by Raymond Cheuk-kuen Chen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-160). / Chapter 1. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.8 / Chapter 1.1. --- Windowing System --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2. --- Fonts --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.1. --- Bitmap Fonts --- p.11 / Chapter 1.2.2. --- Outline Fonts --- p.12 / Chapter 1.3. --- Different font support models --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3.1. --- Supported by applications --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3.2. --- Supported by windowing system --- p.17 / Chapter 1.3.'3. --- Supported by a dedicated server --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4. --- Issues of Chinese Font Support --- p.20 / Chapter 2. --- OVERVIEW OF X WINDOW SYSTEM --- p.22 / Chapter 2.1. --- Introduction --- p.22 / Chapter 2.2. --- Architecture --- p.23 / Chapter 2.3. --- Font Management in the X Window System --- p.23 / Chapter 2.3.1. --- Before X Version 11 Release5 --- p.24 / Chapter 2.3.2. --- In X Version 11 Release5 --- p.25 / Chapter 2.3.3. --- Portable Compiled Format --- p.25 / Chapter 2.3.4. --- Font Server --- p.26 / Chapter 2.3.5. --- Font Management Library --- p.28 / Chapter 2.4. --- Internal Code --- p.29 / Chapter 3. --- CHINESE FONT SERVER --- p.30 / Chapter 3.1. --- Motivation --- p.30 / Chapter 3.2. --- Font Server Architecture --- p.31 / Chapter 3.2.1. --- Device Independent Font Server layer(DIFS) --- p.32 / Chapter 3.2.2. --- Operating System layer(OS) --- p.32 / Chapter 3.2.3. --- Font Management Library(FML) --- p.33 / Chapter 3.2.4. --- Font Path Element --- p.34 / Chapter 3.2.5. --- Font File Renderer --- p.35 / Chapter 3.2.6. --- Font server Renderer --- p.36 / Chapter 3.3. --- Implementation of Chinese Font Server --- p.36 / Chapter 3.3.1. --- Font data and code set --- p.36 / Chapter 3.3.2. --- Registering a new font reader --- p.38 / Chapter 3.3.3. --- Font specific functions --- p.42 / Chapter 3.3.4. --- Load-All Scheme --- p.43 / Chapter 3.3.5. --- Demand-Loading Scheme --- p.44 / Chapter 3.3.6. --- Embedding of font rasterizer --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4. --- Test Results --- p.45 / Chapter 3.4.1. --- X Application Tests --- p.45 / Chapter 3.4.2. --- Demand-Loading Test --- p.49 / Chapter 3.5. --- Some Remarks --- p.53 / Chapter 4. --- OVERVIEW OF PRINTING SYSTEM --- p.54 / Chapter 4.1. --- Motivation --- p.54 / Chapter 4.2. --- Design Considerations --- p.56 / Chapter 4.2.1. --- Modification of the X server --- p.56 / Chapter 4.2.2. --- Embed the printing system into the font server --- p.57 / Chapter 4.2.3. --- Distributed Architecture --- p.58 / Chapter 4.3. --- System Architecture --- p.60 / Chapter 4.4. --- Printer Server --- p.61 / Chapter 4.5. --- Font Server --- p.63 / Chapter 4.6. --- Printing Services Protocols --- p.63 / Chapter 4.7. --- X Window System Server --- p.65 / Chapter 4.8. --- Printer Server Library --- p.65 / Chapter 4.9. --- Client Applications --- p.65 / Chapter 5. --- DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A PRINTER SERVER --- p.67 / Chapter 5.1. --- Objects identification --- p.67 / Chapter 5.1.1. --- Dispatcher (dispatcher) --- p.68 / Chapter 5.1.2. --- Communication Channel (ComChannel) --- p.68 / Chapter 5.1.3. --- Font Cache Manager (FnCache) --- p.69 / Chapter 5.1.4. --- PrnFont (PrnFont) --- p.69 / Chapter 5.1.5. --- Per-Font Cache (CacheStruct) 一- --- p.70 / Chapter 5.1.6. --- Font Server (FnServer) --- p.71 / Chapter 5.1.7. --- Client Manager (LRUList) --- p.71 / Chapter 5.1.8. --- Client Record (ClientRec) --- p.71 / Chapter 5.1.9. --- Printer Driver (PrnDriver) --- p.71 / Chapter 5.1.10. --- Down Loaded Font Table (DownLoadedFont) --- p.72 / Chapter 5.1.11. --- Request Header (reqHeader) --- p.72 / Chapter 5.1.12. --- Generic Reply(replyGeneric) --- p.74 / Chapter 5.2. --- Objects Organization --- p.74 / Chapter 5.2.1. --- Server Control Subsystem --- p.75 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- Client Management Subsystem --- p.78 / Chapter 5.2.3. --- Request Handling Subsystem --- p.84 / Chapter 5.2.4. --- Font Managing Subsystem --- p.86 / Chapter 6. --- SAMPLE PRINTER DRIVER --- p.94 / Chapter 6.1. --- Printer Control Languages --- p.94 / Chapter 6.1.1. --- Structure of PCL Command --- p.95 / Chapter 6.1.2. --- PCL Command Example --- p.97 / Chapter 6.2. --- Printer Font Resources --- p.98 / Chapter 6.3. --- Traditional Font Handling Methods in a Printer Driver --- p.99 / Chapter 6.4. --- Soft Font Creation in PCL Printer --- p.101 / Chapter 6.4.1. --- Font ID number --- p.102 / Chapter 6.4.2. --- Font Descriptor --- p.102 / Chapter 6.4.3. --- Character Code - --- p.104 / Chapter 6.4.4. --- Character Descriptor --- p.105 / Chapter 6.4.5. --- Character Bitmap Data --- p.107 / Chapter 6.5. --- New font downloading schemes for double-byte fonts --- p.107 / Chapter 6.5.1. --- Terminology --- p.108 / Chapter 6.5.2. --- Underlying Concepts of Algorithm One --- p.109 / Chapter 6.5.3. --- Algorithm One --- p.111 / Chapter 6.5.3.1. --- Code Mapping --- p.112 / Chapter 6.5.3.2. --- Example --- p.114 / Chapter 6.5.3.3. --- Memory Consideration --- p.115 / Chapter 6.5.4. --- Algorithm Two --- p.117 / Chapter 7. --- EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS --- p.121 / Chapter 7.1. --- Cache Test --- p.121 / Chapter 7.2. --- Printer Driver Test --- p.125 / Chapter 7.2.1. --- Testing with 10 points font --- p.126 / Chapter 7.2.2. --- Testing with 12 points font --- p.129 / Chapter 7.2.3. --- Testing with 15 points font --- p.131 / Chapter 7.2.4. --- Testing with 18 points font --- p.134 / Chapter 7.3. --- Time Measurement --- p.136 / Chapter 7.4. --- Discussion --- p.139 / Chapter 7.5. --- Further Improvement --- p.143 / Chapter 8. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.145 / APPENDIX A. PRINTER DRIVER CLASS --- p.147 / APPENDIX B. SAMPLE OUTPUT --- p.149 / REFERENCES --- p.157

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries / Department: Computer Science.

Thesis. 1976. M.S.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. / Microfiche copy available in Archives and Engineering. / Bibliography: leaves 119-121. / M.S.

<p>This dissertation introduces a scorecard to enable the State of Indiana to measure the cybersecurity of its public and private critical infrastructure and key resource sector organizations. The scorecard was designed to be non-threatening and understandable so that even small organizations without cybersecurity expertise can voluntarily self-asses their cybersecurity strength and weaknesses. The scorecard was also intended to enable organizations to learn, so that they may identify and self-correct their cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The scorecard provided quantifiable feedback to enable organizations to benchmark their initial status and measure their future progress.</p><p><br></p><p>Using the scorecard, the Indiana Executive Council for Cybersecurity launched a Pilot to measure cybersecurity of large, medium, and small organizations across eleven critical infrastructure and key resources sectors. This dissertation presents the analysis and results from scorecard data provided by the Pilot group of 56 organizations. The cybersecurity scorecard developed as part of this dissertation has been included in the Indiana Cybersecurity Strategy Plan published September 21, 2018.</p><p></p>

<div>Control-flow hijacking attacks allow adversaries to take over seemingly benign software, e.g., a web browser, and cause it to perform malicious actions, i.e., grant attackers a shell on</div><div>a system. Such control-flow hijacking attacks exploit a gap between high level language semantics and the machine language that they are compiled to. In particular, systems</div><div>software such as web browsers and servers are implemented in C/C++ which provide no runtime safety guarantees, leaving memory and type safety exclusively to programmers. Compilers are ideally situated to perform the required analysis and close the semantic gap between C/C++ and machine languages by adding instrumentation to enforce full or partial memory safety.</div><div><br></div><div><div>In unprotected C/C++, adversaries must be assumed to be able to control to the contents of any writeable memory location (arbitrary writes), and to read the contents of any readable memory location (arbitrary reads). Defenses against such attacks range from enforcing full memory safety to protecting only select information, normally code pointers to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks. We advance the state of the art for control-flow hijacking</div><div>defenses by improving the enforcement of full memory safety, as well as partial memory safety schemes for protecting code pointers.</div></div><div><br></div><div><div>We demonstrate a novel mechanism for enforcing full memory safety, which denies attackers both arbitrary reads and arbitrary writes at half the performance overhead of the</div><div>prior state of the art mechanism. Our mechanism relies on a novel metadata scheme for maintaining bounds information about memory objects. Further, we maintain the application</div><div>binary interface (ABI), support all C/C++ language features, and are mature enough to protect all of user space, and in particular libc.</div></div><div><br></div><div><div>Backwards control-flow transfers, i.e., returns, are a common target for attackers. In particular, return-oriented-programming (ROP) is a code-reuse attack technique built around corrupting return addresses. Shadow stacks prevent ROP attacks by providing partial memory safety for programs, namely integrity protecting the return address. We provide a full taxonomy of shadow stack designs, including two previously unexplored designs, and demonstrate that with compiler support shadow stacks can be deployed in practice. Further we examine the state of hardware support for integrity protected memory regions within a process’ address space. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a popular technique for securing forward edges, e.g., indirect function calls, from being used for control-flow hijacking attacks. CFI is a form of partial memory safety that provides weak integrity for function pointers by restricting them to a statically determined set of values based on the program’s control-flow graph. We survey existing techniques, and quantify the protection they provide on a per callsite basis.</div><div>Building off this work, we propose a new security policy, Object Type Integrity, which provides full integrity protection for virtual table pointers on a per object basis for C++</div><div>polymorphic objects.</div></div>

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

The X Window System is an industry-standard software system which facilitates programmers to develop portable graphical user interfaces. This thesis describes an image processing tool developed under the X Window System. A multiwindow image display software with image editing and improvement functions is developed. The software has four modules: environment generation, image creation, image editing and image improvement. The environment generation module creates working windows, scrollbars, dialogbox and pulldown menu buttons, and tracks mouse cursor positions. The working windows are three adjacent windows allowing display of three different images simultaneously. The dialogbox provides an interface between the user and the program, such as input new image and parameters. The pulldown menus offer various selections of image processing functions. A pair of scrollbars are also added to allow users to move the magnified image up, down, left and right so that the full picture can be viewed. The image creation module can build colormap, load image data file, convert pixel values to screen color values, create image, and display image on the screen of a workstation. The program can read either sun.rasterfile format or a plain data file. If a plain data file is detected, the software can transform it to sun.rasterfile by adding an appropriate header and a colormap. There are two kinds file saving features: screen capture and store. The screen capture allows the user to save that part of image displayed on the screen. The store function saves the entire image which may be either the screen size or bigger size image (e.g. merged or zoomed image). The image editing module is equipped with the functions for zooming (in or out) , merging, rotating and restoring images. The merge function constructs a new image based on the user selected or input image from the dialogbox. The rotation center of an image can be any point selected by user's clicking mouse button, and the rotation angle is supplied by user in the dialogbox. The image improvement module consists of some image point transformation and image enhancement functions. This software package is easier to use than existing tools for image processing. It has been used in the image processing projects and related educational purposes. The software provides a framework and can be easily extended to other potential applications.

This paper is the result of the adaptation and testing of the IMGRID Programming System acquired from Harvard University, for land use studies in the Department Landscape Architecture and Environmental Planning at Utah State University. The system utilizes rectangular coordinate grid cell data for storage and analysis, and is now in operation on the Burroughs B 6700 computer system. The operation of Utah State IMGRID is documented here to reflect the types of analyses which are currently performed in this region, and examples provided to demonstrate the system to graduate students and others who are interested in land use analysis. Information is also which will assist in preparing the system to accept the modeling criteria and information from different study sites for analysis. This paper is directed towards a user who has a limited knowledge of computer applications in land use studies.

Project (M.S.)--Brigham Young University. Dept. of Statistics, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-67).

<p>Vehicles have been around in our society for over a century, until recently they have been standalone systems. With increased amounts of initiatives to inter-network vehicles to avoid accidents and reduce environmental impact the view of a vehicle as a standalone system needs to be reconsidered. Networking and cooperation between vehicles requires that all systems and the information therein are trustworthy. Faulty or malicious vehicle systems are thus not limited to only affecting a single vehicle but also the entire network. The detection of anomalous behavior in a vehicle computer system is therefore of importance. To improve the vehicle systems we strive to achieve security awareness within the vehicle computer system. As a first step we will identify threats toward the vehicle computer system and what has been done to address them.</p><p>We perform a threat analysis consisting of fault trees and misuse cases to identify the threats. The fault trees provide away to connect the threats found with vehicle stakeholders' goals. The connection between stakeholder goals and threat highlights the need for threat mitigation.</p><p>Several research initiatives are discussed to find out what has been done to address the identified threats and to find the state of the research for security in vehicle computer system.</p><p>Lastly, an error model for the Controller Area Network (CAN) is proposed to model the consequences of threats applied to the CAN bus.</p>