Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1995. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 154-161).

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Thesis advisor: Ken Kersch / This thesis examines the tradition of Catholic natural law conservatism in contemporary American politics. Using the works of Clarence Manion and Robert P. George, it identifies two distinct strands of natural law political philosophy. The analysis concludes with an attempt to reconcile these interpretations with the hope of providing a viable framework for the natural law in modern America. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science.

The general view of pragmatism holds that universal moral norms cannot be justified within a pragmatic perspective. Pragmatism, thus, is associated with relativism. C.I. Lewis says that pragmatism without universal norms is a self-contradiction. I defend the view that there are two dimensions to pragmatism. I claim that Lewis' philosophy encompasses both. I argue that there are two different pragmatic justifications implicit in his philosophy; while one is associated with relativism, the other is not. I call them: "the pragmatic choice of the best" and "the pragmatic justification of the non-repudiable," respectively. What is justified by the first is a choice from alternatives; what is justified by the second is the Categorical Imperative--the imperative to be practically consistent. I argue that the imperative governing ethics is secured as one aspect of, or derivation from, the imperative of practical consistency. I argue that there are ethical alternatives but that this flexibility occurs within the discipline; I propose that pragmatic choice of the best be the determining methodology for selection of an alternative. While the first justification belongs to the dimension of pragmatism as understood by the conventional wisdom, the second belongs to the dimension I call "foundational pragmatism." / From the Introduction to Chapter 2, I present my position. From Chapter 3 to 7, I explain the structure which underlies and makes possible the two different justifications: this requires a careful, and at times helpful, approach to the way Lewis structures a complex and unified system of norms, knowledge, decisions and choices. In Chapters 8 and 9, I explain how Lewis justifies the Categorical Imperative as pragmatically a priori: I also provide a definition of practical consistency, which is lacking. In Chapters 10 through 12, I develop some ideas connecting the later Wittgenstein, Apel and Winch in order to argue for a convergence between Wittgenstein and Lewis. In the concluding chapter, I argue that Richard Rorty's claim that pragmatism and foundationalism are incompatible is incorrect--indeed, it is not upheld by his own version of pragmatism. By these arguments, I bring Lewis' pragmatism into the contemporary arena of the struggle to ground ethics.

Thesis (M.A.)--Youngstown State University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-85).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Technology, Sydney, 2004.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [380]-392).

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 78-81).

A descriptive and critical account of the theory of valuation presented by C.I. Lewis in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. Both the a priori and empirical basis for the theory are examined. The essential weakness of the theory lies in an inability to overcome some of the criticisms of the emotivists, especially in the concept of the ultimately valuable. Hence Lewis in unable, even, to present a view as plausible as the emotivists in that his theory of evaluation is, for all practical purposes, a tautology. In order to overcome this difficulty Lewis must hypostatize some non-empirical property or some imperative. However, Lewis has presented the most comprehensive and analytic defense of a naturalistic system since the appearance of Perry's Interest Theory. Many of the value concepts are analyzed showing the development and structure of Lewis' theory. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

It is the thesis of this study, that although Ayres’s theory of progress is damaging to his sociological theory as a whole, his theory of the basic dichotomy of social action, that of technology and ceremonialism, deserves greater credit than it has received and is profoundly significant sociologically.