non-philosophical’ context, thus when no skeptical hypothesis can be sensibly raised. Even if Moore’s anti-skeptical attempts have unanimously been considered unsatisfying, for several reasons his works have nonetheless been extremely influential, to the extent that quite a few contemporary anti-skeptical proposals can be fairly described as ‘Moorean’. In Chapter 2, I present and discuss the dominant ‘Moore-Inspired’ positions, namely Pryor’s Dogmatist Reading of PEW, Neta’s interpretation of the Proof, Greco’s reliabilist account, Fara’s ‘Second Proof’, DeRose’s ‘Moorean contextualism’ and Sosa ‘Neo-Mooreanism’. I criticise these accounts in turn, in order to show that all these strategies inherit the main problems of Moore’s treatment of skepticism and also have unpalatable consequences with regard to the so-called ‘value problem for knowledge’. After having extensively criticised both Moore’s and ‘Neo-Moorean’ epistemologies, in Chapter 3 I focus my attention on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty; given the obscurity and ambiguity of this work, in this chapter I present some of the less contentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s treatment of skepticism and I emphasise the role played by ‘hinges ’ in his anti-skeptical strategy. This will give me the background to assess the different ‘Wittgensteininspired’ anti-skeptical strategies I consider in Chapter 4, namely Conant’s ‘therapeutic’ reading, Wright’s ‘rational entitlement’ account, Williams’ ‘Wittgensteinian contextualism’, McGinn’s ‘framework’ reading and Pritchard’s ‘hinge commitment’ strategy. I argue that these proposals are wanting, both as plausible interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought and more importantly as viable anti-skeptical strategies. Moreover, I show that McGinn and Williams’ proposals can lead to a form of epistemic relativism, according to which our epistemic practices are the result of pre-rational, social commitments not subject to rational evaluation of any sort; a conclusion which is not more palatable than skepticism itself. Chapter 5 is devoted to presenting Moyal-Sharrock’s ‘non-epistemic’ reading of OC, for which ‘hinges’ such as ‘There are external objects’ or ‘I have a body’ are the expression of a pre-theoretical, animal certainty which she sees as constitutively different from knowledge. While I defend Moyal-Sharrock’s exegesis and her analogy between ‘hinges’ and 'rules of grammar’ as the most plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought, in this chapter I also criticise her ‘non-epistemic’ account; roughly, I argue that following this strategy we will be forced either to reject the Closure principle, thus inheriting the problems of the Dretske-Nozick’s line, or else to endorse skepticism. Moreover, I also consider some of the relativistic implications of Moyal-Sharrock’s account, which make her proposal vulnerable to the same objections I have raised against McGinn’s framework reading and Williams’ Wittgensteinian contextualism. In Chapter 6, I develop my own anti-skeptical proposal, which is informed by the analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’ and their peculiar status. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s reflections on grammatical rules, developed in the socalled second phase of his thought, and especially in his Philosophical Investigations, I argue that ‘hinges’ cannot be object of knowledge but are subject to an altogether different epistemic standing, namely understanding or ‘mastery of techniques’. A promising anti-skeptical implication of this account is that it will help us to dismiss Cartesian-style skepticism as the result of a logical error, based on a misleading way of representing the structure of our epistemic practices, which are not based on propositional beliefs but rather on non-propositional, normative rules. In the rest of Chapter 6, I consider a final problem that a Wittgensteinian epistemology so construed has to face in order to be considered a fully viable antiskeptical position; that is, whether Wittgenstein’s account of ‘hinges’ would lead to epistemic relativism of a kind that is generated by the proposals put forward by Williams, McGinn and Moyal-Sharrock. Chapter 7 is devoted to addressing this question in detail. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s views on mathematics, metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show that his remarks on ‘hinges’ will help us to dissolve epistemic relativism rather than licensing it. This is so because following Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of reason the disagreement between epistemic communities committed to different ‘hinges’ (for instance a community which believes in oracles rather than in science) is either solvable, as different epistemic practices can be compared and assessed if they have similar aims, or is a pseudo-disagreement which stems from a misguided comparison between different practices.

Recent research has demonstrated that high social anxiety is associated with uncertainty about one’s self views and self-concept (Moscovitch et al., 2009; Stopa et al., 2010; Wilson & Rapee, 2006). However, no research has addressed potential mechanisms underlying the link between high social anxiety and low self-certainty nor has research examined whether this relationship is bi-directional. In the current research, I propose a cyclical model in which high social anxiety leads to low self-certainty, which in turn, feeds back into higher levels of social anxiety. I also propose that the relationship between high social anxiety and low self-certainty is mediated by the self-protective self-disclosure patterns employed by socially anxious individuals. In three interconnected studies, I examine the hypothesis that social anxiety, self-disclosure and self-certainty operate in a cyclical model. Study 1 provided a correlational test of the hypothesized feedback model in its entirety and demonstrated that honesty of self-disclosure was the most important and influential mechanism underlying the link between high social anxiety and low self-certainty. Experimentally manipulating the honesty of participants’ self-disclosures in Study 2 demonstrated that dishonest self-disclosures during a social task led to low self-certainty, but only amongst individuals high in trait performance anxiety. Finally, experimentally manipulating self-certainty in Study 3 demonstrated that low self-certainty led to high anticipatory anxiety about an upcoming self-disclosure task. Together, these results elucidate a cyclical maladaptive pattern in which low self-certainty as a result of self-protective self-disclosure leads to high social anxiety and a greater reluctance to self-disclose. Results from the three studies are discussed with respect to their theoretical implications and in relation to clinical applications for individuals with social anxiety disorder.

No description available.

It is often desirable to compare risky investments in the context of economic decision theory. Expected utility analyses are means by which stochastic alternatives can be ranked by re-weighting the probability mass using a decision-making agent’s utility function. By maximizing expected utility, an agent seeks to balance expected returns with the inherent risk in each investment alternative. This can be accomplished by ranking prospects based on the certainty equivalent associated with each alternative. In instances where only a small sample of observed data is available to estimate the underlying distributions of the risky options, reliable inferences are difficult to make. In this process of comparing alternatives, when estimating explicit probability forms or nonparametric densities, the variance of the estimate, in this case the certainty equivalent, is often ignored. Resampling methods allow for estimating dispersion for a statistic when no parametric assumptions are made about the underlying distribution. An objective of this dissertation is to utilize these methods to estimate confidence regions for the sample certainty equivalents of the alternatives over a subset of the parameter space of the utility function. A second goal of this research is to formalize a testing procedure when dealing with preference ranking with respect to utility. This is largely based on Meyer’s work (1977b) developing stochastic dominance with respect to a function and more specific testing procedures outlined by Eubank et. al. (1993). Within this objective, the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic associated with the hypothesis of preference of one risky outcome over another given a sub-set of the utility function parameter space is explored.

Thesis (doctoral)--University of Helsinki, 1978. / Corrected t.p. inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 195-204).

Recent research has demonstrated that high social anxiety is associated with uncertainty about one’s self views and self-concept (Moscovitch et al., 2009; Stopa et al., 2010; Wilson & Rapee, 2006). However, no research has addressed potential mechanisms underlying the link between high social anxiety and low self-certainty nor has research examined whether this relationship is bi-directional. In the current research, I propose a cyclical model in which high social anxiety leads to low self-certainty, which in turn, feeds back into higher levels of social anxiety. I also propose that the relationship between high social anxiety and low self-certainty is mediated by the self-protective self-disclosure patterns employed by socially anxious individuals. In three interconnected studies, I examine the hypothesis that social anxiety, self-disclosure and self-certainty operate in a cyclical model. Study 1 provided a correlational test of the hypothesized feedback model in its entirety and demonstrated that honesty of self-disclosure was the most important and influential mechanism underlying the link between high social anxiety and low self-certainty. Experimentally manipulating the honesty of participants’ self-disclosures in Study 2 demonstrated that dishonest self-disclosures during a social task led to low self-certainty, but only amongst individuals high in trait performance anxiety. Finally, experimentally manipulating self-certainty in Study 3 demonstrated that low self-certainty led to high anticipatory anxiety about an upcoming self-disclosure task. Together, these results elucidate a cyclical maladaptive pattern in which low self-certainty as a result of self-protective self-disclosure leads to high social anxiety and a greater reluctance to self-disclose. Results from the three studies are discussed with respect to their theoretical implications and in relation to clinical applications for individuals with social anxiety disorder.

Thesis (doctoral)--University of Helsinki, 1978. / Corrected t.p. inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 195-204).

I aim to show in this thesis that human beings are morally concerned to the core; that a concern for moral goodness is a necessary part of our humanity. Central to my account of the foundations of morality is what I call 'primary recognition', which I argue is the source of our moral thinking. By primary recognition, I mean our basic apprehension of other human beings as objects of some moral concern. I take this to be a 'basic moral certainty', in accord with the notion recently introduced by Nigel Pleasants in the debate on moral foundations, which he drew from the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein on the notion of basic empirical certainty, found in On Certainty (1969). Building on Pleasants' notion of 'basic moral certainty' I bring to bear Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's distinction between universal and local forms of basic certainty in an effort to make sense of the co-existence of universal moral beliefs and local, often conflicting, moral beliefs. I offer and defend two examples of universal basic moral certainties: 'At least some killings are wrong' and 'Some wrongs are more serious, more wrong, than others', which I take to be necessarily indubitable for any moral agent. I then examine examples of local moral certainties: the wrongness of pig sacrifice in ancient Judaism, the goodness of hospitality among the modern Pashtun, and the wrongness of cannibalism for the ancient Greeks. These examinations lead me to conclude that basic moral certainties come in both local and universal varieties in just the same way as basic empirical certainties, and that holding certain local moral beliefs is definitional for membership in certain epistemic communities. I go on to consider some challenges to the view that morality has its foundations in basic moral certainty, in particular that made by G.E.M Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre that modern moral thought lacks any foundations. I reply by reiterating the nonrational nature of the foundations of morality, modern or otherwise. I conclude the thesis by outlining some of the outcomes of this account of moral certainty for contemporary moral philosophy.

This work tries to analyze the concept of certainty in the Ludwig Wittgenstein's book 'On Certainty' and evaluate whether it corresponds to the criteria expressed by Pope John Paul II in the encyclical letter 'Fides et Ratio'. The first chapter explains the origins of the book and set it within the context of modern concept of certainty and skepticism, with an emphasis on thinking of G.E. Moore, who is main source of inspiration for Wittgenstein. The second chapter deals with the content of the book and tries to answer a series of questions about Wittgenstein's philosophical method. The third chapter first formulates requirements of the former pope on a healthy philosophy from the encyclical letter 'Fides et Ratio' and then try to find out whether these requirements are met or not. Work ends with a description of several elements of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, which can serve as inspiration for thinking and reasoning even if we are unable to accept the whole of his system of thought. Keywords Ludwig Wittgenstein, epistemology, Fides et Ratio, certainty

The existing literature determining the optimal rotation period of a forest stand under conditions of certainty, as well as under uncertainty, lacks the genera 1 scope to be useful. A forest provides timber of commercial value, a flow of recreational services, and other valuable environmental s ervices. Providing goods and services invo lves benefits as well as costs. Relevant management decisions depend on the net va 1 ues that can be obtai ned. The present work developes a more general model for determining an optimal rotation period incorporating various fixed and variable costs associated with timber production and recreational services in an environment of certainty and uncertainty. It is shown that under certainty, the optimal rotation period is likely to be finite and depending on the values of benefits and costs the rotation period indicated by the solution of this model may be identical to, shorter, or longer than that indicated by a model ignoring net values. In addition, a generalized Faustmann rule under certainty (when only recreational value i s added to the model ) using optimal control (maximum principle) as the analytical tool has been developed and the impact of two sources of uncertainties on the optimal rotation decision in the context of the more generalized model is analyzed. They are (1) uncertainty related to future stumpage price, and (2) uncertainty related to the future stock of trees due to unpredictable natural catastrophes. Under price uncertainty the optimal rotation period will be longer than that under conditions of certainty if the forest operator is risk averse. In addition, the period wi ll be lengthened with increasing risk and shortened with increasing expected stumpage price under noni ncreasing absolute risk aversion of the forest operator. The risk of catastrophic destruction of the biomass whether total or partial will lead to a rotation period dependent on the value of the average rate of occurrence of catastrophes.