No description available.

Traditionally, it has been the cognitive-developmental approach that has dominated moral judgment research. Specifically, it has been Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969, 1986) that has provided the theoretical framework for much of the research in the field. According to the Kohlbergian perspective, individuals are rational agents who engage in conscious deliberation in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. In contrast to this, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007) proposes that it is the individual’s immediate affective reactions to events are the overriding cause of moral judgment. In addition to this, the model proposes that the social context is an equally important determinant of moral judgment. Emergent group norms are said to directly shape the moral judgments of the individual, with the moral judgments of friends, allies and acquaintances having a direct bearing on the moral judgments one makes, even those made and held privately. In the current thesis, the impact of social persuasion - group norms, audience, and social identity - on moral judgment was investigated, using the methods and meta-theoretical framework of the social identity approach. In Studies 1 (N = 98) and 2 (N = 60) the influence of group norms and level of identification with the reference group on participants’ moral evaluations was assessed. The results of these studies revealed that participants’ evaluation of the target issue (the sex selection of children) was not influenced by the group norms to which they were exposed. In both studies, the interaction between norm and identification was also found to be non-significant. Under investigation in Studies 3, 4, and 5 was the impact of normative influence on participants’ moral evaluations. In Study 3 (N = 186) the impact of group norms, level of identification, and audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluations of morally-tinged scenarios and issues were assessed. Those exposed to a norm portraying the reference group as judgmental tended to be harsher in their evaluations than those exposed to a non-judgmental norm, but the effect was weak and inconsistent. Contrary to expectation, identification and audience were not found to interact with the norm manipulation. Study 4 (N = 93) focused exclusively on the impact of audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluation. Participants evaluated a number of morally-tinged scenarios either alone, under the expectation that their responses would be visible to an audience (with either the opportunity to justify their evaluations, or not), or under the pretext of being connected to a lie-detector. Contrary to expectation, no significant difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found across the four audience conditions. To discount the possibility that the lack of normative influence on moral evaluation obtained in Study 4 was due to methodological limitation (i.e., the audience category was too broad), the selection of participants and the choice of audience were modified for Study 5 (N = 54). In Study 5, Christian students were required to make their moral evaluations under the expectation that their responses would be made visible to either a Christian or student audience. Contrary to expectation, only a subtle effect of audience was found in relation to both the morally tinged issues and the morally tinged scenarios. Participants in the Christian audience condition were found to evaluate only a small number of the issues (3 of 10), and only one of the four scenarios more negatively than those in the student audience condition. In Studies 6 and 7 the impact of social identity factors on participants’ moral evaluations was investigated. In Study 6 (N = 45), the extent to which participants’ moral evaluation were influenced by their social identity was assessed. In this study, participants had either their Christian identity or their student identity made salient when making their evaluations. No difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found between the Christian identity and student identity salience conditions. In Study 7 (N = 68), the extent to which participants’ political identity influenced their moral evaluation of government policy was assessed. Participants (who were either Australian Labor Party supporters or Australian Liberal Party supporters) were led to believe that the policies had been proposed by either the Australian Labor Party or the Australian Liberal Party. It was found that participants’ political affiliation contributed to their moral evaluation of the presented policies. Overall, the current program of studies provides a first step toward understanding the impact that group norms, audience, and social identity factors have on the evaluation component of moral judgment. It suggests that morality is complex, and that moral judgments may be amenable to social influence, albeit weakly. Theoretical and practical implications for this research are discussed with reference to social identity theory and the broader literature on moral psychology.

Traditionally, it has been the cognitive-developmental approach that has dominated moral judgment research. Specifically, it has been Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969, 1986) that has provided the theoretical framework for much of the research in the field. According to the Kohlbergian perspective, individuals are rational agents who engage in conscious deliberation in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. In contrast to this, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007) proposes that it is the individual’s immediate affective reactions to events are the overriding cause of moral judgment. In addition to this, the model proposes that the social context is an equally important determinant of moral judgment. Emergent group norms are said to directly shape the moral judgments of the individual, with the moral judgments of friends, allies and acquaintances having a direct bearing on the moral judgments one makes, even those made and held privately. In the current thesis, the impact of social persuasion - group norms, audience, and social identity - on moral judgment was investigated, using the methods and meta-theoretical framework of the social identity approach. In Studies 1 (N = 98) and 2 (N = 60) the influence of group norms and level of identification with the reference group on participants’ moral evaluations was assessed. The results of these studies revealed that participants’ evaluation of the target issue (the sex selection of children) was not influenced by the group norms to which they were exposed. In both studies, the interaction between norm and identification was also found to be non-significant. Under investigation in Studies 3, 4, and 5 was the impact of normative influence on participants’ moral evaluations. In Study 3 (N = 186) the impact of group norms, level of identification, and audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluations of morally-tinged scenarios and issues were assessed. Those exposed to a norm portraying the reference group as judgmental tended to be harsher in their evaluations than those exposed to a non-judgmental norm, but the effect was weak and inconsistent. Contrary to expectation, identification and audience were not found to interact with the norm manipulation. Study 4 (N = 93) focused exclusively on the impact of audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluation. Participants evaluated a number of morally-tinged scenarios either alone, under the expectation that their responses would be visible to an audience (with either the opportunity to justify their evaluations, or not), or under the pretext of being connected to a lie-detector. Contrary to expectation, no significant difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found across the four audience conditions. To discount the possibility that the lack of normative influence on moral evaluation obtained in Study 4 was due to methodological limitation (i.e., the audience category was too broad), the selection of participants and the choice of audience were modified for Study 5 (N = 54). In Study 5, Christian students were required to make their moral evaluations under the expectation that their responses would be made visible to either a Christian or student audience. Contrary to expectation, only a subtle effect of audience was found in relation to both the morally tinged issues and the morally tinged scenarios. Participants in the Christian audience condition were found to evaluate only a small number of the issues (3 of 10), and only one of the four scenarios more negatively than those in the student audience condition. In Studies 6 and 7 the impact of social identity factors on participants’ moral evaluations was investigated. In Study 6 (N = 45), the extent to which participants’ moral evaluation were influenced by their social identity was assessed. In this study, participants had either their Christian identity or their student identity made salient when making their evaluations. No difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found between the Christian identity and student identity salience conditions. In Study 7 (N = 68), the extent to which participants’ political identity influenced their moral evaluation of government policy was assessed. Participants (who were either Australian Labor Party supporters or Australian Liberal Party supporters) were led to believe that the policies had been proposed by either the Australian Labor Party or the Australian Liberal Party. It was found that participants’ political affiliation contributed to their moral evaluation of the presented policies. Overall, the current program of studies provides a first step toward understanding the impact that group norms, audience, and social identity factors have on the evaluation component of moral judgment. It suggests that morality is complex, and that moral judgments may be amenable to social influence, albeit weakly. Theoretical and practical implications for this research are discussed with reference to social identity theory and the broader literature on moral psychology.

Traditionally, it has been the cognitive-developmental approach that has dominated moral judgment research. Specifically, it has been Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969, 1986) that has provided the theoretical framework for much of the research in the field. According to the Kohlbergian perspective, individuals are rational agents who engage in conscious deliberation in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. In contrast to this, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007) proposes that it is the individual’s immediate affective reactions to events are the overriding cause of moral judgment. In addition to this, the model proposes that the social context is an equally important determinant of moral judgment. Emergent group norms are said to directly shape the moral judgments of the individual, with the moral judgments of friends, allies and acquaintances having a direct bearing on the moral judgments one makes, even those made and held privately. In the current thesis, the impact of social persuasion - group norms, audience, and social identity - on moral judgment was investigated, using the methods and meta-theoretical framework of the social identity approach. In Studies 1 (N = 98) and 2 (N = 60) the influence of group norms and level of identification with the reference group on participants’ moral evaluations was assessed. The results of these studies revealed that participants’ evaluation of the target issue (the sex selection of children) was not influenced by the group norms to which they were exposed. In both studies, the interaction between norm and identification was also found to be non-significant. Under investigation in Studies 3, 4, and 5 was the impact of normative influence on participants’ moral evaluations. In Study 3 (N = 186) the impact of group norms, level of identification, and audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluations of morally-tinged scenarios and issues were assessed. Those exposed to a norm portraying the reference group as judgmental tended to be harsher in their evaluations than those exposed to a non-judgmental norm, but the effect was weak and inconsistent. Contrary to expectation, identification and audience were not found to interact with the norm manipulation. Study 4 (N = 93) focused exclusively on the impact of audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluation. Participants evaluated a number of morally-tinged scenarios either alone, under the expectation that their responses would be visible to an audience (with either the opportunity to justify their evaluations, or not), or under the pretext of being connected to a lie-detector. Contrary to expectation, no significant difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found across the four audience conditions. To discount the possibility that the lack of normative influence on moral evaluation obtained in Study 4 was due to methodological limitation (i.e., the audience category was too broad), the selection of participants and the choice of audience were modified for Study 5 (N = 54). In Study 5, Christian students were required to make their moral evaluations under the expectation that their responses would be made visible to either a Christian or student audience. Contrary to expectation, only a subtle effect of audience was found in relation to both the morally tinged issues and the morally tinged scenarios. Participants in the Christian audience condition were found to evaluate only a small number of the issues (3 of 10), and only one of the four scenarios more negatively than those in the student audience condition. In Studies 6 and 7 the impact of social identity factors on participants’ moral evaluations was investigated. In Study 6 (N = 45), the extent to which participants’ moral evaluation were influenced by their social identity was assessed. In this study, participants had either their Christian identity or their student identity made salient when making their evaluations. No difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found between the Christian identity and student identity salience conditions. In Study 7 (N = 68), the extent to which participants’ political identity influenced their moral evaluation of government policy was assessed. Participants (who were either Australian Labor Party supporters or Australian Liberal Party supporters) were led to believe that the policies had been proposed by either the Australian Labor Party or the Australian Liberal Party. It was found that participants’ political affiliation contributed to their moral evaluation of the presented policies. Overall, the current program of studies provides a first step toward understanding the impact that group norms, audience, and social identity factors have on the evaluation component of moral judgment. It suggests that morality is complex, and that moral judgments may be amenable to social influence, albeit weakly. Theoretical and practical implications for this research are discussed with reference to social identity theory and the broader literature on moral psychology.

No description available.

When people migrate to a new country, they experience changes in many areas of life. Migrants are faced with the challenges of making sense of as well as dealing with these changes in life. This research is interested in understanding the experiences of Chinese migrants in New Zealand as well as exploring how to conduct 'psychological intervention‘ work with recent Chinese migrants to deal with the challenges associated with migration. This research consists of two parts. The first part is concerned with developing a better understanding of the way Chinese migrants make sense of their experiences after migrating to New Zealand. In this part, focus groups were held and a discursive approach was used to analyze participants' accounts. Findings from this part show that negotiating meanings for "migration" and "fitting in" is the central process for Chinese migrants to make sense of their migratory experiences in New Zealand. In this meaning-making process, Chinese cultural meanings provide useful discursive resources for Chinese migrants to draw upon to better understand their experiences of migrating from China to New Zealand. Chinese sayings, such as "fish or bear‘s paw", "loss are accompanied by gain", "life is about negotiating loss and gain", are used by Chinese migrants in ways that allow them more flexibility in constructing their experiences in New Zealand. More importantly, adopting a dialectical sense-making embedded in traditional Chinese cultural knowledge is helpful for participants to transfer their discursive constructions from negative to positive aspects of their migration experiences. The second part of this research involves exploration and application of a culturally appropriate 'psychological intervention‘ with recent Chinese migrants in transition from living in China to living in New Zealand. This part draws upon the findings from the first part of the research. In the second part, two groups of participants were invited to attend a three-session group intervention. Useful discursive constructions around flexible meanings of "migration" and "fitting in" found in the first part of the research were introduced to participants. A discursive analytical approach was used to observe how participants take up these introduced meanings and to examine the discursive changes throughout the three group sessions. The second part of the research illustrates that participants took up the introduced meanings of "migration" and "fitting in" as a flexible process, and use these to further co-construct helpful meanings to negotiate their 'problematic‘ experiences. In all, this research articulates the importance of cultural meanings and cultural ways of making sense of migratory experiences by Chinese migrants. It also shows the importance of building a shared experience, making use of Chinese cultural meanings, and taking a social constructionist approach in psychological intervention work with Chinese migrants. The implications of this research are discussed in terms of further research on migrants' experiences and how to conduct 'psychological interventions' with Chinese migrants.

Traditionally, it has been the cognitive-developmental approach that has dominated moral judgment research. Specifically, it has been Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969, 1986) that has provided the theoretical framework for much of the research in the field. According to the Kohlbergian perspective, individuals are rational agents who engage in conscious deliberation in order to reach a moral judgment or decision. In contrast to this, the social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007) proposes that it is the individual’s immediate affective reactions to events are the overriding cause of moral judgment. In addition to this, the model proposes that the social context is an equally important determinant of moral judgment. Emergent group norms are said to directly shape the moral judgments of the individual, with the moral judgments of friends, allies and acquaintances having a direct bearing on the moral judgments one makes, even those made and held privately. In the current thesis, the impact of social persuasion - group norms, audience, and social identity - on moral judgment was investigated, using the methods and meta-theoretical framework of the social identity approach. In Studies 1 (N = 98) and 2 (N = 60) the influence of group norms and level of identification with the reference group on participants’ moral evaluations was assessed. The results of these studies revealed that participants’ evaluation of the target issue (the sex selection of children) was not influenced by the group norms to which they were exposed. In both studies, the interaction between norm and identification was also found to be non-significant. Under investigation in Studies 3, 4, and 5 was the impact of normative influence on participants’ moral evaluations. In Study 3 (N = 186) the impact of group norms, level of identification, and audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluations of morally-tinged scenarios and issues were assessed. Those exposed to a norm portraying the reference group as judgmental tended to be harsher in their evaluations than those exposed to a non-judgmental norm, but the effect was weak and inconsistent. Contrary to expectation, identification and audience were not found to interact with the norm manipulation. Study 4 (N = 93) focused exclusively on the impact of audience expectation on participants’ moral evaluation. Participants evaluated a number of morally-tinged scenarios either alone, under the expectation that their responses would be visible to an audience (with either the opportunity to justify their evaluations, or not), or under the pretext of being connected to a lie-detector. Contrary to expectation, no significant difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found across the four audience conditions. To discount the possibility that the lack of normative influence on moral evaluation obtained in Study 4 was due to methodological limitation (i.e., the audience category was too broad), the selection of participants and the choice of audience were modified for Study 5 (N = 54). In Study 5, Christian students were required to make their moral evaluations under the expectation that their responses would be made visible to either a Christian or student audience. Contrary to expectation, only a subtle effect of audience was found in relation to both the morally tinged issues and the morally tinged scenarios. Participants in the Christian audience condition were found to evaluate only a small number of the issues (3 of 10), and only one of the four scenarios more negatively than those in the student audience condition. In Studies 6 and 7 the impact of social identity factors on participants’ moral evaluations was investigated. In Study 6 (N = 45), the extent to which participants’ moral evaluation were influenced by their social identity was assessed. In this study, participants had either their Christian identity or their student identity made salient when making their evaluations. No difference in participants’ moral evaluations was found between the Christian identity and student identity salience conditions. In Study 7 (N = 68), the extent to which participants’ political identity influenced their moral evaluation of government policy was assessed. Participants (who were either Australian Labor Party supporters or Australian Liberal Party supporters) were led to believe that the policies had been proposed by either the Australian Labor Party or the Australian Liberal Party. It was found that participants’ political affiliation contributed to their moral evaluation of the presented policies. Overall, the current program of studies provides a first step toward understanding the impact that group norms, audience, and social identity factors have on the evaluation component of moral judgment. It suggests that morality is complex, and that moral judgments may be amenable to social influence, albeit weakly. Theoretical and practical implications for this research are discussed with reference to social identity theory and the broader literature on moral psychology.

The present thesis investigates two theoretically novel processes of change in groups relevant to agents for change. Specifically, it examines the effects of group opinion change and reintegration on group members’ evaluation of ingroup change-agents. Group opinion change is operationalized as the group adopting the position advocated by a change-agent, and reintegration is operationalized as the group responding more positively towards a change-agent. These formulations of change processes within groups extend past theorizing in opinion deviance research (e.g., Festinger, 1950; Schachter, 1951; Marques & Paez, 1994) by a) examining how contextual differences that result from changes in the group may affect group members’ reactions to opinion deviates, and b) considering contingencies that result in acceptance or rejection of change-agents and their messages. In addition, this thesis investigates the psychological processes that may mediate and moderate the effects of group opinion change and reintegration on appraisals of change-agents. Specifically, it considers attributed motives of change-agents (i.e., perceived constructiveness; Hornsey, 2005), and target prototypicality (e.g., Hogg, 1993; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) as two possible mediators of these novel effects. Finally, group members’ identification with the group is examined as a moderator of these processes. Chapter 3 presents the first two experiments that tested the effects of group opinion change on the evaluation of change-agents. Experiment 1 (N=100) was a scenario-based study that had a change-agent express a non-conformist view of giving water to an outgroup state at a time when the ingroup state was experiencing a water crisis. Experiment 2 (N=103) was a scenario-based study that looked at a change-agent who expressed pro-immigration views to the ingroup country at an earlier time when popular attitudes toward immigration were poor. In both experiments the deviants were marginalized initially because they endorsed non-conformist opinions. Depending on the condition, group opinions either shifted toward the positions advocated by the deviants or remained unchanged. Results showed group members’ target evaluations shifted as a function of group opinion change. Target evaluations became less favourable in Experiment 1, and more favourable in Experiment 2. There also was evidence that increased perceived constructiveness mediated more favourable target evaluations in Experiment 2. Chapter 4 presents the first two experiments that tested the effects of reintegration and group members’ identification on the evaluation of change-agents. Both Experiments 3 (N=103) and 4 (N=94) involved a scenario where there was a severe drought in the ingroup state. In Experiment 3, a deviant politician argued for more investment on water infrastructure 10 years earlier when water shortage was not a critical problem. Thus, the politician expressed a minority opinion. In Experiment 4, a deviant water commissioner expressed a controversial opinion to give water to an outgroup state at the height of the drought. Both deviants were marginalized/excluded initially by the group. Reintegration was manipulated by showing that popular support for the deviant had increased (Experiment 3) or the deviant was reinstated (Experiment 4), or the group did not increase support for the deviant at all (not reintegrated). Results showed that high identifiers evaluated the deviant less positively, and perceived the deviant as more destructive after he or she was reintegrated than when marginalization continued. Further, perceived destructiveness mediated the effects of reintegration and identification on trait evaluations. Experiment 4 also showed that high identifiers were less willing to support change after the deviant was reintegrated, than when marginalization continued. Finally, Chapter 5 tested the interactive effects of group opinion change and reintegration on evaluation of change-agents. I also assessed group members’ responses to change-agents in light of the group’s resistance to change even though the change-agents were right and the groups were wrong. Experiment 5 was a scenario-based study in a minimal-groups situation that had a deviant arguing for a more equitable research funding than the existing distribution. Experiment 6 was a scenario-based study on the disagreement between Galileo Galilei and the Catholic Church on planetary motion. Again, the deviants initially were marginalized by the groups. For opinion change, the groups either adopted or rejected the deviants’ opinions. For reintegration, the groups either treated the deviants more favourably or continued to reject them. Results showed that either opinion change or reintegration was sufficient to defuse negativity towards the deviants. More importantly, group members continued mistreating the deviants when the groups rejected opinion change and reintegration. That is, negativity towards the deviants was highest when opinion was unchanged, and marginalization continued. Overall, this thesis shows that group members’ evaluations of deviant agents for change can shift as a function of group opinion change and reintegration. Group opinion change and/or reintegration defuse negativity toward change-agents in the absence of psychological threat (i.e., perceived destructiveness). However, if threat is present, opinion change or reintegration may ironically elicit more group members’ negativity towards these targets. This thesis also contributes to the literature by showing how change promotes or inhibits group members’ endorsement of change-agents.

Judgements of and sensitivity to style are ubiquitous. People become sensitive to the structural regularities of complex or “polymorphous” categories through exposure to individual examples, which allows them respond to new items that are of the same style as those previously experienced. This thesis investigates whether a dimension reduction mechanism could account for how people learn about the structure of complex categories. That is, whether through experience, people extract the primary dimensions of variation in a category and use these to analyse and categorise subsequent instances. We used Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) as the method of dimension reduction, which yields the main dimensions of variation of pixel-based stimuli (eigenvectors). We then tested whether a simple autoassociative network could learn to distinguish paintings by Picasso and Braque which were reconstructed from only these primary dimensions of variation. The network could correctly classify the stimuli, and its performance was optimal with reconstructions based on just the first few eigenvectors. Then we reconstructed the paintings using either just the first 10 (early reconstructions) or all 1,894 eigenvectors (full reconstructions), and asked human participants to categorise the images. We found that people could categorise the images with either the early or full reconstructions. Therefore, people could learn to distinguish category membership based on the reduced set of dimensions obtained from SVD. This suggests that a dimension reduction mechanism analogous to SVD may be operating when people learn about the structure and regularities in complex categories.

Irregular pagination: Page numbers 572 to 582 & 755 missing, 754 is not numbered / This thesis explores the stories of four Maori counsellors who are employed in Western style organisations. Two 'readings' of participants' narratives are provided. The 'readings' are constructed from two distinct discursive frames, identified as ENGLISH-Maori and MAORI-English. It is proposed that participants' conceptions of self and other are constructed through narratives based in a MAORI-English discursive frame, and that their models of counselling are developed within this discursive frame. It is further proposed that meanings made within this discursive frame are not readily available to 'others' whose constructions of self and other are based in an ENGLISH-Maori or Western discursive frame. This mismatch leads to misunderstandings which impact negatively on the credibility and status of Maori counsellors and Maori models of counselling when viewed from the perspective of Western models of counselling theory, practice and organisation. It is also posited in this thesis that a form of 'sub-textual' communication exists within which Maori meanings are made and conveyed in the English language