This thesis explores the literary career of Stephen Crane, concentrating on his war works.

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A rising politician from Indiana, Lew Wallace became a Civil War general through political connections. As the war developed, political generals contributed to the Union war effort in multiple ways. This dissertation evaluates Wallace’s service for the Union. While he had much success as a regimental commander, he experienced troubles at the brigade and division levels. Some natural rivalry and tension between West Pointers and political generals may have caused ill-will between Wallace and professionally trained officers, but other factors also contributed to his difficulties. A temperamental officer, Wallace often sought out mentors, but then quickly found reasons to fault them. Wallace’s lack of respect for his superiors led him to occasionally criticize or be rude to them. Moreover, General Wallace vigorously sought chances to see glorious action in the field, but then failed to perform well when given the opportunity. Despite creating problems for himself, such as his recurrent unwillingness to give speeches and recruit soldiers for the Union, Wallace concluded his Civil War service having contributed both politically and militarily to the war effort. For example, the general came to the aid of the Union right flank at Fort Donelson, performed admirably on the second day of the Battle of Shiloh, and defended Cincinnati in 1862. He came to the defense of southern Indiana and continued to grudgingly assist in recruiting new troops in 1863. He administered Baltimore and the Middle Department and set up an adequate defense at the Monocacy River in 1864. Wallace also accepted politically risky assignments on high-profile military commissions in 1862 and 1865. His service as a volunteer general demonstrated how a politician in uniform should be evaluated differently than most professionally trained officers.

A rising politician from Indiana, Lew Wallace became a Civil War general through political connections. As the war developed, political generals contributed to the Union war effort in multiple ways. This dissertation evaluates Wallace’s service for the Union. While he had much success as a regimental commander, he experienced troubles at the brigade and division levels. Some natural rivalry and tension between West Pointers and political generals may have caused ill-will between Wallace and professionally trained officers, but other factors also contributed to his difficulties. A temperamental officer, Wallace often sought out mentors, but then quickly found reasons to fault them. Wallace’s lack of respect for his superiors led him to occasionally criticize or be rude to them. Moreover, General Wallace vigorously sought chances to see glorious action in the field, but then failed to perform well when given the opportunity. Despite creating problems for himself, such as his recurrent unwillingness to give speeches and recruit soldiers for the Union, Wallace concluded his Civil War service having contributed both politically and militarily to the war effort. For example, the general came to the aid of the Union right flank at Fort Donelson, performed admirably on the second day of the Battle of Shiloh, and defended Cincinnati in 1862. He came to the defense of southern Indiana and continued to grudgingly assist in recruiting new troops in 1863. He administered Baltimore and the Middle Department and set up an adequate defense at the Monocacy River in 1864. Wallace also accepted politically risky assignments on high-profile military commissions in 1862 and 1865. His service as a volunteer general demonstrated how a politician in uniform should be evaluated differently than most professionally trained officers.

The Battle of Sailor's Creek, 6 April 1865, has been overshadowed by Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House several days later, yet it is an example of the Union military war machine reaching its apex of war making ability during the Civil War. Through Ulysses S. Grant's leadership and that of his subordinates, the Union armies, specifically that of the Army of the Potomac, had been transformed into a highly motivated, organized and responsive tool of war, led by confident leaders who understood their commander's intent and were able to execute on that intent with audacious initiative in the absence of further orders. After Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia escaped from Petersburg and Richmond on 2 April 1865, Grant's forces chased after Lee's forces with the intent of destroying the mighty and once feared protector of the Confederate States in the hopes of bringing a swift end to the long war. At Sailor's Creek, Phil Sheridan, Grant's cavalry commander was able to put his forces south and west of Lee's Army trapping it between Sheridan's cavalry and George Meade's Army of the Potomac. After fighting a brutal, close quarters engagement, Union forces captured or killed the majority of two of Lee's corps, commanded by Richard H. Anderson and Richard S. Ewell, and severely attrited a third corps under John B. Gordon, leaving Lee only James Longstreet's corps intact to continue the struggle.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Harold Trinkunas, Jeanne Giraldo. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-79). Also available online.

Popular historiography of the U. S. Civil War has traditionally underemphasized the war’s foreign dimension and the role outside support and potential recognition played in the conflict. Recent literature, however, has begun to reverse this trend. Building upon recent studies, this thesis examines public opinion in Halifax during the Civil War. In a period characterized by divided opinion – both within the United States and abroad – Haligonians overwhelmingly supported the South for most of the conflict. This thesis explores public opinion in Halifax by studying one of the city’s most prominent Confederate supporters, Dr. William Johnston Almon. By examining Almon and his community, the role certain factors played in influencing Haligonian support for the Confederacy – such as Northern provocations, sociopolitical ideology, and economic interests – can be better understood. This thesis contends that Almon’s involvement in the Civil War was ideologically motivated and that he was not necessarily an outlier in Halifax.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2006. / Title from title screen (site viewed on Nov. 22, 2006). PDF text: ii, 333 p. : ill. ; 1.82Mb. UMI publication number: AAT 3217536. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche format.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006. / Thesis Advisor(s): Letitia Lawson and Jessica Piombo. "June 2006." Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-97). Also available in print.