Since 25 January 1994, when the interim Constitution came into operation, South Africa's criminal justice system became subject to constitutional provisions, especially the Bill of Rights. All forms of punishment and treatment are subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The first casualties were the death penalty and corporal punishment, which were found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Since our criminal justice jurisprudence is still in the developing stage, a comparative analysis with the Canadian and American penal systems forms part of this thesis. Provisions of the Constitution, which will have an indirect influence on punishment include, access to information, just administrative action and state institutions supporting democracy. The following provisions of the Bill of Rights are expected to have a significant impact on punishment in all its facets, equality; human dignity; life; freedom and security of the person; freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour; and the rights of children. Judgments of the Constitutional Court, which abolished the death penalty and corporal punishment are examined since they were the first indication the Court gave on aspects of punishment. The Constitution also deals specifically with the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons. It is within this provision that 2 the rights of prisoners are spelt out. Imprisonment as a form of punishment, has to conform to the provisions of the Constitution, and the Correctional Services Act is an attempt to render imprisonment compliant. With the abolition of the death penalty and corporal punishment, the effect of constitutional provisions on conventional forms of punishment and the overpopulation of prisons, the establishment of alternative forms of punishment, which would pass constitutional muster, is imperative. The Child Justice Bill is an attempt to establish a unique system for juveniles who commit offences / Penology / D. Lit. et Phil. (Penology)

Thesis (D. Lit. et Phil.)--University of South Africa, 2001.

published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Law / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Doctor of Legal Studies

Constitutional change is relentless. Today, states jockey with regional associations, international organizations, transnational networks and sub-state authorities to define the scope of legitimate political conduct and establish rival bases for political affiliation. Constitutional theorists must be resolute but they should not be rigid. Especially in such uncertain conditions, theories are best understood not as plans to be implemented but as hypotheses to be tested. Charles Sabel and David Dyzenhaus write separately but share this pragmatic orientation, in which doubt is indispensable and truth is the end of public inquiry. They also share a distinctive belief that constitutionalism serves a moral end: it is the project of cultivating citizens who conceive their political community in terms of the commitments revealed by its practices. Their position, which is well suited for contemporary challenges, warrants elaboration and examination. British Columbia offers an ideal constitutional laboratory for that test. During the 1970s and 1980s, doubts mounted about the legitimacy of the constitutional settlement imposed by the Crown in the westernmost province of Canada. Legal, political and constitutional decisions raised the possibility that aboriginal rights and title survived colonization and Confederation. Since 1990, their existence has been confirmed in a cascade of constitutional experiments. Those initiatives can be distilled into four procedures: litigation, negotiation, consultation and collaboration. Although they have delivered practical benefits to some indigenous peoples, these procedures have not transformed provincial politics into a moral endeavour. The constraints on constitutionalism in British Columbia are both conceptual and institutional. Despite marginal improvements, those constraints endure and constitutionalism remains for now the sporadic pursuit of a small elite. To conceive constitutionalism as a project is to set a sound but exacting standard. Although British Columbia falls short, its failure is informative: the theory is useful.

L'été 2006 fut marqué par la consécration jurisprudentielle de la notion d'identité constitutionnelle de la France par le Conseil constitutionnel. Cette dernière constitue une réserve de constitutionnalité destinée, au même titre que les conditions essentielles d'exercice de la souveraineté nationale, à réguler l'intégration du droit de l'Union européenne en droit interne. Or, son aspect largement défensif doit être relativisé. En effet, la possibilité affirmée de pouvoir opposer au droit européen une règle ou un principe inhérent à l'identité constitutionnelle française ne saurait résumer à elle seule la finalité de la réserve. Celle-ci apparaît comme étant une notion fonctionnelle adaptée à la régulation des rapports de systèmes juridiques faisant de l'identité une norme nouvelle permettant tant la conciliation des ordres juridiques en présence, que la préservation des singularités fondamentales de la Constitution française. / The summer of 2006 was marked by the judicial adoption of the concept of constitutional identity of France by the Constitutional Council. The latter is a reserve for constitutionality, as well as the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty, regulate the integration of EU law into national law. But its largely defensive aspect must be relativized. Indeed, the possibility of power asserted against European law rule or principle inherent to the French constitutional identity can not summarize alone the purpose of the reserve. It appears as a functional concept adapted to the regulation of relations legal systems that identity as a new standard for reconciling legal orders concerned the preservation of fundamental singularities of the French Constitution.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of I aw University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Johannesburg 1978 / lae evolution of the treaty-making power in the Republic has been heavily influenced by the fact that South Africa, as one of the 'older’ British Dominions, acquired independent through a slow but orderly constitutional process. In ■i c first two chapters of this thesis I have ^ therefore attempted to sketch briefly the force at work in South Africa ’“'J n 'tt{ earliest f orm.iti ve years. This ha.-: stalled m examination of c ‘ 1 ; onstitutit i.i 1 ;aw I ssue:. ( nc lud i n fh pr- rogatlve powers of the Crown in relation to treat!c >• and declarai i i.s of war) as well as U problems of internal! nai law. My resear it in th s field led re. to won don and 1111 wva. : of mcttr - il lodged in the various Comr'onweal th mm libraries. In the i i.ir.i and fourth chapters I have concentrated on more immediate matters, namely, th. ■gotiation and conclusion, ratification and implementation of treaties in present-day South Af.lea. The dearth of published in! ormation on th * topic ha necessitated the construction of an overall """* pi.ture by in- in!-tv avii o information obtained fret, the Department ° • ^ Affairs with the views of the International Law Commission as tJ xpr< ssed in the 1969 Vienna C nventiort on the Law of Treaties. It should ^ be i t d that. , ilthough South Africa has not yet ratified the Convention, it recognizes its international validity and attempts, whenever possible, to give effect to its provisions. Chapter five covers th constitutional limitations on the treatyweei making power as well as the inter-relaiionship f international law with "1 municipal law. In both these relat. i ar- as South African practice has be cm moulded n British lines. A a result I have been led to compare — I the law (: -th precedent and principle) in South Xi rica v. . th that of Britain. «J I have attempted to show, too, that the Blacks tone doctrine that 1internation ! law 1 part of the 1 iw o! the land' is not applicable to treaties. ^ A number of States have acquired indepvnd nee in recent years or are in the proce s of doing .o af the present time. With this in mind, an r*t international i • t- rence was convened in Vienna in April, 1977, to discuss succession of State to treaties, and a dtaft convention was formulated. I have included a chapter on the South African approach to succession of *** States to treaties not only because the problem is topical but also fl because it affects the Republic personally'. South Af ri an courts have M been approached on several occasions to decide whether treaties have

De importância central para o debate sobre a efetivação de princípios constitucionais, a distinção entre princípios e regras desenvolvida por Robert Alexy tem sido objeto de considerações opostas quanto à sua adequação e suas implicações práticas: por um lado é defendida como uma forma de garantir judicialmente a máxima realização das normas constitucionais, por outro, é criticada por levar ao acúmulo de poder nos órgãos judiciais e por comprometer a segurança jurídica. Essa polarização está diretamente relacionada à compreensão sobre o modo de solução do conflito entre um princípio e uma regra. Concebidos, quase que paradoxalmente, como normas que ordenam que algo seja realizado na maior medida possível dentro possibilidades fáticas e jurídicas existentes caso dos princípios e normas que contêm determinações no âmbito daquilo que é fática e juridicamente possível caso das regras , essas duas espécies normativas podem prescrever consequências jurídicas opostas a uma mesma situação, dando ensejo a um conflito cuja relevância não se limita ao âmbito metodológico, mas também tem implicações práticas diretas. Dependendo dos ônus argumentativos que forem impostos pelo método de solução deste conflito normativo, tem-se um cenário mais favorável à prevalência das regras ou, de modo oposto, à sua superação para a efetivação dos princípios colidentes, o que é extremamente relevante, uma vez que a positivação das regras tende a estabilizar as expectativas dos seus destinatários, fomentando a segurança jurídica, e a preservar a competência decisória de agentes estatais que, muitas vezes, são mais representativos ou tecnicamente mais capacitados para decidir sobre a melhor forma de concretizar os princípios constitucionais do que os órgãos judiciais. Para que essas funções possam ser cumpridas, o conflito entre um princípio e uma regra não pode ser resolvido por meio de um sopesamento entre princípios materiais, nem compreendido como uma relação de restrição à realização do princípio pela regra, que, diante de inevitáveis resultados indesejados, acaba sendo relativizada em situações indefinidas ou descritas por critérios excessivamente vagos. É necessário que as regras sejam mais resistentes à superação e vinculem o aplicador do direito em maior medida do que os princípios, o que pode ser observado em dois métodos de solução para o conflito entre um princípio e uma regra defendidos pelos adeptos da teoria dos princípios: o exame de proporcionalidade e o sopesamento envolvendo princípios materiais e formais. Orientados por parâmetros argumentativos distintos, que podem ser claros e bem definidos, no caso do exame de proporcionalidade, ou abstratos e complexos, no caso do sopesamento envolvendo princípios formais e materiais embora nesse caso tendam a ser mais adequados, pois que permitem a consideração de outros aspectos além do grau de realização dos princípios materiais , esses métodos levam a soluções mais equilibradas para o conflito entre um princípio e uma regra, atenuando a influência da teoria dos princípios tanto para a proteção de direitos por meio da adjudicação, como também para a concentração de competência decisória nos órgãos judiciais e para o casuísmo na aplicação do direito. / Central in the debate on constitutional principles, the distinction of legal norms into principles and rules developed by Robert Alexy has been either defended by most of its adepts as necessary means to ensure the realization of constitutional rights through adjudication or criticized for concentrating power in the judiciary branch and reducing legal stability and reliance. This polarization is directly related to the comprehension of the resolution of the conflict between principles and rules. Described almost paradoxically as norms requiring something to be realized to the greatest extent possible, given the factual and legal possibilities at hand case of the principles and norms that entail definitions in the realm of what is factual and legally possible case of the rules , norms of these two kinds can prescribe different consequences to the same situation, which leads to a normative conflict with not only methodological but also practical implications. Depending on the argumentative burdens imposed by the method applied to solve this normative conflict, the scenario can be more prone to rule-based decisions, or, adversely, to overruling and principle-based decision-making, which is extremely relevant given that rules tend to stabilize expectations, thus promoting legal stability, and to protect the decision-making competence of state branches that are often more representative and instrumentally more capable of taking better decisions on the realization of constitutional principles than the judiciary bodies. For these functions to be fulfilled, the conflict between a principle and a rule cannot be solved neither by means of a balance between material principles nor by assuming that the principles realization is always constrained by the rule, since this constraint, often resulting in unwanted effects, ends being overridden in situations either described in extremely vague terms or not at all. Rules impose stronger constraints in decision-making and must bind the decision-maker to a higher extent than principles, as presented in the two methods admitted by the principles theory to decide on the prevalence of a rule or an opposing principle: the proportionality test and the balancing between formal and substantive principles. Guided by distinct argumentative standards, which can be clear and well defined in the proportionality test or abstract and complex when balancing involves formal and substantive principles in this case the standards might be more suitable to decision-making by permitting the consideration of other elements in addition to the extent of the realization of substantive principles , these methods tend to lead to more balanced solutions to the conflict between a principle and a rule, thus lessening the influence of the principles theory on the realization of constitutional rights through adjudication, as well as on the concentration of power in the judiciary bodies and on the decrease of legal stability and reliance

Constitutional system of the United Kingdom is seldom a theme of interest in domestic academic debates for it is usually considered as a part of Anglo-American juridical culture. According to the author of this master thesis, it is a pity, because the study and interpretation of the British constitutional system can enrich in some respects the current domestic doctrine. Master thesis has the ambition to describe British historical constitutional development, and particularly the current state of the British constitutional law and to emphasise its co-existence with the European law. The approach of the thesis is chronological. Thus, in introductory chapters there are indicated the juridical preconditions of Brexit from both the common law perspective and also the continental law perspective and there is also considered the actual constitutional case report. The last part analyses possible future juridical development. The thesis is focused on the description and the analysis of the withdrawal process of the United Kingdom from the European Union and it considers a variety of aspects of domestic law, international law and law of the European Union. Author makes an attempt to formulate a juridical predication which is based upon foreign literature and domestic and European juridical cases. Specifically, he...