Thesis--Sofia, 1938. / At head of title: N. Stavrovsky ... Bibliography: p. 202.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Joseph E. Potter. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

In ethics, a highly relevant and divisive topic is that of consent. Many moral dilemmas and ethical forks in the road turn on the question of consent. But how do we differentiate between the consensual and the non-consensual? There is no simple answer to this question and philosophers are quite divided, as they tend to be. Some believe that consent is a mental state whereas others maintain that it is a behavioral expression of some kind. There are others still who argue that consent is some combination of mental states and communication. In this paper, I shall defend the view that consent is a mental state and that it does not depend on any type of behavior. My central thesis is that only this view accounts for the ethical importance of consent in a liberal moral framework where consent matters due to its connection to our intrinsic right to personal autonomy. Additionally, views that make consent dependent on behavior have counterintuitive, and sometimes morally unacceptable, consequences for what is and isn’t consensual. I argue that only the view that I defend can account for the moral significance that consent should have. / I etik är samtycke ett väldigt relevant och delande samtalsämne. Många moraliska dilemman och etiska vägkorsningar hänger på frågan om samtycke. Men hur skiljer vi mellan vad som är samtycke och vad som inte är det? Det finns inget enkelt svar på den frågan och filosofer är ganska oense, som de brukar vara. Vissa tror att samtycke är ett mentalt tillstånd medans andra hävdar att det är någonting vi uttrycker via vårt beteende på något sätt. Det finns andra som påstår att samtycke är någon slags kombination av mentala tillstånd och kommunikation. I den här uppsatsen ska jag försvara synsättet att samtycke är ett mentalt tillstånd och att det inte är beroende av något slags beteende. Min centrala tes är att enbart detta synsätt tar hänsyn till den etiska vikten som samtycke har i ett liberalt moraliskt ramverk där samtycke är viktigt på grund av dess koppling till vår intrinsikala rätt till personlig autonomi. Vidare har synsätt som gör samtycke beroende av beteende kontraintuitiva, och ibland moraliskt oacceptabla, konsekvenser för vad som samtycke är och inte är. Jag argumenterar att enbart synsättet som jag försvarar betraktar den moraliska betydelsen som samtycke bör ha.

No description available.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Malpractice litigation is on the increase and a lack of informed consent is more frequently becoming primary and secondary causes of action. A study was designed to compare and analyze the viewpoints of Indiana pediatric dentists and trial attorneys concerning the doctrine of informed consent. The ultimate goal was to share the information with both groups and raise the level of awareness of the doctrine among pediatric dentists. A three-page questionnaire dealing with the doctrine of informed consent was mailed to 85 pediatric dentists and 350 trial attorneys practicing in Indiana. The response rate for pediatric dentists was 70.6 percent and the response rate for trial attorneys was 61.4 percent. Overall, most pediatric dentists and trial attorneys were moderately familiar with the doctrine of informed consent. However, trial attorneys do not feel that pediatric dentists conform to the doctrine, while pediatric dentists perceive that they do conform. Pediatric dentists and trial attorneys recommend that informed consent be obtained orally and then documented on an informed consent form. Both professional groups agree that obtaining informed consent is necessary in the practice of pediatric dentistry. Unfortunately, pediatric dentists and trial attorneys do not f eel that predoctoral dental school education or specialty training prepares the pediatric dentist to obtain an informed consent. Not surprisingly, both groups feel that pediatric dentists are more concerned with obtaining informed consent today than they were in the past. Most pediatric dentists are obtaining informed consent in less than five minutes. However, pediatric dentists feel that the time spent obtaining informed consent has either remained the same (55.9 percent) or increased (44.1 percent); trial attorneys feel that this trend has increased (81.5 percent). Overall, pediatric dentists and trial attorneys disagree on whether parental consent is required for specific patient types. Moreover, the two groups agree on the type of consent necessary. For 20 dental procedures (54 percent) and disagree on 17 dental procedures (46 percent). Finally, most trial attorneys and pediatric dentists feel that conforming to the doctrine of informed consent reduces or eliminates future malpractice litigation.

No description available.

no / This article identifies the key ethical issues that need to be addressed in any research study involving children and young people, accessed through the NHS. It makes specific reference to the Declaration of Helsinki and to additional guidance developed for researchers from a variety of disciplines, both within healthcare and in other fields of study. The focus of the paper is on defining the key ethical issues, identifying the complexities in the legislative framework underpinning research involving this patient group and offering practical advice on when, and how, ethical approval needs to be sought.

I wish to determine when one is justified in paternalistic interferences that override a subject’s autonomy. In order to lay the groundwork for discussing paternalistic interferences with autonomous decisions, I first consider different conceptions of autonomy, welfare, and paternalism, and determine which I mean to use. In particular, I proceed with Dworkin’s characterization of autonomy as a combination of authenticity and self-determination; Nussbaum’s capabilities theory in order to determine welfare; and a definition of paternalism as being an interference with a subject’s liberty or autonomy that is motivated exclusively by consideration for that subject’s own good or welfare. Once I have working definitions for autonomy, welfare, and paternalism, I consider arguments justifying paternalistic interferences. Because I especially wish to determine when paternalistic interferences that conflict with a subject’s autonomous decision are justified, I begin with Scoccia’s arguments for using hypothetical consent — which is based on what would maximize the subject’s welfare — to justify paternalistic acts. Using Scoccia’s argument, I consider a few cases in which concerns for welfare may justify paternalistic acts overriding the subject’s autonomy. However, hypothetical consent does not go very far in justifying paternalistic acts. Therefore, I also consider arguments justifying paternalism in cases where the subject is not necessarily fully autonomous when making or acting upon a decision. For example, Carter argues that paternalistic acts are justified if autonomy has been waived through prior or subsequent consent. Additionally, I look at justifying paternalism when the subject’s autonomy is compromised through involuntariness or incompetence.

This thesis deals with the concept of the medical duty to inform focusing on the rights of the patient. It emerges that the notions governing medical responsibility do not adequately address the question of the protection and application of the rights of the patient. Existing conceptions of the notions of dereliction, causality and damage are analysed in order to point out the many inadequacies with the rights of the patient, source of the obligation to inform. Particular emphasis is given to the situation in Quebec and to the eventual place that could be occupied by conception of the duty to inform that is more sensitive to the situation and rights of the patient.

Thesis--Helsingfors. / Errata slip tipped in. Summary in German. Bibliography: p. [xii]-xxii.