published_or_final_version / Management Studies / Master / Master of Business Administration

Although recognized as an important stage of the merger and acquisition (M&A) process, little is understood about the processes that unfold during deal negotiations. In line with recent qualitative research highlighting the role of interorganizational trust, I examine the role of acquirer trust during M&A negotiations. Specifically, through two essays, I consider the effects of acquirer trust on two outcome variables: the acquisition premium and target executive retention. In Essay One, I integrate the social embeddedness theory and agency theory and find that acquirer trust leads to higher premiums. In Essay Two, I integrate the social embeddedness perspective with justice theory and find that the positive relationship between acquirer trust and target executive retention is mediated by justice. Boundary conditions are also considered in each essay. These two essay provide contributions to the nascent literature on M&A negotiations and the complex role of trust in M&A negotiations. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

by Chou Tak-Ki Dicky. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990. / Bibliography: leaves 55-57. / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF EXHIBITS --- p.v / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.vi / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.4 / Chapter III. --- A STATISTICAL REVIEW --- p.5 / Chapter IV. --- CASE STUDY 一 HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI HOTELS --- p.10 / Introduction --- p.10 / Background of the Target --- p.10 / The Raider --- p.11 / The Scenario of Takeover --- p.11 / Initiation --- p.11 / Fighting for Control --- p.12 / Climax - The Annual Shareholders Meeting --- p.13 / Trigger Point - 35% --- p.13 / Settle Down --- p.15 / A Review of the Issues --- p.17 / Why Did This Takeover Take Place --- p.17 / Strategy Used --- p.19 / Acting in Concert --- p.20 / Reasons of Failure --- p.21 / Who Are the Winners --- p.21 / The HK Hotels Afterwards --- p.22 / Chapter V. --- PROCEDURES OF TAKEOVERS --- p.24 / Chapter VI. --- "COST, RISK AND BENEFITS IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS" --- p.26 / Cost --- p.26 / Risk --- p.26 / Benefits --- p.27 / Chapter VII. --- ATTACK AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES --- p.28 / Private Company --- p.28 / Public Company --- p.28 / Takeover Strategies --- p.28 / Public Relations and Advertising --- p.28 / Move Fast --- p.29 / Anti-Takeover Strategies --- p.29 / Active Strategies --- p.29 / Keep Share Price High --- p.29 / Stock Watch --- p.30 / Multiple-Vote Common Stock --- p.30 / Employee Stock Ownership Plans --- p.31 / Golden Parachutes --- p.31 / Reactive Strategies --- p.31 / Anti-Trust Suit --- p.32 / Selling the Crown Jewels --- p.32 / Pac-Man --- p.32 / Greenmail --- p.33 / Chapter VIII. --- THE EFFECTS OF TAKEOVERS ON ECONOMY --- p.34 / Effects on Company and Management --- p.34 / Effects on Stock Prices and Stock Market --- p.36 / Effects on Economy --- p.37 / Effects on a Nation --- p.38 / Chapter IX. --- CONTROL OF TAKEOVERS --- p.40 / Why Control is Needed --- p.40 / Investors --- p.40 / General Public --- p.41 / Nations --- p.41 / Control of Takeovers in Hong Kong --- p.42 / The Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers --- p.42 / General Principles --- p.43 / Power of the Code --- p.45 / Main Problem with the Code --- p.47 / Possible Future Control --- p.48 / Chapter X. --- ROLE OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS & FUTURE TRENDS CONCERNING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS --- p.49 / Hong Kong Government --- p.49 / Management --- p.49 / Merchant Banks --- p.50 / Financial Consultants --- p.50 / Europe Economic Community --- p.51 / Junk Bond --- p.52 / APPENDIX --- p.53 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.55

Li Xi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 42-44). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review / Chapter 2.1. --- Literature on Mature Markets --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2. --- Evidence from China --- p.8 / Chapter 3. --- Theoretical Rationale for the Main Hypotheses / Chapter 3.1. --- Institutional Settings --- p.10 / Chapter 3.2. --- Theoretical Argument --- p.11 / Chapter 3.3. --- Hypotheses --- p.13 / Chapter 4. --- Data / Chapter 4.1. --- Data Description --- p.16 / Chapter 4.2. --- Summary Statistics / Chapter 4.2.1. --- Pre-acquisition Characteristics --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2.2. --- Post-acquisition Operating Performance Dynamics --- p.19 / Chapter 5. --- Methodology / Chapter 5.1. --- Control Group Matching --- p.20 / Chapter 5.2. --- Comparison Analysis / Chapter 5.2.1. --- The Sample Group and the Control Group --- p.22 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- The Subgroups --- p.22 / Chapter 5.3. --- Post-acquisition Activities / Chapter 5.3.1. --- Restructuring Activities --- p.23 / Chapter 5.3.2. --- Financing Activities --- p.24 / Chapter 5.4. --- Pooled Regression / Chapter 5.4.1. --- Whole Sample Analysis --- p.26 / Chapter 5.4.2. --- Subgroups Analysis --- p.28 / Chapter 6. --- Empirical Results / Chapter 6.1. --- Post-acquisition Operating Performance Comparison --- p.29 / Chapter 6.2. --- Post-acquisition Restructuring Activities --- p.30 / Chapter 6.3. --- Post-acquisition Financing Activities --- p.32 / Chapter 6.4. --- Effectiveness of Takeovers --- p.33 / Chapter 6.5. --- Hypothesis Testing on Financing --- p.35 / Chapter 7. --- Discussion and Extension --- p.37 / Chapter 8. --- Conclusion --- p.41 / Chapter 9. --- References --- p.42 / Chapter 10. --- Tables --- p.45 / Chapter 11. --- Figures --- p.65

Leung Yuk Sze. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-131). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / 摘要 --- p.ii / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / Chapter 1 Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 Literature --- p.12 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Financial Characteristics of Target Firms --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2 --- Agency Problems in Emerging Markets --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Ownership Characteristics of Target Firms --- p.17 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Hypotheses --- p.21 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Financial Characteristics of Likely Targets --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2 --- Ownership Structure Characteristics and Takeovers --- p.27 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Sample Construction --- p.33 / Chapter 4.1 --- Data Descriptions --- p.33 / Chapter 4.2 --- Variable Descriptions --- p.37 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Regression Results on Financial Characteristics --- p.41 / Chapter 5.1 --- Methodology and Econometric Model --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2 --- Summary Statistics of Financial Variables --- p.43 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Financial Characteristics of Firms Targeted by Foreign Firms --- p.47 / Chapter 5.4 --- The Financial Characteristics of Firms Targeted by Foreign Firms during the Crisis Year --- p.50 / Chapter 5.5 --- The Financial Characteristics of Firms Targeted by Other Domestic Firms --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Regression Results on Governance Characteristics --- p.55 / Chapter 6.1 --- Methodology and Econometric Model --- p.55 / Chapter 6.2 --- Summery Statistics of Ownership Variables --- p.57 / Chapter 6.3 --- The Ownership Structure Characteristics of Target Firms during the Crisis --- p.60 / Chapter 6.4 --- Interaction between Liquidity and Corporate Governance Variables during the Crisis --- p.65 / Chapter 6.5 --- The Effects of Ownership Structures on the Likelihood of Foreign Acquisitions during the pre-Crisis Period --- p.69 / Chapter 6.6 --- The Ownership Structure Characteristics of Domestic Firms Targeted by Other Domestic Firms during the Crisis --- p.70 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Discussion --- p.72 / Chapter 7.1 --- Additional Tests --- p.72 / Chapter 7.2 --- A Diagnostic Test --- p.74 / Chapter 7.3 --- Explanations and Limitations --- p.75 / Chapter Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.78

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Hamburg, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 585-679).

Univ., Diss.--Hamburg, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. 585 - 679.

No abstract available. / Thesis (MBA)-University of Natal, Durban, 2000.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Groningen, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 207-215) and index.

The recent upsurge in the number of take-over bids in British Columbia and in England has revealed several problems of control. These resulted in legislation in British Columbia and a system of voluntary self-control by the institutions involved in England. The object of this paper is to examine the adequacy of control in some important aspects of take-over bids. As a background to discussion, two bids which disturbed the financial and legal communities in England are described. Some of the problems which were illustrated during the course of these bids are isolated and examined. These include the directors' powers when reacting to a take-over offer, disclosure of information, equality of treatment for shareholders, the role of financial advisers, and the position of minority shareholders after the completion of a bid. It will be seen that two different methods of control operate in British Columbia and in England. In British Columbia, the Securities Act 1967 contains provisions relevant to take-overs, and is administered by the Securities Commission. In England the situation is more complex. Legislative provisions are contained in the Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules, but more significant control is exercised by the Take-over Panel who administer the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers, 1969, a voluntary system of self-control. In both jurisdictions the common law plays an important role. The strengths and weaknesses of the two systems and their effect on the problems under discussion are noted. The Securities Commission has wide investigatory and legal powers, but the rules are somewhat inflexible and as the Commission is understaffed it cannot give the attention necessary to problems which may arise. The Take-over Code contains excellent rules, which may be easily adjusted to take account of changes in commercial circumstances, but the Panel suffers from a lack of legal powers. It is discovered that shareholders in each jurisdiction have common problems of access to information and enforcement of the rules. In those areas in which the common law is the controlling influence, there is uncertainty as to the rights of shareholders and the extent to which they may be affected by a resolution of the company in general meeting. It is suggested that the problems which are revealed by an examination of recent bids can best be approached through a procedure which combines the best and eliminates the worst facets of the present systems in British Columbia and in England. It is therefore recommended that a Take-over Commission be established in each jurisdiction under the Securities Act and the Companies Act respectively, having supervisory, investigatory and legal powers. Flexibility is maintained by enabling a committee of experts to draw up and continually revise the rules pertaining to take-overs. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate