Yes / Our paper examines the distress anomaly on the Chinese stock markets. We show that the anomaly disappears after controlling for institutional ownership. We propose two hypotheses. The growing scale of institutional investors and changes in institutional preferences can generate greater demand shocks for stocks with low distress risk than those with high distress risk, causing the former to outperform the latter. Consistent with our hypotheses, the growth of institutions explains the anomaly when the institutional market share increases rapidly. We also show that institutional preferences for stocks with low distress risk have significantly increased over time and changes in preferences also explain the anomaly. Finally, momentum trading and gradual incorporation of distress information cannot account for the anomaly.

The fast-growing economy in China attracts the world’s interests, which includes the Chinese stock markets. The market efficiency of Chinese stock markets is widely discussed by researchers in different approaches. The involvement of government in stock markets is a unique case in the financial world.   By this paper, we are answering the question that is the degree of market efficiency of stat-owned companies different from that of private companies in Chinese stock markets. This will bring us knowledge about Chinese stock markets as well as the impact from ownership, market value and management styles on market efficiency.   To clarify the influence from government involvement in stock markets, we select 938 stocks distinguished by ownership structure. This quantitative study is preceded on daily data from 2007 to 2011. We use auto correlation, Chi-square test, and linear regression together with Spearman’s correlation to test our hypothesis. The degree of market efficiency of each ownership group is examined and compared to each other. Market efficiency related to ownership and market capitalization are inspected if they are anomaly factors in Chinese markets.   The empirical results indicate that the degree of market efficiency of state-owned companies is significantly different from the degree of market efficiency of private-owned companies in China. The market capitalization is one of the existing anomaly factors in Chinese stock markets, as well as it is correlated with degree of market efficiency to some extent. For state-owned enterprises, active management on stock market does not provide a better market efficiency compared to passively managed companies.

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