Thesis (Ph. D.)--Princeton University, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thèse--Genève. / At head of title: Droit public général. "Ouvrages cités": p. [155]-156.

Thesis (M.A. (Philosophy))--Rhodes University, 2005. / "A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the department of Philosophy" -T.p.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1996. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 308-317).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat, Münster (Westfalen), 2005/2006.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, December 2009. / Electronic version restricted until 18th December 2014.

Thesis (Ph.D) - University of Queensland, 2006. / Includes bibliography.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references.

Magister Legum - LLM / The political context that prompted the formation of district municipalities in the present form can be summarized as follows: before 1994, there were a few sporadic Regional Services Councils and Joint Services Boards responsible mainly for bulk service provision in rural areas. In many rural areas, the acute imbalances in personal wealth, physical infrastructure and the provision of services were most patent. Provinces decided which of the local government models best suited their province. Consequently, it was possible for the institutions of local government to differ from province to province and there would be a two-tier system of local councils and region-wide district councils throughout non-metropolitan South Africa. The aim of this study was two-fold. FIrst to analyze the key causes of conflict that arise within the two-tiered system. Second, to determine whether district intergovernmental forums will be able to address the key causes of conflict identifies and assist in making the relationship between district and local municipalities more co-operative. / South Africa

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the inhabitants of some parts of Europe and the North American colonies were confronted with proto-state institutional arrangements. In certain cases, they responded ambivalently. That ambivalence is at the heart of what I will call the 'limited government tradition'. The tradition's adherents thought that long historical experience, not to mention the events of their own times, provided ample evidence of the corrupting effects of power on those who wield it. Power-holders, left to their own devices, are likely to succumb to the temptations of power by exercising it arbitrarily. Where they are able to do so comprehensively and systematically, the upshot is tyranny. How, then, to ensure that state power is constituted in a manner that is inhospitable to tyranny? The tradition envisaged a range of measures, including a distinctive vision of 'the Rule of Law'. The Rule of Law would both define and enforce certain limits on state power. This study argues that the tradition's hostility to political absolutism is based on moral foundations which apply with equal force to economic power. The tradition ought to examine the modern constitution of economic power to determine whether it is hospitable to arbitrariness and tyranny. If such an examination is undertaken, we learn that modern economic power poses the kind of moral dangers that the tradition's Rule of Law project is designed to combat. However, the tradition assumes that it need not treat economic power as even a potential target of the Rule of Law. I will call that assumption the 'Consensus'. This study's first major aim is to explain the origins and stubbornness of the Consensus. Its second major aim is to persuade readers that the Consensus is mistaken: the tradition must regard economic power as, at least, a potential target of the Rule of Law.