How much the writer of this thesis is blazed on the subject of religion can be determined accurately only in his own mind. However, there must be the recognition that a person's background, especially his religious training and church affiliation, has its influence no matter how objectively a religious question is approached in a study. Even though this thesis is concerned with the legal concepts within the oases of the Supreme Court of the United States, the question of religious bias probably has its place, large or small„ Let it suffice to state that the writer is of a Protestant faith, specifically the Presbyterian denomination. The degree that has biased the treatment of the study should be a consideration of the reader, keeping in mindthe reader's own bias.

This paper presents a study of the Twenty·-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. The Amendment was first proposed to Congress as Senate and House Joint Resolutions in February 1965. It became law in February 1967, when Nevada secured the distinction of being the 38th state to ratify it, thus fulfilling the required agreement by three·-fourths of the states. The Amendment has not yet been tested. It is the first comprehensive legislative attempt to solve three related problems that have plagued the executive branch of our government since the earliest days of the Union.

This dissertation examines the interaction between American social movements as they pursue their constitutional rights. The public law literature is dominated by a topdown approach to the study of constitutional politics, frequently focusing on the impact of Supreme Court decision-making. Instead, I explore constitutional politics from the bottom-up, analyzing constraints on social movement organizations as they formulate their constitutional strategies. Social movements must always be keenly aware of the actions of their peers who also seek to exploit the Constitution for their own benefit. My findings indicated that social movements recognize this competitive relationship with other social movements and treat their fellow constitutional claimants accordingly, acting to contest claims unfavorable to their cause, co-opt claims of other groups that have shown promise, and even form coalitions with their peers where an adjustment of their own claims to accommodate their coalition partners will likely net a greater return than going it alone. These negotiated constitutional claims have resulted in significant, durable and often ironic or unexpected shifts in constitutional development. / text