Warriors are a less visible topic in the study of imperial China. They did not write history, but they made new history by destroying the old. The fall of the first enduring Chinese empire, the Han, collides with the rise of its last warriors known as the â talons and fangs.â Despite some classical or deceptive myths like the Chinese ideal of bloodless victories and a culture without soldiers, the talons and fangs of the Eastern Han warlords demonstrated the full potential of military prestige in a Confucian hierarchy, the bloodcurdling reality of dynastic rivalry, as well as a romantic tradition infatuated with individual heroism.

Warriors are a less visible topic in the study of imperial China. They did not write history, but they made new history by destroying the old. The fall of the first enduring Chinese empire, the Han, collides with the rise of its last warriors known as the â talons and fangs.â Despite some classical or deceptive myths like the Chinese ideal of bloodless victories and a culture without soldiers, the talons and fangs of the Eastern Han warlords demonstrated the full potential of military prestige in a Confucian hierarchy, the bloodcurdling reality of dynastic rivalry, as well as a romantic tradition infatuated with individual heroism.

The importance of party-military relations in the People's Republic of China was succinctly stated by Mao in his dictum that "political power comes from the gun" and "the Party should command the gun." Party-military relations in the PRC have never fully conformed to Mao's warning. This study seeks to analyze the nature and types of party-military relations in the PRC during the post-Mao period and the factors affecting change in these relations.

Great powers have almost exclusively decided the destiny of international relations. The birth, life, and death of an order have been regulated by those actors with the largest military, strategic, economic, and other capabilities. Conceptually building upon the premises of structural realism, the thesis claims that the Chinese nuclear rise is the decisive factor for the disappearance of the incumbent international system and the consequent rise of the new one, labeled as asymmetric triangular nuclear competition. This critically affects the notion of strategic stability, adjusting its characteristics for a different strategic environment. The research has twofold relevance. First, in the academic sense, it deepens a scantly treated debate on the interconnection between the management of nuclear weapons arsenal and the overall outlook of the international system. Second, in the practical sense, the study of the behavior of great powers provides an excellent foundation for policy analysis. The aforementioned is achieved in the three stages. In the beginning, the Chinese nuclear rise is considered as a set of comprehensive reforms in terms of weapons systems, military apparatus, but also doctrines and strategic concepts. After that, the nuclear rise is put in the context of Chinese silent moves from...

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This thesis has explored two basic themes in post-Cold War international relations. The first is the transformation of the global and regional security environments leading to a projected decline in the importance of traditional realist-style security problems. The second is the supposed shift in state behavior with conflictual strategies giving way to accommodation. These presumed trends are explored in the context of Southeast Asia and, more specifically, China's security strategies and relations in the region. This study argues that conventional security problems have declined in Southeast Asia in the short term but still remain prominent. In terms of policies, while China's goals remained partly revisionist with regard to territorial issues and status/power relationships, its approaches became more accommodative in coping with disputed issues in the region. This was manifested above all in its gradual acceptance of a multilateral framework for dialogue on regional security issues and in its willingness to undertake some confidence building measures in the military area. This shift can be explained partly in terms of China's external political concerns at both the global and regional levels. The more fundamental explanation, however, lies in China's drive for economic modernization with an accommodative regional strategy intended to ensure the flow of external resources required for this purpose.

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The official reaction of the Russian Federation and of the People's Republic of China to the announcement made by the United States in December 2001 to abrogate the almost thirty years old Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has been remarkably weak, given their sustained and coordinated opposition to the deployment of strategic defences against ballistic missiles (BMD). Because the existing literature, particularly balance of power theory, under-explored this puzzle and fails to provide a satisfactory explanation to it, a neoclassical realist model building on structural and unit-level variables is proposed to supplement this caveat. It is argued that Russia, as a stagnant great power experiencing trouble at the domestic level, bandwagons with the United States because it discounts the medium- and long-term threat posed by BMD. China, a rising developmental state, is soft balancing because it resents the project and the threat it poses to its security. It has not hard balanced so far because there is an acknowledgement that this could jeopardize its power base, as the telling example of the USSR collapse illustrated.

學界常以嚇阻理論觀點詮釋解放軍的外在戰略作為，但經由本研究透過嚇阻理論分析檢證的結果，發現事實上中共有其一貫的「威懾戰略」思維模式，並且為解放軍核心戰略「積極防禦」的依據，此戰略思維內涵承襲中國傳統戰略文化與原則，其實際意義和中共學界定義的威懾戰略不同。「威懾戰略」思維也是解放軍在建構與運用戰略武力時的根本依循原則，而非根據嚇阻理論產生的嚇阻戰略，因此以嚇阻戰略的標準來檢驗與分析解放軍戰略作為，將不能得到正確解答。 解放軍從早期建構核戰略武力開始，即是出自於現實戰略利益考量，並不只是如中共官方所稱，要打破大國核壟斷與追求徹底消滅核武器等理想性、道德化說詞；解放軍隱晦的「不首先使用」核武原則，更是「威懾戰略」思考下，避免引起強國攻擊，以換取戰略武力發展空間的一項策略。隨著國際戰略局勢以及中共安全認知轉變，在美國發展彈道飛彈防禦體系以及調整核武戰略的情況下，解放軍將會持續建構包含非核戰略武力在內的戰略打擊力量，但在核戰略武力建構方面將會有所節制，置重點於技術提升和多元發展，以確保解放軍能在不改變既有原則的基礎上，更加彈性靈活運用各式戰略武力，一方面維持威嚇的效果，另一方面也能在必要時配合「威懾戰略」動用武力，達成中共所賦予解放軍的任務。 關鍵詞：中共軍事、嚇阻理論、嚇阻戰略、威懾戰略、戰略武力、不首先使用 / Researchers often apply the concept of Deterrence Theory to explain the outward strategic actions of People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, through comprehensive analyses and examinations of Deterrence Theory, the research result indicated that PLA has created its own strategic logic of “Threat and Deterrent Strategy” which became the foundation of PLA’s core military strategy--Active Defense. In addition, this kind of strategic thinking which can be considered as the heritage of traditional Chinese military culture and principle is significantly different from the concept and measures of Deterrence Theory commonly agreed by scholars. “Threat and Deterrent Strategy” also became the foundation of PLA’s main military strategy “Active Defense”. “Threat and Deterrence Strategy” is PLA’s principle of building and operating its strategic weapon. Applying the concept of Deterrence Theory to explain PLA’s military actions may be inappropriate and result in misunderstanding because the concept and application of “Threat and Deterrence Strategy” are different from Deterrence Theory. Even though China official claimed that the goal of obtaining nuclear power is based on an ideal and proper purpose such as to break the exclusive development of nuclear weapon by certain countries and abolish nuclear weapon eventually, the reason why PLA developed nuclear weapon is because of the military advantages and strategic interests from obtaining nuclear power. PLA announced its “no-first-use” principle of using nuclear weapon without notifying the proviso is a typical example of playing “Threat and Deterrence Strategy” so that China can develop its strategic weapon without creating opposition from other countries. Along the strategic interactions among countries, the changing attitude toward national security in China, the development of Ballistic Missile Defense System in U.S, and the adjustment of using nuclear weapon and its strategy, PLA will keep improving its strategic weapon, including nuclear and non-nuclear. However, PLA will not speed up its development of nuclear weapon. Instead, PLA will emphasize more on improving the capacity and variety of its strategic weapon so that PLA can utilize all kinds of strategic weapon flexibly and ingeniously. On the one hand, improving military strength can ensure the effectiveness of deterrence; on the other hand, cooperating “Threat and Deterrence Strategy” and military actions can help PLA to complete the mission from China. Keywords: China Military, Deterrence Theory, Deterrence Strategic, Threat and Deterrence Strategy, Strategic Weapon, No first use

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