My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Humanidades, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Gradução, 2009. / Submitted by Elna Araújo (elna@bce.unb.br) on 2010-05-06T20:07:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_JulianadeOrioneArraesFagundes.pdf: 449603 bytes, checksum: d6eb5059bd95a2eda0e9bf6540a7f5f4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Daniel Ribeiro(daniel@bce.unb.br) on 2010-05-07T19:18:14Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_JulianadeOrioneArraesFagundes.pdf: 449603 bytes, checksum: d6eb5059bd95a2eda0e9bf6540a7f5f4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-05-07T19:18:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2009_JulianadeOrioneArraesFagundes.pdf: 449603 bytes, checksum: d6eb5059bd95a2eda0e9bf6540a7f5f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Esta dissertação discute alguns dos problemas contemporâneos da consciência. Não basta a consciência ser evidente de um ponto de vista de primeira pessoa. Uma explicação do mental deve passar pela compreensão de seu lugar na natureza. Para Chalmers, a consciência não pode ser explicada a partir dos conceitos e teorias científicas atuais. Ele sugere sua incorporação em nossa ontologia como uma propriedade fundamental. Dennett, por outro lado, defende a possibilidade de uma explicação da consciência a partir de uma perspectiva de terceira pessoa. Para isso, o trabalho das diversas disciplinas científicas deve ser levado em consideração. Como Dennett, a autora desta dissertação acredita que uma explicação apropriada da consciência deve partir da compreensão do ser humano em suas dimensões biológica e cultural. A primeira parte deste trabalho discute criticamente as idéias de Chalmers. A segunda apresenta as propostas de Dennett para tratar do tema, além de dois modelos apresentados pelo autor. A última parte trata da evolução cultural e da sua relevância para a discussão sobre a mente humana. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This thesis discusses some of the contemporary problems of consciousness. It's not enough for consciousness to be evident from a first person point of view. An explanation of consciousness depends on a comprehension of its place in nature. According to Chalmers, consciousness cannot be understood in terms of the present scientific concepts and theories. Instead, it must be assimilated into our ontology as a fundamental property. Dennett, on the other hand, argues that it is possible to give an account of consciousness in terms of the current scientific framework. In order to accomplish this, scientific advances in many disciplines must be taken into consideration. For him, the correct perspective should be the third person point of view. Like Dennett, the author of the present work thinks that a proper theory of consciousness must be based on an understanding of how human beings fit in both their biological and cultural dimensions. The first part of this thesis tackles Chalmers’s ideas on consciousness and its shortcomings. The second part of the thesis deals with Dennett's views on consciousness and two models he advances. Its last part discusses cultural evolution and its relevance to the discussion concerning the human mind.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Bibliography: leaves 88-89.

Würzburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2003.

Zugl.: Innsbruck, Univ., Diplomarbeit, 2004

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1994. / Permission to use letters at end of volume 2. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 462-595). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1994. / Permission to use letters at end of volume 2. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 462-595). Also available on the Internet.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2013-02-18Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:53:22Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 leite_scb_me_mar.pdf: 681572 bytes, checksum: 998e82036cf8727d4c73328be2481656 (MD5) / Este trabalho tem como objetivo geral realizar um contraste entre duas teorias cognitivas da consciência, a Teoria do Espaço de Trabalho Global de Bernard Baars (1988) e o Modelo de Esboços Múltiplos de Daniel Dennett (1991). Apesar de Dennett demonstrar apreciação pela Teoria do Espaço de Trabalho Global, sua teoria não aparenta ser muito compatível com a mesma. O objetivo específico deste trabalho é de verificar esta compatibilidade perguntando se as criticas de Dennett ao Teatro Cartesiano atingem a Teoria do Espaço de Trabalho Global. O primeiro capítulo expõe a visão de Dennett sobre como a consciência evoluiu, em contraste com a visão baseada na Teoria do Espaço de Trabalho Global. Para a primeira, a cultura e a linguagem possuem um papel central na origem da consciência, para a segunda a consciência tem principalmente uma origem biológica. No segundo capítulo, ambas as teorias da consciência são expostas, comentadas e criticadas. O terceiro capítulo realiza um contraste entre as duas teorias e analisa as implicações do conceito de Teatro Cartesiano para a Teoria do Espaço de Trabalho Global. Argumentamos que o conceito do Teatro Cartesiano é vago, e através de uma análise cautelosa encontramos 10 requisitos para uma teoria não se enquadrar em um Teatro Cartesiano, através das palavras de Dennett. Verificamos que a Teoria do Espaço de Trabalho Global preenche alguns desses requisitos. Por fim, através de uma exploração das análises de Todd (2009), concluímos que as críticas principais de Dennett a alguns aspectos do Teatro Cartesiano são fracas. Dessa forma, as críticas ao Teatro Cartesiano não são uma ameaça para a Teoria do Espaço de Trabalho Global / This work has as its main goal a contrast of two renowned cognitive theories of consciousness, Bernard Baars’ (1988) Global Workspace Theory and Daniel Dennett’s (1991) Multiple Drafts. Although Dennett shows some appreciation to the Global Workspace Theory, his own Multiple Drafts Model does not seem very compatible with it. The specific goal of this work is to verify such compatibility by asking if the Global Workspace Theory suffers from Daniel Dennett´s criticism of the Cartesian Theater. The first chapter exposes Dennett´s perspective on the evolution of consciousness, in contrast to the view based on The Global Workspace Theory. The former understands that language and culture play a central role in the origin of consciousness; the latter understands consciousness has mainly a biological origin. In the second chapter, both theories of consciousness are exposed and reviewed. The third chapter focuses on a contrast of the two theories and some implications of the Cartesian Theater. Also, we noted that the concept of a Cartesian Theater is vague, and through a rigorous analysis, 10 requisites for a theory to evade the Cartesian Theater, following Dennett’s words, were identified. The Global Workspace Theory was shown to meet a few of these requisites. Finally, making use of Todd´s (2009) analyses, we concluded that Dennett´s main critics to some aspects of the Cartesian Theater are weak. So it follows that the criticism to the Cartesian Theater does not pose serious problems for the Global Workspace Theory

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2012-04-10Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:33:07Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 paulo_gv_me_mar.pdf: 754923 bytes, checksum: 93352ef571f6b574816c31264db6c3e8 (MD5) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / O objetivo desta dissertação é propor um estudo comparativo envolvendo duas diferentes perspectivas teóricas para o estudo da consciência situadas no contexto da Filosofia Contemporânea da Mente e das Ciências Cognitivas. Analisaremos criticamente seus pressupostos, suas divergências e o alcance de suas propostas considerando os filósofos da mente John R. Searle e Daniel C. Dennett como paradigmas representantes de cada uma das duas perspectivas. A filosofia da mente de John Searle caracteriza-se por levar em consideração os aspectos subjetivos dos estados conscientes em uma perspectiva que nunca permite dispensar ou desconsiderar os dados de primeira pessoa no estudo da consciência. Estes dados geralmente dizem respeito às experiências conscientes e às peculiares impressões e sensações internas tais como os qualia. Por outro lado, Daniel Dennett adota a perspectiva de terceira pessoa no estudo da consciência, buscando critérios científicos para o desenvolvimento deste estudo sustentado por dados publicamente observáveis e intersubjetivamente definíveis. Estes dados levam em conta as evidências comportamentais, informacionais ou neurofisiológicas que remetem a aspectos mentais, tentando assim estabelecer uma relação explicativa destes com o que se entende por consciência. No atual campo de pesquisas da Filosofia da Mente junto às Ciências Cognitivas não há consenso sobre o método mais adequado para o estudo da consciência sendo, ao contrário disso, composto por várias divergências. Por este motivo, consideramos relevante uma confrontação entre as principais perspectivas utilizadas no estudo do assunto. Buscaremos realizar esta tarefa analisando as contribuições das teorias estudadas para a elucidação da relação subjetividade/objetividade dos estados conscientes / This research is a comparative study of two different theoretical perspectives on the study of the consciousness, in the context of the contemporary philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. We analyze their presuppositions, their differences, and the reach of the two proposals, considering the philosophers of mind John R. Searle and Daniel C. Dennett as paradigmatic representatives of each of the two perspectives. The philosophy of mind of John Searle is characterized by the taking into consideration of the subjective aspects of conscious states, in a perspective that never allows the discarding or ignoring of first person data. These data generally have to do with conscious experiences and with specific impressions and internal sensations such as qualia. Daniel Dennett, on the other hand, adopts the third person perspective in the study of the consciousness, seeking scientific criteria that are supported by publicly observable and intersubjectively definable data. These data take into account behavioral, informational, or neurophysiological evidence that refers to mental aspects, thus attempting to establish an explanatory relation between these aspects and what is understood as consciousness. In the current field of research in philosophy of the mind, as well as in the Cognitive Sciences, there is no consensus on the most adequate method for the study of the conscience, and in fact various tendencies exist within the field. For this reason, we consider it relevant to compare the two main perspectives in the study of the subject. We attempt to carry out this task by analyzing the contributions of the theories under consideration, in order to elucidate the subjectivity/objectivity relationship in conscious states