abstract: In an interview with the author, composer Chen Yi shared thoughts regarding her inspiration to compose the piece As in a Dream. She composed the first version in 1988 for soprano, violin, and cello. Left unpublished, this work was re-done in 1994 with the Chinese instruments zheng and pipa in place of the violin and cello. As in a Dream is a setting of two linked poems of six lines each by Qingzhao Li, one of the earliest female poets in China. Chen Yi kept the voice part the same in the two versions, but adapted the accompaniment to suit the Chinese instruments. This study of As in a Dream focuses on the 1994 version, and especially on the first song, with a view to introducing the singer to its Chinese elements. To help performers to understand better the text of the set, a translation and transliteration of the two poems by Qingzhao Li are offered with line-by-line interpretation. An introduction to the history and characteristics of the zheng and the pipa is supported by examples of the uses of these instruments in the songs. Drawing upon information provided by Chen Yi in the interview with the author, a discussion follows of Mandarin speech tones and their effect on the melodic design of As in a Dream, with music examples. An examination of traditional Beijing Opera styles of singing, with insights provided by Rao Lan, the soprano for whom the work was written, leads to a description of the fusion vocal technique required for performance of As in a Dream and some of the rules for diction in Mandarin Chinese. Intended as an introductory guide for the soprano contemplating performance of Chen Yi’s As in a Dream, this study also reveals the combination of Eastern and Western musical characteristics in these songs and gives examples of how the music interprets the veiled meaning of the poetry. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Music 2015

牟宗三的哲學系統建基於康德哲學，可謂眾所周知。不論批評抑或支持，論者均以牟宗三與康德表面上的親和關係而立論。本文嘗試擴闊相關課題的論域，論證牟宗三反覆申述的康德哲學，其實源於海德格的康德詮釋。他閱讀的康德，他建立的系統，均以「有限」與「超越」概念為焦點，這都是海德格影響下的結果。因此，本文的目標是雙重的：其一，重新評估牟宗三的哲學系統，我們應該重視他與海德格之間的對話，不應該只側重他與康德的關係；其二，顯示「有限」與「超越」概念如何有助我們重構中國哲學。 / 本文共分五章。第一章檢討學界現況，說明牟宗三與海德格之間關係的研究素被忽略，本文將論證海德格在牟宗三的哲學中扮演了關鍵的角色。第二、三章探討兩者哲學歷程上的相似性，點出兩人如何從生命哲學轉到存在論的研究。接下來的兩章，本文重點剖析牟宗三與海德格的兩個基本概念，一個是「有限」，另一個是「超越」。本文會研究牟宗三如何繼承海德格的概念，又如何使用這些概念來闡述他的存在論。牟宗三強調「智的直覺」並非出於誤解，那是他回應海德格基礎存在論的策略。 / It is well-known that Mou’s system of philosophy is constructed through a transformation of Kant’s philosophy. Both critics and followers of Mou make their stance based on the apparently intimate relation of his thought to Kant’s philosophy. My own inquiry will broaden this scope by trying to demonstrate how Mou’s much-discussed Kantianism is rooted in his close reading of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation. Under Heidegger’s influence, Mou’s own reading of Kant and his system of philosophy focus on the concepts of “finitude and “transcendence. Now the purpose of my thesis is twofold: first, the system of Mou’s philosophy should be reassessed through a dialogue with Heidegger, not merely with Kant; second, it will be shown how the reconstruction of the Chinese philosophy through concepts like “finitude and “transcendence is possible. / This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter reviews the state of current scholarship on Mou’s relation to Heidegger. This issue is largely neglected. I will argue that it is Heidegger who plays a crucial role in Mou’s philosophical development. The second and the third chapters are concerned with the similarity of their approaches to philosophy, i.e. the transformation from a philosophy of life to ontology. The following two chapters focus on the two fundamental concepts of both Mou and Heidegger -- finitude and transcendence. I will investigate how Mou inherits Heideggerian concepts and uses them to articulate his own ontology. Taking this backdrop into consideration, the purpose of Mou’s emphasis on intellectual intuition comes to the foreground, which I understand not as the result of a misunderstanding of Kant’s, but as his strategy in response to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 劉保禧. / Thesis submitted in 2012. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 265-272). / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Liu Baoxi. / 摘要 --- p.i / 鳴謝 --- p.iii / 目錄 --- p.iv / 引用與縮寫 --- p.viii / Chapter 第一章 --- 導論：隱匿的對話 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 前言：海德格籠罩下的陰影 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 文本根據：牟宗三筆下的海德格 --- p.5 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 主題式的理解：牟宗三論西方哲人 --- p.6 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- 理論勁敵：牟宗三論海德格 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.2.1 --- 起點：上帝隱退與神聖之感 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.2.2 --- 誤讀：海德格與主體性 --- p.12 / Chapter 1.2.2.3 --- 轉折：海德格的康德詮釋 --- p.16 / Chapter 1.3 --- 理論根據：有限與超越 --- p.23 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- 柏拉圖的兩個世界 --- p.24 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- 牟宗三：兩個世界的圓融無礙 --- p.25 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- 海德格：時間、有限與超越 --- p.27 / Chapter 1.3.4 --- 有限與無限之爭 --- p.31 / Chapter 1.4 --- 本文定位 --- p.33 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- 學界現況：牟宗三與漢語哲學 --- p.33 / Chapter 1.4.1.1 --- 牟宗三與康德 --- p.36 / Chapter 1.4.1.2 --- 牟宗三與黑格爾 --- p.37 / Chapter 1.4.1.3 --- 牟宗三與海德格 --- p.40 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- 隱匿的對話 --- p.44 / Chapter 1.4.2.1 --- 「隱匿」 --- p.46 / Chapter 1.4.2.2 --- 「對話」 --- p.48 / Chapter 1.4.3 --- 研究範圍 --- p.50 / Chapter 1.4.4 --- 論文佈局 --- p.53 / Chapter 第二章 --- 生命：實況性與氣質 --- p.55 / Chapter 2.1 --- 前言：同一的思想軌跡 --- p.55 / Chapter 2.2 --- 海德格：生命、實況性與詮釋 --- p.56 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 實況性的詮釋 --- p.59 / Chapter 2.2.1.1 --- 生命與實況性 --- p.60 / Chapter 2.2.1.2 --- 詮釋 --- p.65 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 小結 --- p.72 / Chapter 2.3 --- 牟宗三：生命的學問 --- p.74 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- 建構理論的純學院式人物？ --- p.74 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- 生命的學問 --- p.76 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- 「生命」 --- p.77 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- 「學問」 --- p.80 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- 小結 --- p.84 / Chapter 2.4 --- 生命哲學的交鋒 --- p.85 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- 「英雄式的勇敢哲學」：牟宗三論海德格的生命哲學 --- p.85 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- 海德格的可能辯護 --- p.89 / Chapter 2.5 --- 結語：真正的分歧 --- p.94 / Chapter 第三章 --- 存在論：一個世界抑或兩個世界？ --- p.97 / Chapter 3.1 --- 康德的遺稿 --- p.97 / Chapter 3.2 --- 牟宗三：兩層存有論 --- p.99 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 存在論的轉向 --- p.100 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 現象與物自身 --- p.105 / Chapter 3.2.2.1 --- 「現象」所以可能的根據 --- p.108 / Chapter 3.2.2.2 --- 「物自身」所以可能的根據 --- p.111 / Chapter 3.2.2.3 --- 「現象與物自身」所以可能的根據 --- p.114 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- 基本存有論 --- p.116 / Chapter 3.3 --- 海德格：基礎存在論 --- p.122 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 「兩個觀點」的閱讀方式 --- p.122 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 存在論的差異 --- p.126 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- 哥白尼式革命 --- p.128 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- 範疇論與存活論 --- p.131 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- 存在論的「基礎」 --- p.136 / Chapter 3.4 --- 結語：無本之論 --- p.138 / Chapter 第四章 --- 有限：智的直覺與想像力 --- p.139 / Chapter 4.1 --- 前言：有限抑或無限？--牟宗三與海德格的正面衝突 --- p.139 / Chapter 4.2 --- 「有限性」的哲學意涵 --- p.141 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 康德：人是甚麼？ --- p.142 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 海德格：人的有限性 --- p.143 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- 牟宗三：人雖有限而可無限 --- p.144 / Chapter 4.3 --- 「有限」的界線 --- p.145 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- 康德 --- p.145 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- 海德格 --- p.149 / Chapter 4.4 --- 越界：牟宗三論「智的直覺」 --- p.152 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- 「智的直覺」為何可能？ --- p.154 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- 「無限」為何可能？ --- p.160 / Chapter 4.4.2.1 --- 「命」之限制 --- p.163 / Chapter 4.4.2.2 --- 無限的歷程？. --- p.168 / Chapter 4.5 --- 化無限為有限：海德格論「想像力」 --- p.173 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- 質疑：想像力不是「共根」 --- p.174 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- 回應：想像力、圖式論與共根 --- p.175 / Chapter 4.5.2.1 --- 想像力 --- p.177 / Chapter 4.5.2.2 --- 圖式論 --- p.179 / Chapter 4.5.2.3 --- 共根？ --- p.185 / Chapter 4.6 --- 處境與可能性：海德格對牟宗三的可能批判 --- p.190 / Chapter 4.6.1 --- 處境 --- p.191 / Chapter 4.6.2 --- 可能性 --- p.194 / Chapter 4.7 --- 結語：哲學家之間的思想對話 --- p.197 / Chapter 第五章 --- 超越：天道與界域 --- p.199 / Chapter 5.1 --- 前言：關於「超越」的爭議 --- p.199 / Chapter 5.2 --- 牟宗三：超越而內在 --- p.200 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- 上帝隱退與神聖之感 --- p.201 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- 作為宗教的儒學 --- p.202 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- 爭議：「無本之論」--牟宗三論海德格的超越 --- p.205 / Chapter 5.2.3.1 --- 超越論的對象 = x --- p.207 / Chapter 5.2.3.2 --- 真正的「超越」 --- p.211 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- 正名：transcendent 與transcendental --- p.212 / Chapter 5.2.4.1 --- 康德 --- p.213 / Chapter 5.2.4.2 --- 牟宗三 --- p.214 / Chapter 5.2.5 --- 質疑：「超越而內在」是否可能？ --- p.216 / Chapter 5.3 --- 海德格：此在的超越 --- p.224 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- 為形而上學奠基 --- p.225 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- 此在、世界與超越 --- p.228 / Chapter 5.3.2.1 --- 此在 --- p.230 / Chapter 5.3.2.2 --- 世界 --- p.232 / Chapter 5.3.2.3 --- 超越 --- p.234 / Chapter 5.3.2.4 --- 小結 --- p.235 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- 根據的本質 --- p.237 / Chapter 5.3.3.1 --- 界域 --- p.237 / Chapter 5.3.3.2 --- 無 --- p.239 / Chapter 5.3.3.3 --- 根據 --- p.240 / Chapter 5.3.3.4 --- 小結 --- p.243 / Chapter 5.4 --- 道德與歷史：兩條取代宗教的道路 --- p.244 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- 牟宗三：以道德代宗教 --- p.244 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- 海德格：以歷史代宗教 --- p.246 / Chapter 5.5 --- 結語：同一與差異 --- p.248 / Chapter 第六章 --- 結論：有限者的超越 --- p.251 / Chapter 附錄一： --- 詞彙表 --- p.257 / Chapter 附錄二： --- 外文著作學者姓名對照表 --- p.263 / 參考書目 --- p.265

This dissertation is a study on the integration of Chinese traditional musical elements in Western-style compositions for the violin by contemporary Chinese composers. As background, the development of musical synthesis in Chinese New Music since the 1930s is reviewed, and essential aspects of the musical language and aesthetics of Chinese Traditional Music are surveyed. Through detailed analyses of three representative compositions by contemporary composers Ma Sicong (1912-1987), Chen Yi (b. 1953), and Bright Sheng (b.1955), their different approaches to the synthesis of Chinese traditional and Western musical styles are examined. Historical context is provided in biographical information about the three composers, including their educational background, musical influences, and compositional styles.

My dissertation investigates the concepts and techniques of “copying” and appropriation in contemporary Chinese art, which, despite its phenomenal growth, has seldom been credited as original. Critics either condemn the Chinese artists’ willingness to appropriate from others as a lack of individuality, or declare it as a peculiarly “Chinese” quality. This paper, instead, argues that the Chinese artists deliberately adopt such “copying” as a visual strategy, in order to reexamine the traditions they “borrowed”, to reflect on their own cultural status in the modern world, and to challenge the conventional concept of originality--namely, to show that originality is not created by irreducible individuality or mystified inspiration, but by the author’s choice as well as manipulation of contexts. This strategy, I argue, is essential to the proper evaluation and interpretation of contemporary Chinese artworks. The first two chapters of my dissertation focus on laying out the context from which this art grows. I review how the ideas, styles and institutional structures of western modern art were imitated, questioned and redefined by the Chinese artists, from 1978 to the present; I then examine the conceptual complexity of originality and “copying” in the theories of modernism, postmodernism, postcolonialism and in traditional Chinese art. The next two chapters focus on, respectively, calligraphy and photography in contemporary Chinese art, both of which contain the paradox between originality and “copying” in their very nature. The works of four artists, Xu Bing, Qiu Zhijie, Hong Hao and Zhao Bandi, are discussed in details. Xu's site-specific reproduction of “pseudo characters” manage to engage its targeted audiences, psychologically and physically; Qiu's obsessive yet futile copying of a canon of calligraphy returns the act of writing to its essence--a physical pursuit of one's spiritual state of being; Hong's photographic emulation of an ancient masterpiece suggests that painting may excel photography in its ability to portray a grand cityscape; Zhao’s simulacrum of pop culture paradigms enables him to evade political censorship, and to have an substantial yet ironic impact in a broader public sphere. Each of these works has made a unique contribution to the redefinition of artistic originality. / text