Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Bruce T. Lamont, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept. of Management. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Sept. 22, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-122). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

Thesis (MPAcc.)--Unitec New Zealand, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 33-35).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57).

Este estudio examina el impacto de los anuncios de cambios de Gerente General o Chief Executive Officer (por sus siglas en ingles CEO) en los retornos accionarios de las principales empresas que cotizan en la bolsa limeña. Se emplea la metodología de análisis de eventos con una muestra de 22 anuncios desde el año 2000 hasta el 2015. Los resultados muestran que los anuncios de cambios de CEO provocan una reacción en los participantes del mercado, viéndose reflejado en el cambio de patrón de los retornos de cada firma, días antes y después del anuncio. Teniendo como resultado para algunas firmas, retornos acumulados positivos y para otras firmas retornos negativos, ello depende de la valorización que el mercado le da al nuevo CEO. Este resultado está acorde con la literatura, la cual nos brinda 3 hipótesis que explican porque son más o menos valorizados los CEOs por el mercado. La hipótesis de la capacidad, sostiene que los gerentes tienen diferentes habilidades, por consiguiente la empresa busca el mejor talento disponible para la dirección de la misma, respondiendo el mercado de manera positiva. Por otro lado, para las empresas que obtuvieron retornos anormales negativos, la teoría de la información indica que para los participantes, el cambio de CEO, es una revelación de información de una gestión de bajo rendimiento. Por último, para la teoría scapegoat o de sustituibilidad, los retornos accionarios no deberían cambiar su patrón, puesto que el CEO es sustituible y todos los gerentes poseen las mismas habilidades.

Magister Commercii - MCom / CEO’s compensation, as a global management problem, has been a matter of continuing argument in Western economies, over the last two decades. However, the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is still weak, resulting in the CEO overpaid problem being more severe, since the financial turmoil experienced in 2008. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether firm performance justifies CEO remuneration, by comparing South African and Chinese stock-holding banks. The motivation for this study was to understand the correlation between CEO remuneration and the value they added to shareholders. It was anticipated that the results would contribute to exploring whether CEOs were overpaid for what they produced, and help companies to adjust their compensation frameworks. The researcher employed a quantitative approach to ascertain compensation alignment with firm performance. The sample for this current research, from which the data were collected consisted of ten (10) banking institutions (5 South African and 5 Chinese). The findings for the South African banks revealed that the CEO’s remuneration was positively and significantly related to the firm performance; however, the strength of the relationship showed a declining tendency. Additionally, the non-apparent relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance for Chinese banks, indicated the weakness of the pay-performance structure in China. This result may help companies and shareholders to adjust the existing management system, and standardize executives’ responsibilities that would reduce, and avoid many enterprise management loopholes, while improving the development of the nation’s economy, and attracting foreign investors.

As a CEO assumes an important role in an organization, his or her personality, with emphasis on arrogance, may affect a multitude of board members’ attitudes. This study gauges the effect of CEO arrogance on board members’ attitudes, which includes the engagement; cohesiveness; collaboration; job satisfaction; consensual decision making and desirability of the CEO. This investigation drew from existing literature that personality traits affect a leaders’ effectiveness in terms of group performance and followers’ satisfaction (Avolio, Gardner, Walumbwa, Luthans&May, 2004). Through experimental design, actual board meetings were simulated and CEO arrogance was manipulated, mainly by adapting the indicators from the Arrogance Scale in the Workplace developed by Johnson et al. (2010). Experiments were conducted in samples of MBA students and senior management consultants of roughly similar demographics. The findings confirmed that CEO arrogance has a detrimental effect on all the board members’ attitude. Arrogance accounted for almost 60 per cent of the board members’ attitudes ratings. This study is confirms that an arrogant CEO negatively affects the board member dynamics which are essential in maintaining an effective board. This urges the organizations to acquire non-arrogant CEOs to improve the organisation’s productivity. Alternatively, an organization can consider alternatives to dilute a CEO’s arrogance. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

The crucial decisions that impact the performance of an organisation are usually taken by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). However, little is known about the impact that a CEO's risk appetite has on the decision making processes and its ultimate impact on company performance. A greater understanding of the relationship between CEO risk appetite and organisational performance will facilitate the improvement of strategy formulation for the purpose of managing risk appetite at an executive level.A qualitative exploration into the factors that have been acknowledged as contributory aspects in the development of executive risk appetites highlighted the aspects which had the greatest association to the formation of CEO risk appetite. These aspects were utilised in the formation of an interview schedule that evaluated the perceptions of seven CEOs regarding their risk appetite preferences.Using the findings of the CEO interviews, a model was formulated to quantify CEO risk appetite and test its relationship with company performance, which had been calculated via a quantitative analysis of company financial records.The findings of the analysis into the relationship between CEO risk appetite and company performance indicated a positive linear relationship between the two variables. The research findings regarding the factors contributing to CEO risk appetite also proved consistent with the majority of the literature on the subject.The implication of the findings for South African organisations will be an improved understanding of the relationship between CEO risk appetite and organisational performance and the ability to develop strategy around managing this relationship. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

No description available.

Thesis (D.B.A.)--Victoria University (Melbourne, Vic.), 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.