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In essay two, I study top executive compensation and CEO turnover and their relationship to firm performance in business groups in China, using a sample of listed subsidiaries and their parent companies in China. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (CEO turnover) in a listed firm is positively (negatively) related to the accounting performance of its parent company. In addition, I find a stronger relationship between the compensation (turnover) in a listed subsidiary and the performance of its parent company when the controlling shareholder's ownership is high. Using related party transactions to proxy for the correlation between the two firms, I find that management compensation in a listed firm is related to the performance of its parent company if related party transactions exist between them. Using brand name as a proxy for reputation, I find that management compensation and CEO turnover in group firms are more likely to be sensitive to the performance measures in their parent companies if both use the same brand name. In conclusion, the association between the listed subsidiary and its parent company may affect the pay-for-performance sensitivity to a parent company. / Keywords: Communist Party of China (CPC), party secretary, performance; management compensation, business group, China / My dissertation includes two essays. In essay one, I investigate the party control in China's listed firms. Along with state shareholding and government administration, the third source of political control of Chinese listed firms is the Communist Party of China (CPC). Using a unique hand-collected dataset that includes the party secretaries' information for listed firms between 2000 and 2004, I examine the existence and power of the party secretaries in companies and their influence on performance. The party secretary is the leader of party committee and exercises the power of the CPC at firm-level. Power is assessed by whether the party secretary concurrently holds another key management position, such as chairman or CEO, thus allowing him or her to exert influence on the managerial decisions of the firm. I find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with many employees are more likely to have a party secretary or a powerful party secretary than are other firms. Party secretaries are more likely to have political reliability but less professionalism than are CEOs or other senior managers. The existence of a party secretary is negatively associated with a firm's performance, but only in SOEs. Non-state firms with a party secretary are more likely to have senior managers with political connections, but less professionalism, but I find no such significant results for SOEs. The firms with a party secretary or a powerful party secretary have lower labor productivity than do other firms, especially in SOEs and in regions with high unemployment rates. Overall, the results of this study suggest that the CPC has great influence over listed firms in China and that this influence should not be neglected in Chinese studies. / Yu, Wei. / Adviser: P. H. Joseph Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-01, Section: A, page: 0239. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-88). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

This dissertation investigates the antecedents and consequences to pay disparity between the CEO and non-CEO executives from an equity-based perspective. While the principles of agency theory suggest that CEOs are granted higher compensation packages to better align their motives to those of the firm's shareholders, empirical research has not supported a positive relationship between rising CEO pay and firm performance. Some results even suggest a negative relationship. This dissertation argues that if organizational outcomes are determined by the integrated skills and talents of its dominant coalition, and if the management of a firm's trajectory is a shared process, then, the disparity in rewards between the CEO and those that work closest to him becomes an important area of study. / The dissertation investigates the antecedents of pay disparity and proposes that the quality of a firm's governance marked by independent boards as well as higher levels of blockholders will be more likely to temper and better align the CEO's compensation and thereby reduce pay disparity. Empirical results support the major propositions as firms with independent Chairman of the Board, fewer interlocking directors, and higher levels of blockholders were found to have lower levels of pay disparity between the CEO and non-CEO executives. Pay disparity was tested both at the firm level and at the individual executive level and both were found have a significant effect on non-CEO executive turnover for up to two years. / Central to the dissertation is a moderation model which proposes that pay disparity has a profound effect on an executive team's ability to integrate its diverse experience and educational background, and consequently, its capacity to respond strategically to its changing competitive landscape. The study examines the education, age, tenure and functional background of top management teams of Fortune 500 firms and finds support for the assertion that the positive relationship between heterogeneously composed teams and firm performance is contingent on rewards equality between the CEO and balance of the top team membership. The findings suggest that higher levels of pay disparity attenuate the negative aspects of cognitive diversity serving to impede the firm's competitive performance. / by Seema Pissaris. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2008. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, FL : 2008 Mode of access: World Wide Web.

This thesis investigates how chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives affect the remediation of material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control. First, we predict that the sensitivity of CEO stock and stock option portfolios to stock price (CEO price sensitivity or delta) has a positive impact on firm promptness in remedying MWs, because CEOs whose personal wealth is tied to stock price suffer losses from negative market reactions to the public disclosure of MWs. Second, we predict that the sensitivity of CEO stock option portfolio to stock-return volatility (CEO volatility sensitivity or vega) has a negative impact on firm promptness in remedying MWs, as firms with internal control weaknesses are associated with higher information and operating risks that manifest in stock return volatility. Our empirical results, based on a sample of firms disclosing MWs in internal control under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) during November 15, 2003 and August 27, 2006, are consistent with the above predictions. We further provide evidence that an effective board of directors could mitigate the undesirable, negative impact of CEO volatility sensitivity on MWs remediation. We measure firms’ promptness in remedying MWs based on their subsequent internal control audit opinions (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Goh 2009); and CEO price (volatility) sensitivity as the dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolios (option portfolio) from a 1 percent change in stock price (Core and Guay 2002). This thesis is innovative with respect to the prediction and evidence of the opposing effects from CEO price and volatility sensitivities on internal control quality. This new evidence contributes to the literature that examines managerial incentives embedded in stock-based and option-based compensation plans in various economic contexts (e.g., Knopf et al. 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Low 2009; Armstrong et al. 2013). Our findings suggest that when stock constitutes a major part of CEO compensation, the mandatory disclosure requirement of SOX provides a channel for the stock market to discipline CEO. However, when options dominate CEO compensation, volatility sensitivity and the associated risk-taking incentive can cause CEOs to delay rectifying internal control deficiencies. These results have interesting policy implications for regulators and firms concerning mandatory disclosure and compensation design. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the broad literature on corporate governance by documenting an interaction between corporate governance and CEO incentives, namely that strong corporate governance mitigates the undesirable risking-taking incentive caused by CEO option holdings. Overall, this thesis deepens our understanding on mechanisms through which regulators, firm executives, and boards of directors strengthen internal control over financial reporting in the post-SOX era. / published_or_final_version / Business / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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M.Comm. (Financial Management) / Although general studies have been conducted on the agency problem, such studies have not focused on the relationship between executive remuneration and company performance. Many of the studies conducted abroad have focused on quantitative methods using regression analysis to understand the relationships between diverse financial performance measures and a variety of performance appraisal techniques. This study aims at establishing the relationship between executive remuneration and company financial performance on the basis of 20 of the largest companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Ltd (JSE). It has been observed that JSE-listed South African companies have almost a standard governance framework for determining salary structures of CEOs and directors. Furthermore it can be seen that most performance-linked payouts for CEO's and directors are based on measurement criteria established which are based on actual performance levels achieved. For this reason, it may be concluded that short-term targets are crucial to keeping a business going, to ensure positive cash flows, manage working capital, and achieve year-on-year growth of revenues and profits. However, to ensure survival and sustainability of the business in the changing global and local environments, long-term strategies should be formulated and various steps should be taken by CEOs, supported by other executive and non-executive directors. This research focuses on short-term goals and their influence on executive remuneration for CEOs and CFOs. The performance measures selected for this study were revenues, profits, share price and net asset value. These performance measures selected are supported by the relevant academic literature. The results of this study reveal that CEOs and CFOs have received lower remuneration in the form of bonuses as a result of companies not achieving their short-term goals.

The goal of this research was to determine, in a South African context, whether there is any correlation between chief executive officer compensation and the performance of the company. For the purposes of the research , the compensation of chief executive officers was broken down into three components: salary, bonus and "other" remuneration, while company performance was measured on return on equity, return on assets and earnings per share figures. Studies on this topic have been carried out in other countries, most notably in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. It appears that no research of a similar nature has been carried out in South Africa. Data in respect of the forty largest listed companies in South Africa were collected over a period of five years. The econometric models used for the research were based on models identified in the literature study. The data were then analysed for evidence of a correlation between chief executive officer compensation and the performance of the company. The results of this study indicate that there is no linear relationship between chief executive officer compensation and company performance variables. The econometric models did, however, show correlations between certain variables, taking into account the other predictor variables in the model. Evidence of correlations between age and experience and compensation was also found , which may present potential avenues of research to scholars in the future.