Philosophers have traditionally attempted to solve metaethical disputes about the nature of moral judgment through reasoned argument alone. Empirical evidence about how we do make moral judgments is often overlooked in these debates. In the wake of recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology, however, some empirically-minded philosophers are beginning to use neural findings in support of their theories of moral judgment. The intent of this thesis is to explore how this empirical evidence can be integrated effectively into philosophical discussions about moral judgment. In the first chapter of my thesis, I review the moral judgment debate in both philosophy and moral psychology, focusing specifically on contemporary sentimentalist solutions to this problem. This review sets the stage for my critique of Prinz’s sentimentalist account of moral judgment in the second chapter. I argue that Prinz uses neural evidence to support his sentimentalist thesis inappropriately, altering the evidence to fit his theory, rather than using the evidence to inform his theory. In the third chapter, I examine Prinz’s somatic theory of emotion and how this is related to his theory of moral judgment. I argue that neural evidence indicates that a theory of emotion that incorporates aspects of both cognitive appraisal and somatic theories is more empirically accurate than either view in isolation. Finally, I discuss the implications that a neural account of emotion could have on future debates about the nature of moral judgment.

Philosophers have traditionally attempted to solve metaethical disputes about the nature of moral judgment through reasoned argument alone. Empirical evidence about how we do make moral judgments is often overlooked in these debates. In the wake of recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology, however, some empirically-minded philosophers are beginning to use neural findings in support of their theories of moral judgment. The intent of this thesis is to explore how this empirical evidence can be integrated effectively into philosophical discussions about moral judgment. In the first chapter of my thesis, I review the moral judgment debate in both philosophy and moral psychology, focusing specifically on contemporary sentimentalist solutions to this problem. This review sets the stage for my critique of Prinz’s sentimentalist account of moral judgment in the second chapter. I argue that Prinz uses neural evidence to support his sentimentalist thesis inappropriately, altering the evidence to fit his theory, rather than using the evidence to inform his theory. In the third chapter, I examine Prinz’s somatic theory of emotion and how this is related to his theory of moral judgment. I argue that neural evidence indicates that a theory of emotion that incorporates aspects of both cognitive appraisal and somatic theories is more empirically accurate than either view in isolation. Finally, I discuss the implications that a neural account of emotion could have on future debates about the nature of moral judgment.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2007. Graduate Programme in Psychology. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 99-121). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR39033

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego and San Diego State University, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 159-172).

The neural signature and cognitive architecture of how a visual stimulus reaches conscious awareness have not been conclusively determined. Recently, we have reported an ERP activity corresponding with a period of perceptual persistence which has been typically reported in working memory research, known as the contralateral delay activity (CDA). Specifically, we reported how the CDA can be used to track how on object fades in out of consciousness. Here, we report on the behaviour of the CDA when the type of item in this paradigm is manipulated between face, animal and object stimuli. We recorded EEG activity while participants viewed a bilateral Shape-from-Motion display and analyzed where and how large a CDA is observed. Our findings show that the CDA is generalizable to different item types fading from awareness, with no differences between item conditions. This work supports the content-invariant involvement of working memory processes in sustaining conscious awareness.

The neural signature and cognitive architecture of how a visual stimulus reaches conscious awareness have not been conclusively determined. Recently, we have reported an ERP activity corresponding with a period of perceptual persistence which has been typically reported in working memory research, known as the contralateral delay activity (CDA). Specifically, we reported how the CDA can be used to track how on object fades in out of consciousness. Here, we report on the behaviour of the CDA when the type of item in this paradigm is manipulated between face, animal and object stimuli. We recorded EEG activity while participants viewed a bilateral Shape-from-Motion display and analyzed where and how large a CDA is observed. Our findings show that the CDA is generalizable to different item types fading from awareness, with no differences between item conditions. This work supports the content-invariant involvement of working memory processes in sustaining conscious awareness.

This dissertation explored the cognitive processes and neural substrates underlying the simulation and construction of novel mental representations, by manipulating factors influencing construction ability. Across four experiments, subjects constructed novel events by relating multiple cue words to a single context word in order to make a coherent representation. Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether memory deficits related to age and amnesia due to medial temporal lobe lesions affect event construction performance. Both older adults and patients with amnesia showed deficits in event construction, with poorer performance at increasing mnemonic loads. Moreover, older adults’ construction ability was associated with memory performance, suggesting that associative encoding processes are crucial for simulation tasks. Experiments 3a and 3b examined whether semantic congruency between items and context influences event construction and subsequent memory. In Experiment 3a, younger adults constructed imagined events with from cue words that were typically or atypically related to the context word. Atypical events were less coherent, and were rated as poorer in quality and more difficult to construct. Experiment 3b also showed an advantage for typical trials on a cued recall test, suggesting the congruency of an imagined event with prior knowledge has a strong influence on its subsequent retrieval. Experiment 4 used fMRI to determine the neural correlates of imagining. Constructing imagined events activated the hippocampus, medial prefrontal regions, and default mode network regions in comparison to a baseline condition. Moreover, clusters of activation in the anterior hippocampus were positively correlated with construction task performance across all task conditions, whereas activity in the medial frontal poles varied with individual differences in the typicality of imagined events. Posterior hippocampus was associated with the novelty of imagined events, but did not correlate strongly with the anterior hippocampus or task performance. Taken together, these studies suggest that these regions are crucial when constructing a novel imagined event, regardless of the nature of the stimuli. In particular, the hippocampus may be necessary to bind items during the construction process, especially as representations become increasingly complex.

Thesis (M.A.)--Cleveland State University, 2008. / Abstract. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on July 7, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-36). Available online via the OhioLINK ETD Center. Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S.)--Brandeis University, 2008. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on June 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rhode Island, 2003. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-77).