The first chapter studies the strategic timing of irreversible investments when returns depend on an uncertain state of the world. Agents learn about the state through privately observed signals, as well as from each other's actions and experience. In this environment there is the possibility of learning feedback in which an agent's present action affects how much she can learn from the other agent's experience in the future. I characterize symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria, and show that private information mitigates free-riding and increases efficiency if the prior belief about the state is not too low, but that it may lead to inefficient over-investment otherwise. The second chapter examines the effect of trade opportunities on a seller's incentive to acquire information through experimentation. I characterize the unique equilibrium outcome, and discuss the effects of variations in the information structure on the probability of trade. The main result is that more accurate information for the buyer can reduce social welfare. Efficiency requires that the buyer offers a price that the seller always accepts and that the seller experiments when it is socially optimal to do so. When the buyer receives an informative signal about positive experimentation outcomes, the absence of such a signal can induce the buyer to purchase the good with low but known quality at a low price. If the buyer receives an informative signal about negative experimentation outcomes, the seller might not experiment so as to avoid the risk of generating an outcome that could trigger the buyer to reduce her offer. The third chapter analyzes the contracting problem of a principal who delegates research to two independently experimenting agents. The features of the optimal contract depend on the principal's preferences over the agents' successes. If successes are substitutes, the first agent to produce a success receives the greatest reward. The competition for the first success benefits the principal because it reduces the agents' incentive to delay their effort. In contrast, when successes are complements, the reward for the second success is greater which results in a second mover advantage that encourages agents to delay effort.

The first chapter studies the strategic timing of irreversible investments when returns depend on an uncertain state of the world. Agents learn about the state through privately observed signals, as well as from each other's actions and experience. In this environment there is the possibility of learning feedback in which an agent's present action affects how much she can learn from the other agent's experience in the future. I characterize symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria, and show that private information mitigates free-riding and increases efficiency if the prior belief about the state is not too low, but that it may lead to inefficient over-investment otherwise. The second chapter examines the effect of trade opportunities on a seller's incentive to acquire information through experimentation. I characterize the unique equilibrium outcome, and discuss the effects of variations in the information structure on the probability of trade. The main result is that more accurate information for the buyer can reduce social welfare. Efficiency requires that the buyer offers a price that the seller always accepts and that the seller experiments when it is socially optimal to do so. When the buyer receives an informative signal about positive experimentation outcomes, the absence of such a signal can induce the buyer to purchase the good with low but known quality at a low price. If the buyer receives an informative signal about negative experimentation outcomes, the seller might not experiment so as to avoid the risk of generating an outcome that could trigger the buyer to reduce her offer. The third chapter analyzes the contracting problem of a principal who delegates research to two independently experimenting agents. The features of the optimal contract depend on the principal's preferences over the agents' successes. If successes are substitutes, the first agent to produce a success receives the greatest reward. The competition for the first success benefits the principal because it reduces the agents' incentive to delay their effort. In contrast, when successes are complements, the reward for the second success is greater which results in a second mover advantage that encourages agents to delay effort.

Face un environnement complexe et hyper-compétitif, les firmes sont amenées à reconsidérer leur modèle de création de valeur. Leur réaction s’insère dans le cadre d’une réinvention voire innovation de leur Business Model (BM). Ceci passe indéniablement par une démarche d’expérimentation stratégique. Définie comme un processus par lequel les firmes explorent de nouvelles sources de revenus et testent de nouveaux concepts d’affaires, l’expérimentation stratégique s’associe à un outil de réinvention du BM qui intervient non seulement dans la création de nouveaux BM mais également dans la transformation de BM existants. Nous posons ainsi la question de savoir : Comment concevoir l’expérimentation stratégique des BM des entreprises ? Dans cette perspective, notre recherche vise à dresser un cadre conceptuel et méthodologique de l’expérimentation stratégique. Il s’agit de proposer aux entreprises une aide à la conception d’une méthodologie d’expérimentation de BM. Pour répondre à cette problématique, nous proposons de définir l’expérimentation stratégique comme une théorie combinée du changement en partant du modèle de Van de Ven et Poole (1995) sur les théories de changement et de développement organisationnel. Ceci permet de traduire les processus centraux de l’expérimentation stratégique et d’en saisir les dimensions clés. Dans le cadre d’une approche qualitative avec étude de cas, nous interrogeons trois profils d’acteurs sur leurs registres de conception et de pratique de l’expérimentation. Ensuite, nous élaborons via une analyse inter-profils un modèle générique d’expérimentation stratégique de BM qui s’articule autour de trois temps de l’expérimentation stratégique ; un temps de virtualisation, un temps d’actualisation et un temps d’itérations de processus de rationalisation et d’apprentissage. / In a hypercompetitive environment, firms are obliged to reconsider their revenue formula and to innovate consequently the way they create value and make profit. This lies at the heart of every company’s ability to experiment new Business Models (BM) and becomes a key step in the strategic thinking. Defined as a process by which firms explore new ways of doing business, strategic experimentation takes shape of series of trial and error changes pursued along various dimensions of strategy in an effort to identify and establish a viable basis for competing. Our research examines strategic experimentation as an effective tool for BM reinvention. It answers therefore to the main question of: How to conceive BM experimentation? In this way, we define strategic experimentation as a combined theory of change according to the model developed by Van de Ven and Poole (1995) to explain processes of organizational development and change. We aim at dressing a conceptual and methodological framework for strategic experimentation that would helps managers and academics to conceive and master the process of BM experimentation. Using a qualitative research methodology rooted in a case study approach, we achieved semi-structured interviews with three categories of actors implied in the process of BM experimentation. Our results demonstrate that BM experimentation is organized through four major processes which are exploration, formulation, resources allocation and identification which are articulated by a time of virtualization, a time of actualization, and a time of iterations based on learning and rationalization.