In articulating the juridical relationship between the individual and the state, a theory of public law must confront a fundamental problem. The practice of public law involves appeals to ideas of both authority and justice, but these ideas appear to be antagonistic rather than complementary. On the one hand, persons must act in conformity with legal obligations enacted through the contingent exercise of public authority. On the other, persons must act in conformity with timeless ideals of public justice. The theoretical puzzle at the core of public law stems from the incompatibility of these convictions. Because enacted laws are often unjust and just laws are rarely enacted, persons often find themselves simultaneously pulled in one direction by the demands of public authority and pulled in another by the demands of public justice. To escape this tension, the leading theories invariably fragment their subject matter by reducing the whole of public law to one of its aspects, authority in abstraction from justice or justice in abstraction from authority. The purpose of this project is to articulate a unified theory of public law that integrates the distinctive claims of authority and justice into a common framework. My central claim is that once authority and justice are appropriately conceived and justified, they are neither antithetical virtues of opposing theoretical frameworks nor isolated notions. Instead, authority and justice are the mutually implicating principles of a legal system: the right of rulers to exercise public authority is always accompanied by a duty to govern justly; the right of the ruled to just governance presupposes the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. By setting out the character and interrelation of the fundamental components of a legal system, the unified theory illuminates the general practice of public law from the legal systems of the ancient world to the inner workings of modern constitutional states.

In articulating the juridical relationship between the individual and the state, a theory of public law must confront a fundamental problem. The practice of public law involves appeals to ideas of both authority and justice, but these ideas appear to be antagonistic rather than complementary. On the one hand, persons must act in conformity with legal obligations enacted through the contingent exercise of public authority. On the other, persons must act in conformity with timeless ideals of public justice. The theoretical puzzle at the core of public law stems from the incompatibility of these convictions. Because enacted laws are often unjust and just laws are rarely enacted, persons often find themselves simultaneously pulled in one direction by the demands of public authority and pulled in another by the demands of public justice. To escape this tension, the leading theories invariably fragment their subject matter by reducing the whole of public law to one of its aspects, authority in abstraction from justice or justice in abstraction from authority. The purpose of this project is to articulate a unified theory of public law that integrates the distinctive claims of authority and justice into a common framework. My central claim is that once authority and justice are appropriately conceived and justified, they are neither antithetical virtues of opposing theoretical frameworks nor isolated notions. Instead, authority and justice are the mutually implicating principles of a legal system: the right of rulers to exercise public authority is always accompanied by a duty to govern justly; the right of the ruled to just governance presupposes the presence of publicly authoritative institutions. By setting out the character and interrelation of the fundamental components of a legal system, the unified theory illuminates the general practice of public law from the legal systems of the ancient world to the inner workings of modern constitutional states.

This thesis explores how the standardization of language in China has been as a means to unify the empire and restructure relations between citizens and the state through processes of identification. Looking in at the case of China's minzu (ethnic groups), I argue that the current trend instituted through policies at the top-level is to eliminate linguistic and cultural diversities through the promotion of Putonghua as the lingua franca and to eventually amalgamate all minzu of the multi-minzu state into a mono-minzu, Zhonghua Minzu (citizens of the Chinese nation). Beginning with an overview of the historical practices of language standardization, I show how the ideological nature of politically influenced terminologies in the Chinese language has contributed to this restructuring of identity. With identity tied closely to language, recently enacted laws in mainland China have brought the government a step closer to achieving its ultimate goal of creating a mono-minzu state.

Constitutional change is relentless. Today, states jockey with regional associations, international organizations, transnational networks and sub-state authorities to define the scope of legitimate political conduct and establish rival bases for political affiliation. Constitutional theorists must be resolute but they should not be rigid. Especially in such uncertain conditions, theories are best understood not as plans to be implemented but as hypotheses to be tested. Charles Sabel and David Dyzenhaus write separately but share this pragmatic orientation, in which doubt is indispensable and truth is the end of public inquiry. They also share a distinctive belief that constitutionalism serves a moral end: it is the project of cultivating citizens who conceive their political community in terms of the commitments revealed by its practices. Their position, which is well suited for contemporary challenges, warrants elaboration and examination. British Columbia offers an ideal constitutional laboratory for that test. During the 1970s and 1980s, doubts mounted about the legitimacy of the constitutional settlement imposed by the Crown in the westernmost province of Canada. Legal, political and constitutional decisions raised the possibility that aboriginal rights and title survived colonization and Confederation. Since 1990, their existence has been confirmed in a cascade of constitutional experiments. Those initiatives can be distilled into four procedures: litigation, negotiation, consultation and collaboration. Although they have delivered practical benefits to some indigenous peoples, these procedures have not transformed provincial politics into a moral endeavour. The constraints on constitutionalism in British Columbia are both conceptual and institutional. Despite marginal improvements, those constraints endure and constitutionalism remains for now the sporadic pursuit of a small elite. To conceive constitutionalism as a project is to set a sound but exacting standard. Although British Columbia falls short, its failure is informative: the theory is useful.

This thesis aims to assess the role played by disagreement in the High Court???s constitutional law decisions. It does so firstly by considering the theoretical arguments in favour of allowing expression of dissent and those which urge judicial restraint and observance of precedential values. The tensions between change and conformity, and also the individual and institutional aspects of adjudication, intersect when the Court divides. The complex nature of disagreement on a multimember judicial body is further examined in the context of devising an empirical methodology for the quantification of dissent on the High Court. The thesis selects a period of a little over twenty years for detailed examination. Within that timeframe, it measures the prevalence and nature of disagreement amongst the Justices of the Court, with particular emphasis upon constitutional cases. From these results, various streams of opinion are examined for subsequent significance. In particular, the thesis contrasts the practice of persistent dissent from the Court???s approach to an issue, with those occasions when a minority Justice yields to the demands of stare decisis. The impact of dissent upon the development of the Court???s constitutional interpretation is evaluated. Although the study finds that direct reversals in the law in favour of an earlier dissent occur very rarely, it argues that dissents may still exercise a powerful influence on the Court???s pronouncements. The contribution which minority opinions make to judicial deliberation is to inevitably alter the context of the Court???s decision. Consideration of two specific case studies illustrates that this may result in the law taking a more moderate path or may actually lead to greater efforts by a majority to strengthen the cogency of its approach. In either scenario, dissent plays a far more subtle role than suggested by the myth of a ???Great Dissenter??? and the dramatic redemption of his or her lone opinions. To only assess the value of dissenting judgments against that standard is to fail to appreciate the true nature of their influence in many cases and their importance to the work of the High Court.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2007--Marburg.

Zugl.: Bielefeld, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.

Thesis (LL.M.)--University of Toronto, 2004. / Adviser: Bernard Dickens.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2004. / Adviser: Jennifer Nedelsky.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Adelaide, Law School, 1988. / Table of cases: leaves [771]-783. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [784]-795).