Aim and tasks of the work are to create principles of the incident tolerant computer system security evaluation, to examine the survivability of the modelled computer system examining its dependence on the security mechanism strength using the composed model. The tasks for achieving this aim are:  to analyse the computer system security standards and security models;  to compose the computer system attack classification which incorporates all the main features of the attack;  to model typical threats to the computer system using graph theory;  to perform the experimental study on the computer system security incidents;  to analyse security mechanisms evaluating the modelling abilities;  to compose a model of the computer system survivability;  to examine the modelled computer system survivability dependence on the security mechanism strength.

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An often overlooked area of graphics is the ability of application programs to create graphical images. Many programs exist which allow creation interactively, but few offer the same ability for noninteractive application programs. By allowing an application program to create graphical images more user friendly programs may be created by programmers. / Department of Computer Science

Recovery is a time-consuming and computationally expensive operation. If an attacker can affect heavily-shared objects on the machine, then many other processes and files can be compromised from accessing them. This would greatly increase the recovery effort. Since intrusions start with a network connection, we argue that the integrity of heavily-shared objects should be protected from the network, in order to minimize the recovery effort. We discuss our prototype Rosie, which is designed with incident response and post-intrusion recovery in mind. Rosie predicts how heavily-shared each file or process is, based on the previous system activities observed. Rosie enforces appropriate mandatory access control and uses techniques such as sandboxing, in order to protect heavily-shared objects’ integrity. Rosie provides an important recovery guarantee that the maximum number of files need to be recovered is at most equal to the dependency threshold, a value that can be adjusted by a system administrator.

Recovery is a time-consuming and computationally expensive operation. If an attacker can affect heavily-shared objects on the machine, then many other processes and files can be compromised from accessing them. This would greatly increase the recovery effort. Since intrusions start with a network connection, we argue that the integrity of heavily-shared objects should be protected from the network, in order to minimize the recovery effort. We discuss our prototype Rosie, which is designed with incident response and post-intrusion recovery in mind. Rosie predicts how heavily-shared each file or process is, based on the previous system activities observed. Rosie enforces appropriate mandatory access control and uses techniques such as sandboxing, in order to protect heavily-shared objects’ integrity. Rosie provides an important recovery guarantee that the maximum number of files need to be recovered is at most equal to the dependency threshold, a value that can be adjusted by a system administrator.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Texas at Dallas, 2007. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 42-43)

Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1990. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 52-54). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 1993. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 69).

Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1993. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-61). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 1988. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 179-181).