Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 124-129).

Ho, Chun Kit. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 302-315). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Dedication --- p.i / Abstract --- p.ii-v / Acknowledgements --- p.vi / List of Abbreviations --- p.vii / Table of Contents --- p.viii / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review: Coalition Formation and Maintenance --- p.15 / Chapter 3. --- Data and Methods --- p.45 / Chapter 4. --- Characteristics of Broker Organizations --- p.66 / Chapter 5. --- Coalition Brokers and Process of Coalition Formation --- p.102 / Chapter 6. --- Social Construction of Coalition Forms --- p.157 / Chapter 7. --- Changing Coalition Forms and Coalition Maintenance --- p.207 / Chapter 8. --- Summary and Conclusion --- p.271 / Appendices --- p.295 / Bibliography --- p.302

In this dissertation I examine the reciprocal relationship between voters and political parties in coalitional democracies in three essays. First, I investigate how voters alter their perceptions of political parties in response to their participation in coalition cabinets. I argue that voters view coalition participation as broad and wide-ranging policy compromise and update their perceptions of the policy positions of cabinet participants accordingly. I find that voters perceive coalition partners as more similar than parties that are not currently coalesced, all else equal. In the following essay, I examine the electoral repercussions of this shift in perceptions by proposing a model of voting that considers coalition policy-making. I argue that voters will equate the policy compromise they perceive in the cabinet with a failure to rigorously pursue the policies they were promised and that voters who perceive compromise will punish the incumbent. The data reveals that this perception may cost incumbent cabinets about 2.5% of their vote share. Finally, I move from the electorate to the legislature to investigate if and how these perceptions condition legislative behavior. The previous essays suggest that coalition parties have substantial motivation to differentiate themselves from their partners in cabinet when voters perceive them as becoming more similar. I test this argument by examining partisan behavior in legislative review. The data show that coalition partners who are perceived as more similar are more likely to amend one another’s legislation.

Public Health has long led the fight against unjust health disparities within the United States. More and more health educators have had to rely on the social capital of underserved communities via Community Coalitions. Throughout this study, the significance and growth of coalitions and its importance within the field of Public Health was highlighted. The purpose of this study was to test the operational constructs within the Community Coalition Action Theory (CCAT), mainly the constructs of 1) stages of coalition development, 2) membership engagement, 3) leadership, 4) coalition structures & processes, as well as 5) perceived coalition ownership in explaining 6) perceived coalition capacity effectiveness (dependent variable). Results of this study revealed that perceived coalition capacity effectiveness was best predicted by stage of coalition development and perceived coalition ownership. This model accounted for 55.5% of the variance within this study when explaining the high impact participants achieved in regard to their perceived coalition capacity effectiveness.

The first chapter introduces the topic of coalition structures and stresses its importance and impact on game theory. Additionally, it presents and motivates the significance of the three following chapters. / The second chapter investigates how rational individuals partition themselves into different coalitions. We propose a notion that determines simultaneously the coalition structures that are likely to prevail in a game, as well as the feasible payoff configurations associated with them. Our solution concept is built in the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern stability, but it overcomes the overoptimism associated with it when employed in our context. Moreover, in doing so, we achieve consistency and resolve the problem of myopia embedded in previous notions. We prove existence for a general class of games, and investigate the efficiency of our solution. / The third chapter ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can negotiate with each other and their actions have externalities. Naturally, the environment is depicted by a normal form game. The solution is a collection of pairs, each consisting of a coalition structure and a strategy profile. Although this chapter addresses the same question the Ray and Vohra (1997) paper did, it does so in a manner that overcomes the problems embedded in their approach. In particular, we assume that once a coalition deviates it fears the worst, given that the non-members do the best for themselves. In doing so, we improve upon previous solution concepts (e.g. strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria) by NOT assuming that all other players will stay put. Yet, unlike the Ray and Vohra approach, we do not endow the deviating coalition with the power of imposing its will on all of the other players. A general solution concept is defined and its properties (efficiency, etc.) and applications are discussed. / The fourth chapter analyzes cartel stability when firms are farsighted. It studies a price leadership model a la D'Aspremont et al. (1983), where the dominant cartel acts as a leader by determining the market price, while the fringe behaves competitively. According to D'Aspremont et al.'s notion of cartel stability, a firm will not remain in a cartel as long as it prefers the outcome where it is the only member leaving the cartel for the fringe. Such an approach implies that the firm is myopic since it ignores whether the outcome of its deviation is stable itself. Our notion captures foresight by employing a solution concept built in the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set, yet adopting an indirect dominance a la Harsanyi. We show that there always exists a unique, non-empty set of stable cartels.

Thesis (M.S.)--Washington State University, August 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-57).

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