The organisation of drug development has radically changed in the last 40 years due to changes in the scientific knowledge base and the availability of new forms of finance. Stimulated by breakthroughs in biotechnology, new investment has facilitated changes to the strategies and structure of the industry. Furthermore, scientific advances have provided greater understanding of disease, drug targets and disease-drug interactions, particularly in oncology. Yet new ways of organising innovation bring new challenges. This thesis provides evidence to inform new policies and business models by assessing the non-technical conditions associated with the success and failure of drug development projects. The thesis presents an integrative theoretical framework that supports a multi-dimensional analysis of the network, organisation and individuals involved in drug projects. This approach is applied to case studies of 11 development projects for rare cancer drugs involving UK organisations. These cases are then compared and contrasted through a descriptive multi-case analysis and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The findings contribute towards an understanding of the environmental conditions for the successful development of drugs. Firstly, the concept of project drag is introduced, to draw attention to the accumulation of issues during development that can cause projects lose momentum and lead to termination. The organisational environment around firms is found to be key; common disruptions are identified, particularly within small firms which are more vulnerable to industrial dynamics than larger organisations. This thesis also highlights mechanisms that can mediate adverse conditions; key individuals, their networks, power and consistent enthusiasm for projects can mediate project drag. The thesis also makes a methodological contribution in the formation and operationalisation of an integrative framework for project evaluation which provides a foundation for further research in this area. The thesis is concluded with policy recommendations of pathways that contribute towards the successful development of drug projects.

The first chapter studies the strategic timing of irreversible investments when returns depend on an uncertain state of the world. Agents learn about the state through privately observed signals, as well as from each other's actions and experience. In this environment there is the possibility of learning feedback in which an agent's present action affects how much she can learn from the other agent's experience in the future. I characterize symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria, and show that private information mitigates free-riding and increases efficiency if the prior belief about the state is not too low, but that it may lead to inefficient over-investment otherwise. The second chapter examines the effect of trade opportunities on a seller's incentive to acquire information through experimentation. I characterize the unique equilibrium outcome, and discuss the effects of variations in the information structure on the probability of trade. The main result is that more accurate information for the buyer can reduce social welfare. Efficiency requires that the buyer offers a price that the seller always accepts and that the seller experiments when it is socially optimal to do so. When the buyer receives an informative signal about positive experimentation outcomes, the absence of such a signal can induce the buyer to purchase the good with low but known quality at a low price. If the buyer receives an informative signal about negative experimentation outcomes, the seller might not experiment so as to avoid the risk of generating an outcome that could trigger the buyer to reduce her offer. The third chapter analyzes the contracting problem of a principal who delegates research to two independently experimenting agents. The features of the optimal contract depend on the principal's preferences over the agents' successes. If successes are substitutes, the first agent to produce a success receives the greatest reward. The competition for the first success benefits the principal because it reduces the agents' incentive to delay their effort. In contrast, when successes are complements, the reward for the second success is greater which results in a second mover advantage that encourages agents to delay effort.

The first chapter studies the strategic timing of irreversible investments when returns depend on an uncertain state of the world. Agents learn about the state through privately observed signals, as well as from each other's actions and experience. In this environment there is the possibility of learning feedback in which an agent's present action affects how much she can learn from the other agent's experience in the future. I characterize symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria, and show that private information mitigates free-riding and increases efficiency if the prior belief about the state is not too low, but that it may lead to inefficient over-investment otherwise. The second chapter examines the effect of trade opportunities on a seller's incentive to acquire information through experimentation. I characterize the unique equilibrium outcome, and discuss the effects of variations in the information structure on the probability of trade. The main result is that more accurate information for the buyer can reduce social welfare. Efficiency requires that the buyer offers a price that the seller always accepts and that the seller experiments when it is socially optimal to do so. When the buyer receives an informative signal about positive experimentation outcomes, the absence of such a signal can induce the buyer to purchase the good with low but known quality at a low price. If the buyer receives an informative signal about negative experimentation outcomes, the seller might not experiment so as to avoid the risk of generating an outcome that could trigger the buyer to reduce her offer. The third chapter analyzes the contracting problem of a principal who delegates research to two independently experimenting agents. The features of the optimal contract depend on the principal's preferences over the agents' successes. If successes are substitutes, the first agent to produce a success receives the greatest reward. The competition for the first success benefits the principal because it reduces the agents' incentive to delay their effort. In contrast, when successes are complements, the reward for the second success is greater which results in a second mover advantage that encourages agents to delay effort.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Uppsala : Sveriges lantbruksuniv., 2009. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

Thesis (M.A.). / Written for the Dept. of Philosophy. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2007/01/14). Includes bibliographical references.

No / Presents the results of a joint National Science Foundation and European Commission Workshop, set up to identify directions for the future of human-centered computing, online communities and virtual environments. Discusses ways to meet the ultimate goal of facilitating human-computer interaction centered around human needs and capabilities.

published_or_final_version / Community Medicine / Master / Master of Public Health

No description available.

The intention of this thesis is to explore whether New Zealand trends in online dating parallel those identified by overseas studies, or whether patterns are emerging that are unique to New Zealand society. The Internet Windows Messenger instant messenger service (MSN) was used to interview 32 subjects about their experiences with online dating, covering areas such as motivation for using online dating; types of relationships sought; barriers to online dating; online rapport and offline chemistry; online infidelity; and managing 'difference'. Drawing on these responses, this thesis presents findings pertaining to a diverse group of New Zealanders' attitudes towards and uses of online dating. Some of the key findings show that online rapport does not guarantee offline chemistry; that there are gender differences in attitudes towards appearance, age, and receiving sexually explicit material online; and that sexual experimentation and infidelity are being facilitated through online dating. The issue of 'difference' as it relates to online dating has been largely neglected by overseas researchers, and for this reason was extensively included in this research. Key findings relating to 'difference' show that there is a clear split between those interviewees whose 'difference' impacted positively on their online dating experience (those with sexual 'difference' falling into this category), and those whose 'difference' impacted negatively (those with physical or mental 'difference'). In addition, those interviewees with a sexual 'difference' have been able to connect with other like-minded people through online dating, contributing to the 'normalization' of previously considered deviant behaviours. Based on the research presented in this thesis, it appears that New Zealand online dating activities are consistent with overseas trends, although there are indications that some behaviour may be more specific to New Zealand society, such as gender differences in relation to bisexuality, and covert same-sex encounters involving men who are either married or who state in their profiles that they are 'straight' or heterosexual.

Thesis (M. P. H.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Also available in print.