Thesis (PH.D.)--Michigan State University. American Studies, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Aug. 28, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 167-172). Also issued in print.

Borderline conscious creatures are neither definitely conscious nor definitely not conscious. In this thesis, I explain what borderline consciousness is and why it poses a significant epistemological challenge to scientists who investigate phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. When these scientists discover more than one overlapping kind in their samples of conscious creatures, how can they identify the kind to which all and only conscious creatures belong? After assessing three pessimistic responses, I argue that different groups of scientists can legitimately use the concept of phenomenal consciousness to refer to different kinds, in accord with their empirical interests. They can thereby resolve three related impasses on the status of borderline conscious creatures, the neural structure of phenomenal consciousness, and the possibility of artificial consciousness. The thesis has three parts: First, I analyse the concept of borderline consciousness. My analysis counters several arguments which conclude that borderline consciousness is inconceivable. Then I explain how borderline consciousness produces the multiple kinds problem in consciousness science. Second, I assess three recent philosophical responses to this problem. One response urges scientists to eliminate the concept of consciousness, while another judges them to be irremediably ignorant of the nature of consciousness. The final response concludes that scientific progress is limited by the concept's referential indeterminacy. I argue that these responses are too pessimistic, though they point to a more promising approach. Third, I propose that empirically constrained stipulation can solve the multiple kinds problem. Biologists face the same problem because of their longstanding controversy over what counts as a species. Building on new arguments for stipulating the reference of species concepts, I demonstrate that this use of stipulation in biology is neither epistemologically complacent nor metaphysically capricious; it also need not sow semantic confusion. Then I defend its use in consciousness science. My approach is shown to be consistent with our understanding of natural kinds, borderline cases, and phenomenal consciousness.

Si la conscience semble d’abord poser un ensemble de problèmes philosophiques, l’étude de la conscience est aussi un domaine florissant des neurosciences cognitives. Au lieu d’un travail de philosophie de l’esprit visant à déterminer a priori si la conscience est explicable scientifiquement, cette thèse offre une analyse détaillée des pratiques scientifiques impliquées dans l’étude de la conscience, et d’un ensemble de problèmes philosophiques surgissant de l’intérieur même de ce programme de recherche. Cette nouvelle approche, relevant de la philosophie des sciences, donne toute sa place à un problème identifié comme central dans la constitution des sciences de la conscience, celui de développer des procédures permettant de déterminer si les sujets ont des états mentaux conscients, ou non, c’est-à-dire, des procédures de détection de la conscience. Parce qu’elle présente une synthèse complète des procédures de détection de la conscience utilisées par les scientifiques, et des problèmes impliqués par l’utilisation de ces procédures, cette thèse s’adresse tout à la fois aux philosophes soucieux de comprendre la façon dont les scientifiques étudient la conscience, et aux scientifiques à la recherche des fondements épistémologiques de leur discipline. Les sceptiques, enfin, y trouveront un ensemble de réponses à leurs arguments, fondées pour la première fois sur une épistémologie cohérente des sciences de la conscience. / Although consciousness might appear as a primarily philosophical topic, the scientific study of consciousness has been an integral part of cognitive neuroscience for about thirty years. Instead of a work in philosophy of mind, debating whether or not consciousness can be explained scientifically, this dissertation provides a detailed examination of the scientific practices involved in the scientific study of consciousness, and of a wide variety of philosophical problems arising from within the science of consciousness itself. Through its original philosophy of science approach to the scientific study of consciousness, this dissertation focuses on one of the most central problems in the field: that of developing procedures for determining whether subjects have conscious or unconscious mental states, namely, procedures for detecting consciousness. As the first detailed epistemological analysis of the detection procedures used in consciousness science, and the problems they face, this dissertation is of interest for philosophers who want do understand how scientists study consciousness, aswell as for scientists who desire to reflect on the epistemological foundations of their field. Those who are skeptical about the prospects of the scientific study of consciousness will also find, for the first time, answers to their arguments based on a coherent epistemology of consciousness science.

”A finger pointing at the moon is not the moon...” -Buddhist Quote ”...but it can point you in the right direction.” -Charles Tart, American psychologist In this Master’s Thesis I will be presenting the idea of an Inner Gaze as an inherent witnessing system used in artistic practice. I will be mirroring my own practice as a Musician/Artist/Sound-Designer in the teachings of Hypnosis and The Science of Consciousness. Further I will share and analyze the collected data gathered from interviews with artists from different artistic fields, in order to gain a better understanding of how they experience their creative and performing minds. Is there any coherence in how we experience creativity? How common are the sensations of altered states of consciousness among artists? Can other artists relate to the idea of an inner gaze? Is this something we long to further explore and develop and would such a concept be beneficial for the artist and its works?

Submitted essay is an inquiry into J. G. Fichte's early philosophy focused particularly on Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre as a central work of his early period. Interpretation is based on assumption that its principal aim consists in manifestation of the way leading to emergence of our commonsense and ordinary understanding with reference to both world and ourselves. This approach carries Fichte's affilation with tendency inherent to transcendental philosophy of his era not only in its search for the origin of empirical knowledge, but for the origin of aprioristic structures of our experience especially. His transcendentally laden search manifests itself as so called "pragmatic history of the human mind", the principal object of our inquiry. Here we can find an attempt to reconstruct just transcendental, but not "real", temporally sequential, genesis of our mind from original state of feeling to our common representation both about independently existing things and ourselves as free cognizing subjects. Application of this philosophical method allows him to genetically derive and justify basic forms of our experience and its aprioristic components like space, time, substantiality or causality. The first part of essay introduces fundamental principles of Fichte's philosophical system and...