Ngan, Hoi Yee Meko. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-60). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Kent State University, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Mar. 26, 2010). Advisor: Adam Rapp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-113).

This study employs the method of linear regression to examine the competition behavior of TV console industry in the North America market and affection of the TV console developer¡¦s action on the competitors¡¦ sales volume share in the same month. The data only include the hardware and software sales volume of the main competitors-PlayStation 3, Xbox 360 and Wii in this generation and their action after publicly announcing. Main findings of research show that price reduction, console improving and releasing big titles have influence upon the sales volume of opponents. The influence of price reduction action is related to the position of TV console: PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360 have a similar position and their action will affect each other, but the console of different position ¡V Wii not be affected. The action of console improving and releasing big titles apparently shows that TV console in similar position have more influence on each other.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Karolinska institutet, 2007. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

This study employs competitive dynamics theory, upper echelon perspective, power perspective, and strategic human resource management perspective to examine how executives matter with organizational outcomes. It argues that CEO dominance and executive human resource management system will affect top management team social integration, and the latter will promote aggressive competitive behavior. It also explores the performance implications of aggressive competitive behavior. Finally, it endeavors in opening the black box between executive human resource management system and firm performance. Anonymous questionnaires were distributed to firm executives, and the unit of analysis is firm level. Analyses with structural equation modeling confirmed most of our hypothesized relationships. CEO dominance is found to be negatively associated, but teamwork-oriented executive human resource management system is found to be positively related, with top management social integration. Top management team social integration will facilitate aggressive competitive behavior, and action speed matters with firm performance significantly. Finally, top management social integration and aggressive competitive behavior partially mediate the relationship of executive human resource management system and firm performance. Although strategic leadership research is prevalent, only few studies investigated the psychometric characteristics of top management team, even fewer paid attention to the impact of CEO power dominance on top management team¡¦s interaction. At the same time, strategic human resource management studies also put very few efforts on the topics of competitive behavior and top managers, although these issues should be critical sources of an organization¡¦s competitive advantage. This study is initiated to fill in these research gaps. Implications and limitations are discussed.

Tournament theory shows that a firm may motivate employees by running competitors for rewards either for a group or individualistic schemes. The empirical literature on Tournaments has been grown. However, many studies use no appropriate data. This paper provides the first empirical evidence on three key assumptions in these models using a special case surrounding the incentives for workers in public sector. The dataset contains information from the Coordenacao de Fiscalizacao (i.e., the Inspections Division) of the Secretaria da Receita Federal (SRF) on the bonus program created by the Brazilian government to compensate tax officials for their efforts in collecting taxes and uncovering tax violations. We constructed a larger unbalanced panel data Tax collection containing information upon 110 tax agencies distributed between 10 regions and 45 time period by month, which allowed us to support the predictions raised above. In order to examine the tournaments predictions we emphasize the dynamic of the process taking into account the unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems using appropriate GMM techniques. This enable us to pondered the possible inertia for time adjustments within tax agency, possibly in determining strategies to improve the tax agency performance on the sources most valuable for collection, which supports the hypothesis of learning by doing. The results also demonstrated evidence to support the following tournaments hypothesis: (1) prizes motivate agents to exert effort; (2) number of participants increased as the size of the prize increase; (3) differential in wages and bonus directly affect workers incentives.

Diss. Göteborg : Univ., 2004. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

Thesis (M. S.)--Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. / Committee Chair: Silva, Emilson; Committee Member: Kilic, Rehim; Committee Member: Li, Haizheng.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [101]-118).

Individual monetary incentive systems usually include performance feedback as part of the intervention package. However, there is no experimental evidence to suggest that feedback has any functional effect on work performance above and beyond the effects of the incentive systems. It may be that incentive systems have such powerful effects on work behavior that the additional contingencies provided by a feedback system are unnecessary. The present laboratory study investigated the supplemental effects of feedback on work performance under a monetary incentive system. Four subjects were hired to work seven hours a day for four and a half weeks. The experimental work task was a simulation of a proof operator’s job at a bank and involved typing dollar values of “checks” into a computer. Subjects were paid a base salary per session plus incentive money for performance above a criterion. The main dependent variable was the number of correctly completed checks per session. The amount of time off task and rate of responding were also investigated. Subjects were exposed to an ABA experimental design involving; (A) the monetary incentive system without performance feedback, (B) the incentive system with performance feedback, and (A) return to the incentive system without performance feedback. The introduction of feedback resulted in small to moderate performance improvements in two of the four subjects. Possible reasons for the small and inconsistent effects were explored with special attention paid to the functional role of feedback and monetary incentives. It was proposed that small amounts of incentive money and performance feedback may not improve productivity in the absence of other stimulus events inherent in real organizational settings, such as the possibility for pay raises, promotions, and/or the threat of being fired. These variables may have function-altering effects on incentive money and performance feedback. Future laboratory simulations might experimentally manipulate these variables to further investigate the efficacy of monetary incentive systems. / Graduate