Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-08-08T14:32:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Marina Vieira de Figueiredo.pdf: 2377233 bytes, checksum: f182fd72c61743bfa8c84d497dc3f29f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-08T14:32:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marina Vieira de Figueiredo.pdf: 2377233 bytes, checksum: f182fd72c61743bfa8c84d497dc3f29f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The legal standards must not be confused with the prescriptive texts. The first are built from such texts, which allow different interpretations and the creation of conflicting rules. Therefore, the conflict between standards is an embedded problem in the legal system. Among the conflicts which are relevant, those verified among standards derived from a single precedent of the Superior Courts stand out. Current legislation confers special attention to decisions issued by these bodies, imposing their applicability to similar cases. There is no point, however, in granting a binding effect to the precedents if there is no uniformity in their application. It is true, however, that the commonly chosen criteria for rule conflict resolution are not enough to solve this kind of contradiction, since the rules derived from the same precedent: (i) hold the same hierarchy; (ii) are equally general; and (iii) are contemporaneous. This, however, does not mean that there are no criteria liable to resolve such antinomies. Analyzing our legal system, we see that any act of implementing rules (judicial decision there included) always has the same configuration: the norm is created for means of specific concrete application, there is an assessment in order to identify if the facts are comprised by what the aforementioned legal standards set forth, and only then a legal relationship between certain individuals is constituted. Therefore, the construction of a rule based on a precedent will, necessarily, observe these aspects: applicable provision, facts taken into consideration upon decision issuance and how the dispute was settled. The latter, in its turn, will be the first step towards the resolution of conflicts upon its application. Once the ratio decidendi, i.e. the rule of the precedent, is determined then it is time to check whether the jurisdiction for which it provides (power to apply the precedent for similar cases) was legally exerted. If an illegality is identified – resulting from a controversial precedent interpretation – this allows for the application of the penalty provided in the standard of competence: invalidity declaration of the illegally created standard / a partir deste suporte físico, o qual admite interpretações divergentes e, portanto, a construção de normas conflitantes. O conflito entre normas é, portanto, é um problema inerente ao sistema jurídico. Dentre os conflitos que interessam ao direito, destacam-se aqueles verificados entre normas construídas a partir de um mesmo precedente dos Tribunais Superiores. O ordenamento jurídico, atualmente, dá especial relevo às decisões proferidas por estes órgãos, impondo a sua aplicação aos casos análogos. De nada adianta, contudo, conferir eficácia vinculante aos precedentes se não há uniformidade na sua aplicação. É certo, por outro lado, que os critérios comumente eleitos para a solução de conflitos entre normas não são suficientes para solucionar esta espécie de antinomia, já que as normas construídas a partir de um mesmo precedente: (i) ocupam a mesma hierarquia; (ii) são igualmente gerais; e (iii) são contemporâneas. Isso, no entanto, não quer dizer que não existam critérios para resolver tais antinomias. Analisando nosso ordenamento, verificamos que qualquer ato de aplicação de normas (aí incluídas as decisões judiciais) tem sempre a mesma configuração: constrói-se a norma a aplicar no caso concreto, verifica-se se há subsunção entre os fatos e aquilo que prescreve referida norma para, então, constituir uma relação jurídica entre certos indivíduos. Portanto, a construção da norma instituída por um precedente passará, necessariamente, por estes pontos: norma a aplicar, fatos considerados na decisão e modo como a lide foi solucionada. Este, por sua vez, será o primeiro passo para a resolução de conflitos na sua aplicação. Definido a ratio decidendi, ou seja, a norma do precedente, é então o momento de verificar se a competência nela prevista (competência para aplicar o precedente a casos análogos) foi licitamente exercida. Constatada a ilicitude – decorrente da interpretação controvertida do precedente – abre-se espaço para a aplicação da sanção prevista na norma de competência: nulidade da norma criada ilicitamente

La problématique des catastrophes aériennes en Afrique centrale peut être appréhendée sous une approche systémique qui questionne l'efficacité et l'efficience du droit applicable. En effet, régi par des principes et règles, le droit applicable au traitement juridique des catastrophes aériennes pose un questionnement profond de l'ensemble des règles de droit mises en place pour remédier à la grande insécurité aérienne dénoncée par les organisations internationales. C'est ainsi que dans la recherche des sources de droit applicable, il a pu être établi que l'ordonnancement des sources formelles présente une architecture complexe. Concrètement, le droit applicable au traitement juridique des catastrophes aériennes en Afrique centrale est marqué par un pluralisme juridique. La première conséquence est la compétence concurrente et/ou complémentaire de trois règles communautaires à régir les mêmes faits, alors qu'elles sont issues d'ordres juridiques bien distincts. De même, le droit international n'est pas en reste, sans toutefois mettre de côté le niveau divergent des pays d'Afrique centrale en ce qui concerne la ratification des conventions de droit international aérien. Ainsi, dans la mesure où l'ordre juridique interne est seul, il ne peut intervenir pour ordonner l'agencement du droit conventionnel. Par ailleurs, il est ressorti que les multiples sources formelles relevaient du droit commun. En effet, les sources matérielles du traitement juridique des catastrophes aériennes en Afrique centrale sont tantôt celles de l'enquête accident d'aviation civile, tantôt tout simplement celles de droit pénal et de droit civil général. Ce détachement des faits, caractéristique de catastrophes aériennes, est manifeste dans le droit matériel applicable qui ignore la singularité de la catastrophe aérienne d'être un accident collectif. Cette situation qui s'étend à la mise en œuvre du traitement juridique des catastrophes aériennes est marquée par un classique, tant de la titularité de l'action en justice que de celle de la compétence matérielle de la juridiction. Elle appelle à connaître de ce type de contentieux, qui sont pourtant des contentieux sui generis. Si ce régime confirme en tout point le caractère général et abstrait de la règle de droit, il convient de ne pas oublier que le droit est une solution juridique technique qui se doit d'apporter une réponse concrète et satisfaisante à un fait de société surtout lorsque celui-ci perdure. / The problem of air disasters in Central Africa can be apprehended under a systematic approach that questions the efficiency and effectiveness of the applicable law. Indeed, governed by principles and rules, the law applicable to the legal treatment of air disasters raises a profound questioning of all the legal rules put in place to remedy the great air insecurity denounced by international organizations. Thus, in the search for sources of applicable law, it has been established that the scheduling of formal sources presents a complex architecture. In practical terms, the law applicable to the legal treatment of air disasters in Central Africa is marked by legal pluralism. The first consequence is the competing and / or complementary competence of three Community rules to govern the same facts, even though they come from distinct legal orders. Similarly, international law is not left out, however, without setting aside the divergent level of Central African countries in the ratification of conventions of international air law. Thus, insofar as the domestic legal system is alone, it cannot intervene to order the arrangement of the conventional law. Moreover, it emerged that the multiple formal sources fell under common law. Indeed, the material sources of the legal treatment of air disasters in Central Africa are sometimes those of the civil aviation accident investigation, sometimes simply those of criminal law and general civil law. This detachment of facts, characteristic of air disasters, is manifest in the applicable substantive law which ignores the singularity of the air disaster to be a collective accident. This situation which extends to the implementation of the legal treatment of air disasters is marked by a classic, both the ownership of the action in court and the jurisdiction of the jurisdiction. It calls to deal with this type of litigation, which are sui generis litigation. If this diet at any point confirms the general and abstract rule of law character, it should be not to forget that the right is a technical legal solution that needs to provide a concrete and satisfactory to a fact of society especially when response it endures.