Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis it is argued that the age-old philosophical "Problem of the Self' can benefit by being approached from the perspective of a relatively recent science, namely that of Complexity Theory. With this in mind the conceptual features of this theory is highlighted and summarised. Furthermore, the argument is made that the predominantly dualistic approach to the self that is characteristic of the Western Philosophical tradition serves to hinder, rather than edify, our understanding of the phenomenon. The benefits posed by approaching the self as an emergent property of a complex system is elaborated upon, principally with the help of work done by Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Paul Cilliers. The aim is to develop a materialistic conception of the self that is plausible in terms of current empirical information and resists the temptation see the self as one or other metaphysical entity within the brain, without "reducing" the self to a crude materialism. The final chapter attempts to formulate a possible foil against the accusation of crude materialism by emphasising that the self is part of a greater system that includes the mental apparatus and its environment (conceived as culture). In accordance with Dawkins's theory the medium of interaction in this system is conceived of as memes and the self is then conceived of as a meme-complex, with culture as a medium for memetransference. The conclusion drawn from this is that the self should be studied through narrative, which provides an approach to the self that is material without being crudely physicalistic. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis word daar aangevoer dat die relatiewe jong wetenskap van Kompleksiteitsteorie 'n nuttige bydra kan lewer tot die eeue-oue filosofiese "Probleem van die Self'. Met die oog hierop word die konseptueie kenmerke van hierdie teorie na vore gebring en opgesom. Die argument word gemaak dat die meerendeels dualistiese benadering van die Westerse filosofiese tradisie tot die self ons verstaan van die fenomeen belemmer eerder as om dit te bemiddel. Die voordele van dié nuwe benadering, wat die self sien as 'n ontluikende (emergent) eienskap van In komplekses sisteem, word bespreek met verwysing na veral die werke van Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett en Paul Cilliers. Daar word beoog om In verstaan van die self te ontwikkel wat kontemporêre empiriese insigte in ag neem en wat die versoeking weerstaan om ongeoorloofde metafisiese eienskappe aan die self toe te ken. Terselfdetyd word daar gepoog om geensins die uniekheid van die self te "reduseer" na 'n kru materialisme nie. In die finale hoofstuk word daar gepoog om 'n teenargument vir die voorsiene beswaar van kru materialisme te ontwikkel. Dit word gedoen deur te benadruk dat die self gesien word as deel van 'n groter, komplekse sisteem, wat die masjienerie van denke en die omgewing (wat as kultuur gekonseptualiseer word) insluit. Insgelyks, in die teorie van Dawkins word die medium van interaksie in hierdie sisteem gesien as "memes", waar die self dan n meme-kompleks vorm, en kultuur die medium van meme-oordrag is. Daar word tot die konklusie gekom dat die self op 'n narratiewe manier bestudeer behoort te word, wat dan 'n benadering tot die self voorsien wat materialisties is, sonder om kru fisikalisties te wees.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Introduction From the postmodern ethical perspective [the postmodernist would say Jrom the ethical perspective], there is something suspicious and inherently unethical in a system of ethics supported by a comprehensive, cohesive and universal metanarrative, a set of fixed and unbending ethical rules and laws, without the ready possibility of revision [Cilliers, 1998, pp.114, 137-140; Cilliers, 2001, p. 3; Cilliers, 1995, p.125]. Based on the ideas of especially Winkler [1993, pp. 343-365] I have concluded that contemporary mainstream biomedical ethics, represented and directed by the work of Beauchamp and Childress [1994] are caught in such a crush. The primary objective of this assignment is to evaluate the 'principles' of biomedical ethics [respect Jar autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice] which were developed in their water-shed publication [Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University Press, first published in 1979, and now in a fifth edition, 2002] against a background of postmodern ethics. Methodology and conclusions I have argued that Beauchamp and Childress' conception of principlism is a contextual legalistic-philosophical response to the contemporary American situation, developed primarily from legal decisions [often litigation]. It may be regarded as acceptable practice guidelines, but represents a system of ethics without morality. I have given a concise rendering of Winkler's notion of context-based bioethics with the criticism that this also does not guarantee morality. Following that, there is a description of postmodern society in terms of complexity theory. I have indicated how the characteristics of complexity can be developed and applied contextually in bioethics. The postmodern moral society is the locus where morality develops in a non-controllable agonistic interactive process within which the postmodern moral agent unintentionally finds himself. The postmodern ethical position is not an unethical, come-as-you-may anything-goes position; it simply is not predictable, controllable, universal, rational [in a Kantian context] and eternal. Modernity, it can be argued exhibits a far greater degree of relativism. The postmodern ethical position represents a return to morality in ethics, morality of a very personal, face-to-face responsibility from which we as participants of society cannot hide. From a postmodern ethical perspective, an analysis of principlism and its underlying principles exhibits the characteristics of modernity: eternal moral rules which as such cannot be presented as morality. I have acknowleged Beauchamp and Childress' attempts at adding morality to their conception [in the 4th edition] by means of employing character ethics. They have nevertheless not made any radical changes in the format of their presentation and maintain the central and primary role of principles. I have also argued the limitations of the postmodern approach in terms of enclaves of strictly controlled modernity and artificial witholding of information in medicine which limit the free flow of information essential to the postmodern approach. My conception of complexity and the postmodern approach do not pretend to be a panacea for biomedical ethics. It attempts to redefine the meaning of morality in bioethics and questions the unbridled application of this conception of principIism. Finally I have discussed the burning issue of justice in the practice of medicine from the postmodern perspective. Do I as a person have a right to health care; what are the moral issues of dealing with 'life's lotteries'; what is the state's responsibility in health care, and: what are my personal responsibilities in health care? In contradistinction to libertarian concepts, the postmodern approach clearly argues in favour of the acceptance by the state of its role in health care [a responsibility abrogated in many societies, none more so than contemporary South-African society]. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Inleiding Daar IS uit die perspektief van die postmoderne etiese standpunt [die postmodernis sou sê, uit die etiese perspektiej], iets verdags, iets inherent oneties aan 'n sisteem van etiek wat 'n enkele goed omskrewe, kohese en omvattende universele metanarratief voorhou, 'n stel vaste en onbuigsame etiese reëls en wette voorskryf en afdwing sonder om konteks en gevolge te oorweeg, en sonder die geredelike moontlikheid van revisie [Cilliers, 1998, pp.114, 137-140; Cilliers, 2001, p. 3; Cilliers, 1995, p.125]. Dit is, n.a.v. die denke van veral Winkler [1993, pp. 343-365] my oortuiging dat die hoofstroom-denke in biomediese etiek in so 'n drukgang vasgevang is, en verteenwoordig word en gerig is deur die denke van Beauchamp en Childress [1994]. Hierdie werkstuk gaan in hoofsaak daarom om Beauchamp en Childress se toepassing van die beginsels van biomediese etiek soos sedert 1979 in hul waterskeidingsboek 'Principles of Biomedical Ethics' [Vierde uitgawe, Oxford University Press, 1994; daar is nou ook 'n vyfde, 2002] uiteengesit, ontwikkel, bespreek en gepropageer [respek vir outonomie, weldadigheid, non-kwaadwilligheid en geregtigheid] teen die agtergrond van 'n postmoderne etiese beskouing te evalueer. Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings Ek het in hierdie werkstuk aangetoon dat Beauchamp en Childress se weergawe van prinsiplisme 'n kontekstuele wetlik-filosofiese reaksie op die kontemporêre Amerikaanse situasie is, hoofsaaklik uit regsaksie [dikwels litigasie] voortvloei, as goeie praktyksriglyne beredeneer kan word maar etiek sonder moraliteit verteenwoordig. Ek het 'n kort uiteensetting van Winkler se weergawe van 'n konteks-gebaseerde benadering gegee, maar aangetoon dat ook dit nie moraliteit waarborg nie. Daarop het ek 'n beskrywing van die postmoderne samelewing n.a.v. kompleksiteitsteorie gegee, en aangetoon hoe die eienskappe van kompleksiteit kontekstueelontwikkel kan word om in bioetiek toegepas te word. Die postmoderne gepostuleerde morele gemeenskap is die lokus waar moraliteit ontstaan deur 'n onbeheerbare agonistiese proses van interaktiewe wisselwerking waarby die postmoderne morele agent homself onwillekeurig betrokke vind. Die postmoderne etiese posisie is nie onetiese, lukraak, doen-soos-jy-wil relativisme nie; dit is bloot nie 'n voorspelbare, ewige, beheerbare, universele en [Kantiaans-] rasionele sisteem nie; moderniteit is [was?] in effek veel meer relativisties. Die postmoderne etiese standpunt verteenwoordig in my interpretasie 'n terugkeer tot moraliteit in etiek, moraliteit van 'n persoonlike, ingrypende, verantwoordelike aangesigtot- aangesig aard waaraan ons nie kan ontkom nie. Vanuit 'n postmoderne etiese perspektief het ek 'n analise van prinsiplisme en die individuele beginsels gemaak, en aangetoon dat hulle die eienskappe van die 'ewige morele reëls' van moderniteit openbaar en nie sonder meer as morele beredenering voorgehou kan word nie. Ek het erkenning gegee aan Beauchamp en Childress se eie pogings om dit te besweer deur karakteretiek as 'n essensiële tot hul formule toe te voeg, maar die kritiek uitgespreek dat hulle desnieteenstaande hierdie belangrike erkenning, nie bereid is om die formaat van hul aanbieding [ook in die jongste vyfde uitgawe, 2002] radikaal te wysig nie. Hulle oorbeklemtoon die beginsels steeds as sentraal en primêr. Terselfdertyd het ek die beperkings van die postmoderne benadering uitgelig, veral in terme van enklawes van streng-beheerde moderniteit in geneeskunde en 'n kunsmatige weerhouding van die vrye vloei van informasie wat kompleksiteit en die postmoderne situasie kenmerk. My konsepsie hou nie kompleksiteit en 'n postmoderne benadering voor as 'n panakeia vir biomediese etiek nie; dit dien eerder om die betekenis van moraliteit in bioetiek te herdefinieer en die kontemporêre algemene en ongekwalifseerde toepassing van hierdie weergawe van prinsiplisme te bevraagteken. Laastens het ek die brandende vraag van geregtigheid in die praktyk van geneeskunde vanuit 'n postmoderne perspektief bespreek, veral of ek as persoon kan aanspraak maak op 'n reg tot gesondheidsorg, die morele implikasies van 'life's lotteries', die staat se verantwoordelikheid in gesondheidsorg en les bes, persoonlike verantwoordelikheid in gesondheidsorg. Dit is duidelik dat 'n postmoderne benadering tot bioetiek, in teenstelling met libertêre konsepsies, die staat se rol in gesondheidsorg onderskryf ['n rol wat die staat byna universeel, en veral in Suid-Afrika, verwaarloos].