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One of the most common features found within peace agreements are provisions that call for post-civil war elections. Unfortunately, recent research on post-civil war stability has consistently demonstrated that the initial elections held after civil wars significantly increases the risk for renewed fighting. While this research does highlight a danger posed by post-war elections, it focuses only on one element associated with post-civil war democracy. I argue that by implementing electoral reforms that are called for in peace agreements, post-war countries reduce the risk of renewed civil war. Implementing these peace agreement provisions increases the durability of post-war peace in two ways. First, by implementing costly electoral reforms called for in the peace agreement, the government signals a credible commitment to the peace process which reduces security dilemmas faced by opposition groups. Second, electoral reforms generate new avenues for political participation for disaffected citizens, which reduces the ability of hardliners to mobilize future armed opposition. I examine how implementing post-war electoral reforms impact the risk of renewed conflict from 1989 through 2010. Using duration models, I demonstrate that implementing these electoral reforms substantially reduces the risk of renewed conflict.

<p>How does competition and rivalry within alliances affect outcomes and processes in civil wars? Towards addressing this inquiry, this dissertation presents a formal theory of alliance formation that takes into account both internal and external threats. The theory, presented in Chapter 2, focuses on how allying parties make decisions regarding resource mobilization for conflictual purposes, in the presence of both internal and external hazards. The model indicates that intra-coalition division should serve not only as a source of instability but also as a wellspring of strength for aligning militant groups. This leads to a peculiar result, whereby the internal factors enabling groups to overcome the problem of collective action may also contribute to the "conflict trap." Testable implications are derived and examined empirically via a new dataset on alliances between rebel groups during civil wars from 1944 to 2001. The series of logistical models in Chapter 3 indicates that alliances marked by rivalry and competition are indeed more likely to lead to rebel victories. Yet, the analysis also demonstrates that these types of arrangements are also significant predictors of war recurrence. The latter result holds irrespective of how the original conflicts terminate. Additionally, Chapter 4 of this dissertation presents a comparative analysis between two cases of civil war marked by competitive alliances. In addition to other factors, the cases suggest the relative size of alliance members, the influence external actors, and the presence of electoral institutions may either exacerbate or mitigate competition issues within alliances.</p> / Dissertation

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Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007. / Thesis Advisor(s): Simons, Anna. "December 2007." Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Mar 28, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-72).

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007. / Thesis Advisor(s): Simons, Anna. "December 2007." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 18, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-72). Also available in print.

Thesis--Munich. / Vita. Bibliography: p. iv-xxi.

Theses (M.A.)--Marshall University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Includes abstract. Document formatted into pages: contains vii, 55 p. Bibliography: p. 53-55.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 215 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-215).