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Public participation in transport planning in Hong Kong: how well does the road infrastructure planning in HongKong encourage public participation?盧穎芝, Lo, Wing-chee, Wincci. January 2002 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Urban Planning / Master / Master of Science in Urban Planning
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Civil society and the government in Hong Kong: opportunities and challengesChan, Tin-yeung, Joseph., 陳天揚. January 2003 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Urban Planning / Master / Master of Science in Urban Planning
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Conflicts resolutions in infrastructure planning: a case study in Hong KongKwan, Wing-mei., 關穎媚. January 2000 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Urban Planning / Master / Master of Science in Urban Planning
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504 |
Public and private parties' participation in housing development in Hong KongYu, Wai-kin, Nicol., 余偉健. January 2000 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Urban Planning / Master / Master of Science in Urban Planning
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Participation of grassroots' organization in environmental protection policyNg, Hang-sau., 伍杏修. January 1992 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Social Work / Master / Master of Social Work
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Public participation in the environmental impact assessment system of Hong KongChu, Hung, Viola., 朱紅. January 1998 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Urban Planning / Master / Master of Science in Urban Planning
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The health policy network and policy community in Hong Kong: from concertation to pressure pluralismNg, Suk-han, Christina., 伍淑嫺. January 1998 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy
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A critical review of the District Administrative Scheme in Hong KongYau, Kwai-chong, Eliza., 尤桂莊. January 2006 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration
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Putting the public in public involvement : a case study in Texas groundwater managementByford, Leigh S. 05 April 2010 (has links)
Not available / text
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THE DEMOCRACY OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATESEom, Kihong 01 January 2003 (has links)
The intention of campaign finance regulations was to reduce the influence of special interest groups while increasing citizen contributions. Critics have suggested an unintentional consequence of this policy of increasing bias in campaign contributions in favor of incumbents. These claims of intentional and unintentional consequences, however, have rarely been tested. My dissertation examines the intentional and unintentional consequences of campaign finance regulations in the American states. This study adopts a theoretical framework emphasizing the different effects of regulations on two distinctive types of contributors. A particularistic contributor, whose motivation is influencing policy, is likely to be affected by contribution limits. A universalistic contributor, motivated by helping his or her favorite candidates, is not likely to respond to regulations. Furthermore, the disparity of contributions is not expected to be affected by contribution limits. Two specific hypotheses reflecting the theoretical consideration are tested: 1) Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions and increase the disparity between the numbers as well as the amounts of contributions, and 2) Contribution limits do not affect the number, the amount, or the disparities of universalistic contributions. Individual contribution records on gubernatorial elections are collected from 1990 to 2000 in 42 states. After aggregating individual contribution records by state and candidate, two analyses are conducted at the state and candidate level. The results indicate that campaign finance regulations work without the unintentional consequence of providing a financial advantage to incumbents at both the state and candidate levels. Contribution limits increase the number of total contributors, reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions, and increase the number of universalistic contributors. In addition, further analyses show a dynamic effect of contribution limits on corporations, labor unions, individuals, parties, and ideology PACs. Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of corporate contributions, but only reduce the amount of labor union contributions. On the other hand, strict contribution limits encourage individual contributions, but discourage party and ideological PAC contributions. The intentional consequence of campaign finance regulations does not result in the unintentional consequence of increasing bias in favor of incumbents. These findings suggest that current regulations that limit campaign contributions should remain in place.
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