Thesis (M.Tech.: Tourism and Hospitality Management)-Durban University of Technology, 2007 xi, 130 leaves / Tourism is one of the world's major industries and is increasing in importance as a source of substantial employment and of great economical and social benefit to many regions around the world. China has the world’s largest population and it has been predicted that China will become one of the world’s major sources of international travellers in the 21st century. Although the outbound travel industry in China has only been developing in recent years, there has been an increasing number of outbound Chinese going all over the world. South Africa is one of the countries that are beginning to be penetrated by the emerging Chinese outbound traveller market. The purpose of this study is to examine the South Africa inbound tourism industry’s readiness for the increasing Chinese tourist market to South Africa and also to examine South Africa as a secondary international destination for the Chinese traveller. The study also aims to explore the Chinese travellers’ interests and major concerns when travelling to South Africa and the expectations of the inbound tour operators in Shanghai. A purposive sample of 118 respondents from Shanghai’s tourism industry participated in the study.

No description available.

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis is a study of the People’s Republic of China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. In particular, the thesis explores Chinese policy-makers’ ideas about Japan in the wake of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), and considers how those ideas shaped China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. To do so, the thesis employs a four-part ideas framework that examines Chinese policy-makers’ background, foreground, cognitive and normative ideas about Japan, and shows how the interaction between these four different idea types shaped China’s Japan policy between 1949 and 1965. Furthermore, the thesis draws on over 200 recently declassified Chinese-language archival records from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as well as additional Chinese, Japanese, US and British archival sources. It argues that China’s experience of Japanese imperialism, industrialisation and war during the first half of the twentieth century deeply shaped Chinese ideas about Japan after 1949, though in ways that at first seem counterintuitive. Although Japan had waged a brutal war against China, Chinese policy-makers viewed Japan as an important source of industrial goods, technology and expertise, and a symbol of a modern, industrialised nation-state. However, China’s experience of Japanese imperialism and militaristic aggression often made it difficult to justify the policy of ‘trading with the enemy’. Ultimately, the thesis argues that China sought to expand economic ties with Japan after 1949 because Chinese policy-makers believed that doing so would assist China in becoming a modern and industrialised state, one that was strong enough to withstand foreign imperialism and restore its central position in the international system. Chinese conceptions of Japan thus help to explain how Japan became China’s largest trade partner by 1965, despite the bitter legacy of the War of Resistance and the Cold War divide between the two countries after 1949.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences. / Department of Government and Public Administration

This thesis examines America's post-Cold War relations with China in the context of the neoliberal vs. neorealist debate. It concludes that neorealism - the dominant school of thought in the international relations literature - is incapable of explaining America's response to China's rise in the post-Cold War era. Because America was the leading global power and China was its most obvious potential rival, a neorealist theory that prioritized the distribution of relative power would anticipate this relationship to be a most-likely case for American policymakers to pursue containment and prioritize relative gains. However, I leverage insights from more than 100 personal interviews to demonstrate that in reality American leaders have overwhelmingly preferred a strategy of neoliberal engagement with China that has remained decidedly positive-sum in nature. My explanation for this consistent, bipartisan preference is that American policymakers have not adopted the neorealist assumption that conflict is inevitable between existing and rising great powers. As a result, policymakers have not focused exclusively on how to minimize the relative costs of a potential conflict with China by trying to contain China's relative power and limit America' exposure to China (as they did with the Soviet Union in the Cold War). Instead, policymakers have subscribed to the neoliberal belief that conflict can be avoided, and that increasing engagement and interdependence is the best strategy to maintain peace. They have pursued this strategy despite acknowledging that engagement and interdependence have increased the costs of a potential conflict by helping to facilitate China's rise in both an absolute and relative sense, and by increasing America's exposure to China. This thesis helps to define the differences between hedging and containing strategies. It argues that while relative material power is often important in deciding whether to hedge or not hedge, these purely material calculations play no role in decisions of whether to pursue containment or engagement. Instead, the decision to contain or not hinges on the target state's behavior and what that reveals about the regime's underlying intentions. Within this new framework, I argue that American policymakers' strategy has been to engage China economically while simultaneously hedging militarily. Furthermore, to the extent that American policymakers have expressed increased concerns about China in recent years, this has been primarily a consequence of China's increased assertiveness - not changes in its relative power.

No description available.

This paper will present a study of the Far East Agreements of the Yalta Conference, held from February 4-11, 1945, and will trace them through to their conclusion in the agreements signed by the Soviet Union and Nationalist China in August of the same year. These wartime agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, subscribed to by Great Britain and later Nationalist China, reflected then existing distributions of power. The Far East Agreements, on the part of the United States, were concluded in the national self-interest of the United States for reasons thought necessary at the time. The majority of the information in this paper was obtained from United States Government documents and first-hand accounts by men who took part in, or observed at meetings and conferences that dealt with the issues being discussed. Reed College documents library supplied the greater bulk of the material, with additional materials being obtained at Portland State University library and Multnomah County library. All other information was obtained on order through the offices of Portland State University library from various libraries throughout the Pacific Northwest. A background and history of the issues are presented to give the reader the proper perspective before the issues are discussed. Strategic positions and conditions of World War II, both prior to and after the Yalta Conference are presented to give the reader a further knowledge of the conditions surroundings the issues discussed. The actual negotiations involving the Far East Agreements and the Sino-Soviet agreements are discussed in greater detail. Certain of the concessions regarding China agreed upon by the United States at the Yalta Conference were thought necessary at the time. Though it was known that these concessions were made at the expense of China the conclusions drawn in this paper will show that the Far East Agreements were a compromise of the continuing viability of the great powers, pending the final defeat of Japan, and not a compromise of principles on the part of the United States, as believed by many historians and critics. In the late 1940’s, and early 1950’s, after the Chinese Communists assumed the predominant position in China, these agreements came under heavy attack and criticism from many sources, including a Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. This paper will show that much of the criticism and many of the critics were completely unjustified in their beliefs, in that they failed to look at the complete picture and benefited greatly from hindsight. The Far East Agreements were not a radical shift in American China policy. They were not a radical change in traditional American policy. They were thought necessary for both military and political reasons. These agreements were a carefully worked out plan to accomplish three goals: (1) to insure the Soviet participation in the Pacific War at the earliest possible date; (2) to bring about the best possible cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government of China; and (3) to limit Soviet expansion in China and prevent China from being divided and torn apart after the war. With the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet negotiations in August of 1945, it was thought that these three goals had been accomplished.

Bibliography: leaves 285-314. Introduction -- Ch. 1. Sea power and the world -- Ch. 2. Chinese sea power and the century of humiliation -- Ch. 3. China's emerging sea power in the PRC period -- Ch. 4. China's expanding maritime sphere of influence int he Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean -- Ch. 5. Southeast Asia: gateway to China's maritime expansion -- Ch. 6. Russia and India: China's immediate competitors -- Ch. 7. Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK): China's competitive neighbours -- Ch. 8. The United States: China's strategic competitor -- Conclusion "The thesis examines China's geostrategic relations with Asia-Pacific countries with special reference to its naval ambitions toward the region. The thesis concentrates especially on the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s apparent intention to expand its maritime influence into the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean by putting pressure on the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) from the Gulf to the nations of East Asia via the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait." -- ABSTRACT

Typescript (Photocopy) Errata slip inserted. Bibliography: leaves 328-347.