Neuroscientific data may be usefully invoked in the arbitration of debates concerning the scope of representational theories of the mind. Contemporary cognitivists (e.g. Fodor) tend toward theoretical imperialism in that they argue that all types of intelligent behaviour, including perceptual-motor skills, can be explained within the framework of representationalism. Phenomenologists (e.g. Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Dreyfus) argue that the scope of cognitivism is not as vast as its proponents suppose. They claim that perceptual-motor skills are non-representational and thus fall beyond the purview of cognitivism. I argue that this debate can be resolved in favour of the phenomenologists by citing the neuroscientific evidence for the claim that there are two distinct neural memory systems: (1) a hippocampal system which operates over neurally realized Fodorian representations and subserves rational thought and action and (2) a non-representational striatal system which subserves perceptual-motor skills.

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