Thesis (Ph. D.)--Drexel University, 2006. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-59).

Purpose: There is accumulating evidence that treatment preference may significantly impact treatment compliance and satisfaction in individuals with psychological disorders. Very few studies have examined treatment preferences in clients with social anxiety disorder (SAD). Moreover, little is known if treatment preference for a conventional therapy such as cognitive behavioural therapy versus mindfulness-based interventions, influence outcomes. The primary objective of the current study was to determine whether treatment expectancy and preferences for a mindfulness intervention adapted for SAD (MBI-SAD), cognitive behavior group therapy (CBGT), or no preference, would influence treatment compliance and treatment satisfaction. Method: The sample included 97 participants who met the DSM-5 criteria for SAD. After selecting a treatment preference, participants were randomly assigned to a treatment group. Analyses of variance, chi-square, and logistic regressions were conducted to determine if being matched to one’s preferred treatment influenced outcomes, and if those with no preference differed from those who indicated a preference. Hierarchical multiple regression was used to determine if participants’ perceptions of credibility and expectations and match to treatment influenced compliance and satisfaction. Results: There was some support that treatment preference and match to treatment influenced compliance and satisfaction, however the majority of the analyses revealed no impact of treatment preferences. CBGT met expectations more often than did MBI-SAD when participants were matched to their preferred treatment. When participants were matched to their preferred treatment or had no preference, they were more compliant with homework than those who were not matched. Those with no preference had lower attendance than both the matched and not matched groups. Perceived credibility and expectancy were higher for those who were matched to their preferred group, however this did not have an impact on compliance and satisfaction. The remainder of the analyses did not find a relationship between treatment preference or match to treatment on compliance or satisfaction.

Dans des chaînes logistiques décentralisées, chaque entité prend ses décisions sur la base de ses seuls intérêts. Les conflits d’intérêt entre entités conduisent dès lors à des décisions sous-optimales et à une performance dégradée de la chaîne logistique considérée dans sa globalité. Ceci nuit également gravement à la crédibilité des échanges d'informations entre entités. Ce mémoire traite de l’étude de la coordination des décisions dans des chaînes logistiques dans un contexte de problème de capacité d'approvisionnement (Capacity Procurement problem), dans différentes situations et en s’appuyant sur 3 modèles. Le premier modèle considère une chaîne logistique dyadique confrontée à une demande stochastique et étudie l’impact des prix sur la performance. Des contrats PARD (PARtially Deductible, reservation contract) et RCRS (Revenue Sharing Reservation contract with Penalty) sont conçus et proposés pour une coordination des décisions dans un contexte d’information partielle ou totale. Il est mathématiquement démontré que la coordination est réalisée par la mise en œuvre de ces contrats dans ces deux situations. Dans le second modèle, l’hypothèse de prix endogène est posée. La demande est alors modélisée comme la somme d’une fonction linéaire décroissante du prix et d’un paramètre stochastique. Le modèle s’intéresse en premier lieu à une structure dyadique, et un contrat RSRP (Revenue Sharing Reservation contract with Penalty) est proposé pour une coordination par les prix, délais et taux de production. Il est démontré que la coordination est assurée par un contrat RSRP dans une structure dyadique. L’application d’un contrat RSRP est ensuite étendue pour application dans une chaîne logistique divergente avec de multiples détaillants. Il est démontré que la performance de la chaîne logistique est considérablement améliorée au regard de la performance résultant de la mise en place d’un seul contrat de vente. Dans le troisième modèle, une chaîne logistique divergente comprenant un fournisseur et de multiples détaillants est étudiée lorsque ces derniers font face à une demande stochastique et dépendante des prix. Un des facteurs non financiers cause de déviations dans les décisions humaines est la Confiance. Dans ce modèle, les détaillants ont des prévisions plus fiables de la demande en raison de leur proximité au marché. Afin de sécuriser la disponibilité des produits lors des périodes de vente, les détaillants sont incités à transmettre des prévisions de vente majorées. Un mécanisme de coordination de la chaîne logistique est proposé, reposant sur un modèle d’optimisation, un système de notation et un système de récompense-punition. S’appuyant sur une approche de simulation, la performance de ce mécanisme est alors comparée à deux autres mécanismes, un mécanisme sans confiance et un mécanisme asymétrique. / In decentralized Supply Chains, each member decides based on his own interests. Conflict of interests results in suboptimal decisions and poor performance for entire supply chains, as well seriously harms credibly information sharing across them. In this thesis, coordination of decisions in supply chains in the context of Capacity Procurement problem are studied in different situations in form of three models. In first model, a dyadic supply chain with stochastic demand and exogenous price is investigated by taking various costs into account. PARD and RCRS contracts are designed and proposed in order for coordination of decisions respectively in full and partial information updating situations. It is mathematically shown that coordination is achieved by using each contract in its corresponding situation. In second model, endogenous price is assumed. That is, demand is modeled as sum of a decreasing linear function of price and a stochastic parameter. The model is first examined in a dyadic structure, and RSRP contract is proposed for coordinating of price, production time and production rate decisions. It is proved that coordination is achieved by RSRP contract in the dyadic structure. The application of RSRP contract is then extended to be employed in a divergent supply chain with multiple retailers, and shown that the supply chain performs considerably better than the same supply chain with a wholesale contract. In third model, a divergent supply chain comprising a supplier and multiple retailers is studied where retailers face stochastic and price-dependent demand. Since main decision makers in supply chain interactions are human, paying attention to human decision making process and their biases from theoretical predictions are important in designing coordination mechanisms. One of the non-pecuniary factors which cause deviations in human-decisions is Trust. In this model, the retailers have more accurate demand forecast information due to their proximity to market. In order to secure availability of products during the selling season, the retailers have incentives to inflate their private forecast information. A coordination mechanism is proposed, which consists of an optimization model, a scoring system and a rewarding-punishing system, in order to coordinate the supply chain. Using simulation approach, performance of the mechanism is then compared to those of two other mechanisms, namely Without Trust an Asymmetric mechanism. According to the results, employing the mechanism in situations with any demand variability is advised. More accurately, in situations with high demand variability, the mechanism achieves a proper profit improvement and moderate capability for identifying deceptive agents, while in situations with low demand variability, the mechanism shows insignificant profit improvement and considerable ability in identifying deceptive agents.