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The introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has affected many elements of the constitutional system in Canada. This dissertation explores the Charter's relationship with liberal constitutionalism and Canadian federalism, and considers whether judicial review on Charter grounds has seen a progression, or a regression, from parliamentary to constitutional to judicial supremacy. Further, this dissertation considers whether Charter review has reduced provincial autonomy by imposing national values in provincial areas of jurisdiction when Charter review nullifies provincial statutes. Through a complex process referred to as the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism, this study argues that a changed Charter jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Canada and a changed policy process within the administrative state at the federal level have reduced the negative implications of Charter review for liberal constitutionalism and Canadian federalism. To advance this argument, the concept of Charter activism is introduced to demonstrate that the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism is the product of the shifting equilibrium within two distinct elements that comprise Charter activism---judicial activism and bureaucratic activism. This study pursues three themes to demonstrate that the decline of judicial activism and the emergence of bureaucratic activism now converge at a point within Charter politics that facilitate the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism and ensure that Charter review advances constitutional and not judicial supremacy. The first theme investigates the Supreme Court of Canada as a policy actor during Charter review, and analyzes Charter decisions between 1982 and 1997. The second theme considers the impact of Charter review on Canadian federalism and whether the Charter has centralized Canadian federalism and reduced provincial autonomy. The final theme investigates bureaucratic activism and the changes within the policy process at the fe

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The aim of this thesis is to provide an analytic framework for the governance of suspended declarations of invalidity in Canadian constitutional law. A suspended declaration is a remedial device by which a court strikes down a constitutionally invalid law, but suspends the effect of its order such that the law retains force for a temporary period. While introduced to Canadian law under circumstances of exigency, suspended declarations have grown to be used liberally by the courts, and the principles that previously confined them have been abandoned. As a result, constitutional rights have sometimes been suspended without just basis. I propose a means to reverse this trend: by adopting proportionality, a core feature of the analytic method used to adjudicate limitations on Charter rights, as a remedial principle guiding the use of suspended declarations. I review the jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional Court to illustrate the merits of this approach.

The aim of this thesis is to provide an analytic framework for the governance of suspended declarations of invalidity in Canadian constitutional law. A suspended declaration is a remedial device by which a court strikes down a constitutionally invalid law, but suspends the effect of its order such that the law retains force for a temporary period. While introduced to Canadian law under circumstances of exigency, suspended declarations have grown to be used liberally by the courts, and the principles that previously confined them have been abandoned. As a result, constitutional rights have sometimes been suspended without just basis. I propose a means to reverse this trend: by adopting proportionality, a core feature of the analytic method used to adjudicate limitations on Charter rights, as a remedial principle guiding the use of suspended declarations. I review the jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional Court to illustrate the merits of this approach.

This thesis examines recent doctrinal developments regarding the aboriginal and treaty rights which are recognised and affirmed in s.35(l) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Specifically, it explores how the meaning of such rights is being constituted by diverse relations of power operating within specific 'cites' of struggle. Chapter I is a brief introduction to recent transformations in the legal discourse of the Supreme Court and an overview of the methodologies being employed in this thesis. In this regard, the author undertakes an interdisciplinary approach to discourse analysis. Chapter II draws upon the writings of Michel Foucault to make the argument for the analytical framework being utilised; namely, the study of 'law' within a 'sovereign- discipline- government' society. Chapter III examines the relationship between the productive power of the disciplines and the legal discourse constituting the content of aboriginal rights; the purpose being to explore to what extent law 'operates as a norm' within this area. Additionally, it provides a lead into the discussion of 'government' by outlining the rationality underpinning the test for the justified governmental infringement of aboriginal and treaty rights. Chapter IV, examines the relationship between the regulatory power of 'government' and the legal discourse around current treaty negotiations. Specifically, it explores the inter-dependency between rationalities of self-government and the governmental technologies associated with 'advanced' liberalism. In doing so, it focuses on an emerging treaty from British Columbia to assess the extent to which law is being used as 'a tactic of government'. Chapter V, examines the relationship between the deductive power of 'sovereignty' and the legal discourse constituting the content of Aboriginal title. It argues that recent developments require the Court to deal with the issue of legal pluralism. And to do so, in a way that lays a more successful foundation in law for the legitimate reconciling of the pre-existence of First Nations societies and the sovereignty of the Crown. Chapter VI provides some concluding comments about the insights gained from the proceeding analysis. In doing so, it offers a brief discussion of how the proceeding specific analysis may relate to some recent work in post-colonial studies.

Un autre essai sur la sempiternelle question de l'unite canadienne, deplorez-vous presentement. Pis encore, ajoutez-vous, on y aborde une fois de plus l'ennuyeuse et l'ennuyante problematique constitutionnelle. Et pourquoi l'auteur a-t-il choisi un tel sujet? Parce qu'il fait partie de la race des fatigants mais infatigables maniaques de cet incessant debat qu'est celui des Deux Solitudes? Possible. Surement meme. Mais il y a plus: le Renvoi relatif a la secession du Quebec ne represente pas qu'un simple episode de la saga constitutionnelle canadienne. Vraisemblablement, ces implications pratiques pourraient un jour sceller l'issue du debat. Certes, le mouvement separatiste quebecois, loin d'etre moribond, ne s'eteindra pas sur la seule base d'une decision de la Cour supreme du Canada. Pretendre le contraire releve de la fantaisie, de l'outrecuidance ou encore, d'un manque tangible de pragmatisme politique. Toutefois, un fait persiste: applique in extenso, l'Avis s'avere une serieuse embuche sur le chemin menant a l'independance. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

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This thesis explores the meaning and content of s. 41 of the Official Languages Act of Canada, which imposes certain duties on all federal institutions towards French- and English-language minority communities. While vitally important as a component of Canada's language rights archictecture, the nature and content of s. 41 as a legal norm remain woefully unclear. The immediate aim is to determine: (1) whether s. 41 confers a right to specific measures in particular cases; (2) whether such rights are individual or collective; and (3) if collective, what sort of interests are protected. Section 41 presents a number of interpretive challenges. First, it uses terminology which is undefined in the Act and yet has no self-evident meaning. Thus, the nature of the primary legal subject, 'linguistic minority communities' (LMCs), is unclear, as are the nature of the protected interests, 'vitality' and 'development'. Second, the interpretive principles developed by the case-law for official language rights rely on a conceptual framework that is vague and under-theorized. Key components of that framework, like the concept of a necessary link between language and culture, have yet to be fully explored, either in the case-law or in legal scholarship. This presents an acute problem in the case of s. 41, where the content of these concepts will likely prove dispositive. In order to grapple with these challenges, this thesis develops an account of language rights as collective rights. Drawing on the philosophical literature and existing case-law, I argue that LMCs should be conceived of as collectivities rather than mere aggregates of individuals, and that a number of language rights, such as s. 41 of the OLA, and ss. 16.1 and 23 of the Charter, aim to protect the collective interests of these collectivities. I then define some of these interests from both an empirical and a normative perspective. I conclude by arguing that s. 41 of the OLA protects an 'autonomy interest', which both prohibits federal institutions from interfering with existing LMC autonomy, and provides a basis for claiming enhancements to that autonomy, within the confines of the statutory mandate of the institution in question.